Does "ought" imply "can" - Free Will

[ughaibu]

If it depends then it is not implied. Please read again the earlier posts, you are not discussing anything related to the topic.

[infamous]

The word "ought" carries with it the meaning of responsibility as in "should". The word "can" only represents a personal ability. Because the concept of free will has to do with choice, one could say that "I can choose'", whether I should has more to do with the responsibility to make a moral choice than it does with the ability to choose. IMHO, the word "can" is associated with free will but the word "ought or should" has only the relationship to responsibility but not to free will........................Infy

[CraigD]

I'm not trying to be rude here, but I've noticed a slight trend on these forums. No one likes dictionaries.

I like dictionaries, as do many hypographers I know. There is even a special [dictionary] markup for use in posts to easily link words to a dictionary site, “wordseek”.

Let's define ought.

…

Again, not trying to be rude, but some people here need to look up certain words and how they are used in the english language.

I think the word needing clarification is not “ought”, but “implies”.

 

In the context of this thread, the term “implies” refers to the logical operator “→”, which has a very specific meaning.

So the statement S: “A ought to B” → “A can B” is true if and only if, for every possible true “A ought to B” (eg: “Alice ought to stand up”), the corresponding “A can B” (“Alice can stand up”) is true. S is false if there exists a true “A ought to B” for which the corresponding “A can B” is false (eg: “Alice ought to stand up” is true, but “Alice can stand up” is false – perhaps because Alice has no legs?). Note that S is also true if there exists a false “A ought to B” (eg: “Alice ought to kill the cute kitten”) for which the corresponding “A ca B” (“Alice can kill the cute kitten”).

 

Though formal logic is useful in clarifying the meaning of natural language, natural language is informal, with words frequently used to mean the exact opposite of their ordinary meaning or even more confusing variations (eg: a woman telling a man “you really ought to experience giving birth”, or the several other examples in post #2 post #13 and others). However, IMHO, in the most commons usage of the words “ought” and “can”, “A ought to B” → “A can B”.

[owl]

I'm not sure what's causing all the confusion in the above several messages (ughaibu vs. phoenix). This shouldn't be a complicated or controversial issue. I'm simply saying a person is not obligated to do the impossible. At least three illustrations have now been given:

 

1) A student is unable to come to class because he's buried under snow, has two broken legs, etc. After hearing that, his professor would be crazy to say, "Well, you should have come anyway."

2) A parent is obligated to vaccinate their child against measles, but not against cancer, since there is no cancer vaccine.

3) It's false that I should remember Ughaibu's birthday, since I never knew it in the first place.

 

Phoenix, could you explain what you disagree with here? Do you think that in the above examples, the person is obligated to come to class, vaccinate their child against cancer, or remember the birthday? Or do you think they're not obligated, but this is for some other reason, not because they can't do it?

 

As far as dictionaries go, dictionaries are of little or no use in philosophical discussion. A dictionary is written by a normal speaker of the language, just like you and me. There's no reason to think that the editor of a dictionary understands some philosophical term (such as "ought" or "justice" or "truth") better than the philosophers who have discussed the related concept for centuries; and there's plenty of reason to think he'd understand the term much less. And the OIC principle has been the standard view among philosophers for at least about the last three centuries (it's also common sense, of course).

 

But setting that aside, I don't see how Phoenix thought that the dictionary entries he quoted were at odds with OIC in the first place. Take the entry that says "ought" is used to express moral obligation. How is that supposed to be at odds with OIC?

[phoenixbyrd]

Before this, I've never heard of the ought implies can concept. Without knowledge of the concept but knowledge of what the words mean makes the phrase very confusing. It should read can implies ought. Then throwing free will into the title of the thread just complicates matters more as the concept has nothing to do with free will and imo, demonstrated as so. If I can't remember his birthday then ought imples can makes no sense as a phrase with just the definitions of the words alone to go on.

[CraigD]

Before this, I've never heard of the ought implies can concept. Without knowledge of the concept but knowledge of what the words mean makes the phrase very confusing. It should read can implies ought.

