Does "ought" imply "can" - Free Will

[owl]

I haven't had time to follow all of this, but I want to make brief comments on the long post #41.

 

... OIC is something that I and probably many other determinists would reject outright due to contradiction of fundamental determinist beliefs.

...

I feel at the very heart of determinism is the idea that it is 100% wrong for anyone to tell another person that they should have done something differently in the past... Not that a person cannot say what they think you should do in the future, but that is a different story.

 

First comment: If that's the central motivation for determinism, then it seems to me that it explains why determinists would embrace OIC and, instead, reject most "ought" statements.

 

OIC does not say when an "ought" statement is correct. It actually just says something about when an "ought" statement is incorrect--namely, an "ought" statement is incorrect when the agent cannot do (/could not have done) the action being recommended. If you're concerned about all these B.S. "ought" assertions people are making, I'd think you would want to accept relatively strict conditions on when one can appropriately make an "ought" claim. Rejecting OIC is (absurdly, IMO) expanding the range of conditions in which someone can say "so-and-so ought to do A".

 

My second comment is that I think there's something wrong with the asymmetry you posit between present-tense and past-tense "oughts". I think "You ought to have done A" is just the past tense of "You ought to do A." Therefore, I think that if "You ought to do A" is sometimes correct, then "You ought to have done A" is also sometimes correct (namely, at times later than those at which "You ought to do A" is true). That's generally true about past-tense statements.

 

And furthermore I feel like everyone knows this subconsiously - My argument for this is as follows: If someone tells you once calmly "You should have done X" then you are likely to accept it - I propose interpreted as a statement as to what you should do in the future. If someone tells you "YOU IGNORANT FOOL, WHAT WERE YOU THINKING WHY DIDNT YOU DO X GOD YOU ARE SO STUPID" or even just makes the first statement twice you will not accept it and instead you might even become angry. I propose the reason for this is because subconsiously everyone knows that it is fallacious to tell people what they should have done.

 

But consider another piece of evidence: People frequently say, "You should have done so-and-so." (Sometimes they'll even say the stuff about "you're so stupid," etc., but that's inessential.) That suggests that people think that it is correct to tell people what they should have done.

 

I propose an explanation that makes sense of both pieces of data (namely, our tendency to tell people what they should do AND our resistance to the "oh my god you are so stupid" speeches). My explanation is that, while we think it's often correct to say S should have done A, we think that we, ourselves, are not stupid. So if the "ought" statement is phrased in such a way as to imply that we are, we'll reject it.

 

I should say that, although I too think "ought" statements are often correct, I'm open to the possibility that they are correct far less often than is usually thought. I think that when we consider other people's behavior and find that they "should have" done something different, we very often are simply failing to appreciate the values and reasons that the other person had.

 

If you do not allow a determinist to say that "a person couldn't have done X because he could not have done it, didn't know that he should, or had no reason to" then you have simply assumed determinism is false.

Limiting can to physical ability is assuming free will.

 

I don't limit "can" to a statement of physical ability. I agree that in some cases, a person can't do A because of lack of knowledge (as in opening the combination lock when you don't know the combination). And there may be cases in which a person can't do A because of other psychological impediments, such as a person doing B (where this is incompatible with A) because he was hypnotized, or because he has a psychological compulsion.

 

However, again, OIC does not by itself say anything about whether people "can" act otherwise in those sorts of cases. It doesn't say anything about when one can do something or not. It also doesn't say anything about what, if anything, people should do. It just says that there's a connection between the two (between ought and can): if those are cases in which the person ought to do otherwise, then they're cases in which the person can do otherwise; but, on the other hand, if they are cases in which the person can't do otherwise, then they are also cases in which it's wrong to say they should have done otherwise.

 

I hope this makes clear why I think a determinist would be much more likely to reject my premise that says "We should believe only what is true." Most determinists would probably say: "Well, sometimes people are just determined to believe something that's not true, so in those cases, it doesn't make sense to say they should believe differently."

[ughaibu]

Kriminal99: I will take post 68 to be the definitive version of your objection.

Paragraph 2 is unsatisfactory. If people could not do things that they dont know how to do, they would be unable to learn new skills, for example, nobody would be able to walk. Also, if people were incapable of doing things without a reason or without a desire, there would be no fortuitous accidents, for example, the discovery of penicillin. And even with these classes of events there are circumstances in which the use of ought would be no surprise, for example, "he really ought to be able to walk by his age, you ought to take him to the doctor" and "you've tried so many things that you really ought to have come up with something by now, just on the balance of probability".

Paragraph 3 is difficult to understand, there doesn't appear to be any difference between "influence the above factors" and "alter their future behavior", and in neither case is it explained why this would make OIC false.

Paragraph 4 ignores things that have been clearly pointed out. In the first example you are inappropriately claiming a use of "should", the use of ought/should always involves reasons, by ignoring this you are pretending that 'can implies ought', this has been dealt with by both me and CraigD. In the second example you are suggesting a use of "should" in a case of psychological inability, this has been directly addressed by Owl.