I can’t see any sense in this claim, if for no other reason than that one commonly can – that is, is able to – do several mutually exclusive things. For the idea contained in the word “ought” to have any utility, it must provide a selection from among mutually exclusive things, eg: “I can leave by the front door, or the back door. I ought to leave by the front.”

 

A logical algebraic operation, contraposition, allows the statement

“A ought to B” → “A can B”

to be rewritten as

not “A can B” → not “A ought to B”

or a more linguistically natural

“A can not B” → “A ought not B”

However, only the contrapositive of an implication true in all cases is also true in all cases. The converse (the converse of “‘A ought to B’ → ‘A can B’” is “‘A can B’ → ‘A ought to B’”, and is the statement phoenixbyrd made in the quoted post) may not be true for all cases, though it may be true for some.

 

In practical morality, example of “can implies ought” are common, eg: “If you can aid a ship in distress, you ought to”.

Then throwing free will into the title of the thread just complicates matters more as the concept has nothing to do with free will and imo, demonstrated as so

I agree that this thread hasn’t much discussed how the words “can” and “ought” relate to the question of free will, a relationship much discussed in other forums. To synopsize this lengthy and often heated discussion, the lack of free will implies that, when it appears that one has the choice of several mutually exclusive things that one can do (a choice that can be made by doing what one ought), one actually can only do one of the choices – the one one chooses.

 

A couple of hypsography discussion of free will I find noteworthy are in ”God doesn’t play dice…..meaning” and ”A pragmatic conception of free will”.

[ughaibu]

I think Kriminal99's objection is that the "ought implies can" principle assumes non-determinism and for this reason cant be used, as a premise, in Owl's proof. However, I dont see how Kriminal99 has demonstrated this.

[Fatstep]

Ought sometimes implies can and sometimes it does not.

Can sometimes implies ought, I.E.

 

Ought ≠ Can:

I ought to run for presidency, I should but I can't.

Can ≠ Ought:

I can do a research paper in one day, I can but I ought not.

Can = Ought:

I can take a shower, and I ought to take one everyday.

Ought = Can:

I ought to take a shower every day, and I can take a shower every day.

 

It just depends on the situation.

[owl]

Ought sometimes implies can and sometimes it does not. Can sometimes implies ought, I.E.

 

Ought ≠ Can: I ought to run for presidency, I should but I can't.

Can ≠ Ought: I can do a research paper in one day, I can but I ought not.

Can = Ought: I can take a shower, and I ought to take one everyday.

Ought = Can: I ought to take a shower every day, and I can take a shower every day.

 

These aren't cases of something's implying something else, but merely of one thing's (allegedly) being true at the same time as something else. The only one of the above that's a problem is the first one; if correct, it would be a counter-example to OIC. But I think it's false. Why do you think you should run for President, and that you can't?

[Fatstep]

It was a hypothetical statement, but I guess because I know when to say no, and I can't because I'm not 35. and I do not have enough money to get started.

[owl]

It was a hypothetical statement, but I guess because I know when to say no, and I can't because I'm not 35. and I do not have enough money to get started.

 

I think what you're saying is that you would be a good President. Let's suppose that's true. I think it's still false that you ought to run, since you're under 35, and thus ineligible for the office. Why should you run for an office that you can't legally hold?

[Fatstep]

I obviously am confused, nevermind what I said; I am not smart enough to argue philosophy, yet.

[Kriminal99]

mispost

[Kriminal99]

I think Kriminal99's objection is that the "ought implies can" principle assumes non-determinism and for this reason cant be used, as a premise, in Owl's proof. However, I dont see how Kriminal99 has demonstrated this.

 

Free will use of can excludes psychological inability

 

Because determinists believe that if you don't know how to do something, and you don't have any reason to want to given your past experiences that you cannot do it. These arguments limit the definition of can to exclude any such inability, thus assuming non determinism.

 

 

Since I'm the author of the piece Kriminal has referred to, I'll try to make a few helpful remarks.

 

I don't think Krim succeeds in giving a genuine counterexample to the "'ought' implies 'can'" principle (OIC). In his first example, where the student didn't know that he was expected to take the bus, I think it's false to say the student could not have come to class. Not knowing that someone wants you to do A does not make one unable to do A. "I didn't know I was supposed to" is a different excuse from "I couldn't have".

 

In the second example, where the student is physically unable to come to class, I think it's false to say that he should have come.

 

 

No assuming the controversial in a proof

 

I understand that you, being a person that believes in free will, would not agree with the belief that the person could not have taken the bus because he did not know the professor would want him do considering different professors have different beliefs regarding such. However my point is more that a determinist DOES believe that the person can have a psychological inability to perform a task that cannot be overcome. Therefore a proof of free will, where proof is taken to mean something that would force a determinist to accept by saying "Well if you believe X, and you believe Y then Z must also be true" cannot simply exclude any potential psychological inability to perform a task from their definition of "can" as a premise for their proof. That is exactly what a determinist believes IS going on.

 

Ought implies Can? - Lack of knowledge of how

 

But in any case I might as well argue against such a definition of can as well. Consider the following example. Supposedly, an 18 year old college student could wake up and drive to Mexico City by himself instead of going to class one day. Forgetting for a moment that there is no reason why he would ever do this, consider that he does not know how to get there. It seems using your definition of can, he CAN do this without getting directions - ie he could just drive his car and make all the necessary turns until he was in Mexico City. However he does not know what turns to make. So on the other hand it seems that he cannot do it. This is the same kind of psychological inability to perform a task that you have been excluding. You may be able to categorize it seperately from a physical inability, but that does not make the person any more capable of completing the task.

 

Ought implies can? - Lack of will

 

But beyond that, we can see there is no reason why the student would ever do this. Perhaps a free will advocate would simply say that he has no reason to want to. And I agree with that- but does he control what he wants? Or is it a function of his past experiences? Can you see that people that grow up in a country and have all their friends and family there and do not hear much about a given foriegn country would not likely drive there on a random weekday because there is nothing there such people would want? If so I would claim that he does not control what he wants but rather it is determined by these experiences.

 

And therefore one could say that a person could only ever want what he did want - and consequently could only do what they did do. Therefore if a student would not want to take a bus when his car broke down unless he HAD to in order to keep the professor from being irritated with him, (which he wanted to keep from happening more than he wanted to be lazy) then he could not have taken the bus without knowing that professor would in fact be irritated with him otherwise.

 

Psychological to Physical inability

 

If somewhere in the brain a psychological inability to perform a task is realized physicaly then a psychological inability to perform a task WOULD BE a physical inability. - If you believe that everything that happens could only have happened that way given the state of the universe prior. So this is another reason for a determinist to reject a definition of can that excludes psychological inability.

[ughaibu]

Isn't post 30 a form of objection 1, and, as such, dealt with by Owl in his article?

[Kriminal99]

No. Part of post 30 (the part that doesn't just attack his premise but rather complains about assuming contraversial ideas as premises) is SIMILAR to his objection one but not quite the same.

 

His response to objection 1 characterizes "begging the question" as folows:

 

Premise 1 (X)

Premise 2+ (unnecessary additonal premises)

 

Conclusion (X)

 

However this type of begging the question would be so obvious it would never be worth mentioning. Rather I think usually when people speak of begging the question, they mean something more like:

 

Premise 1 (Y), where Y is chosen such that it is univerally agreed (or at least agreed between participants) that Y->X, but Y is not agreed upon.

 

Premise 2+ (Other things that are undisputed)

 

Conclusion (X)

 

Notice the difference - X isn't assumed directly but rather the contraversial issue Y is assumed. Here the disagreement isn't addressed by the "proof" because your opponent would never assume Y to be true - that is what should be proven if you want to convince your opponent. Begging the question was never really made precise enough of an objection - but I think this is what people who use it are getting at.

 

Any "Proof" (ironic name considering what they really are) depends on your accepting the premises. If you reject the premises, then it is not a proof at all.

[ughaibu]

I still cant see your objection. Are you saying that only what is done can be done? If so, I dont see how this is a problem, in fact it's part of the argument.

About accepting the premises; see the final paragraph of the reply to objection 1 and the general remarks about rational discourse. On the previous thread I think I made my view that determinism is an irrational belief, with religious features, clear.