In short, nothing you have said in post 68 contravenes OIC, so, naturally I can not understand what your objection is meant to be.

[Kriminal99]

I haven't had time to follow all of this, but I want to make brief comments on the long post #41.

 

Would never expect you to read all of that, most of it is repetitive don't ask me why I feel the need to respond to every indirect attempt at undermining my arguments...

 

2 common definitions of ought

 

I agree with you about embracing OIC, but that is why I listed 2 different determinist approaches to your argument throughout the thread and in my initial post. The nature of this duality lies in how common language can logically contradict itself, and the need to make a choice to which common meaning of "ought/should" you want to remain faithful to.

 

You can use something like OIC to try and refute arguments like "You should have taken a taxi to class" by saying something like "How could I have known that I was supposed to take a taxi, I couldn't have because every other professor doesn't care". Implied is that you shouldn't have taken a taxi because you couldn't have (known).

 

However at the same time you might argue that a murderer should stop murdering even if he can't!

 

These are two different definitions of ought, a single word! Both are used in common language, and each requires a different determinist approach to your argument. The latter requires you to define OIC as false. The former preserves OIC but not your proof, since in that case it is false that you should believe in determinism (as you said a determinist would reject most instances of "ought")

 

Ought always = false for the determinist using 1st definition

 

Once you choose one or the other of these two definitions most everything else becomes clear. I think if you choose the former definition, it is still wrong to say someone "ought" to do something in the future. I pointed to no assymmetry I just said that a motivation for determinism is people referring to "should have done"'s. With future "oughts" either you convince them to do it, or you fail in which case they should not and cannot do it because they don't have a good reason to.

 

The motivation extends to this since if you think someone ought to do something you should try and convince them of such and if you fail to convince them then maybe it is because you are wrong that they ought to do it! (Thus the ought statement is false in future tense too or doesn't really have an truth value!, given first definition of ought)

 

Deductive reasoning on common behavior

 

People do say that you should have done so and so, but I don't think this is evidence that their statement is true. Rather they are using the second definition of ought, ie using it in the pratical manner as a way to convince you to alter future behavior. Consider the evidence that even if it were true, it would be silly to tell someone what they should have done in the past for that reason because they cannot go to the past and change it. Thus they are not making the statement because it is true because doing so would not.

 

Regarding your "Hey I'm not stupid argument" I agree 100%. But WHY would we accept "We should have done X" (which somewhat implies that you were "stupid" or some other form of inadequate to not have done X) and yet not accept that we were stupid for not doing it? That is a contradiction. I think we wouldn't - I think you reject that you are stupid because you know why you didn't do X and that it was a good reason. I think you might tolerate "you should have done X" statements because you simply translate them as a request that you do X in the future.

 

I understand that you agree that SOMETIMES people "can't do x" for non physical reasons. But if you say that all times people can't do x (where x is something other than what they do do - determinism), then ought becomes false all the time, and then your first premise is definitely rejected for the same reason as you said.

 

Consider the following argument for believing this btw: You agree that sometimes you fail to fully understand and consider another"s reasons for not doing something. The next question is how far does that extend? You cannot know since you are not that person. The only source of information you have on this is yourself. And how often do you look at yourself and say "I should do X no matter what, My reasons for not doing X are stupid, I should do X" and yet do not do X? And after you convinced to do some X, do you then decide you were stupid or do you decide that you only did what you knew to do at the time?

[owl]

However at the same time you might argue that a murderer should stop murdering even if he can't!

 

I don't think one can (rationally) say this, so I don't agree that the second sense of "ought" you're talking about exists (in English). I would, however, agree with the following statements, which might be confused with the statement that "a murderer should stop murdering even if he can't":

 

1. A murderer should stop murdering even if he has no desire to stop.

2. He should stop murdering even if he doesn't understand the reasons why he should stop.

3. He should stop murdering.

4. We should stop him from murdering.

5. It would be best if no one murdered.

 

The best I can figure is that if someone thinks "X should stop murdering even if he can't" sounds true, then they're probably confusing that statement with one of the above. My argument that the statement is false is just that it strikes me (and many others) as contradictory to say, "X can't do A, but X should do A anyway." If someone sincerely asserts that, then I can only say that I don't know what they mean.

 

The former preserves OIC but not your proof, since in that case it is false that you should believe in determinism (as you said a determinist would reject most instances of "ought")

 

Although I agree that most determinists would do that, I think they still have a problem. As I suggested in the web essay, I think certain norms are presupposed in reasoning and argumentation. So I think the determinist is in a self-undermining position if he rejects all norms (as most determinists would probably do).

 

But WHY would we accept "We should have done X" (which somewhat implies that you were "stupid" or some other form of inadequate to not have done X) and yet not accept that we were stupid for not doing it?

 

Everyone makes mistakes. Even I once made a mistake.

 

Consider the following argument for believing this btw: You agree that sometimes you fail to fully understand and consider another"s reasons for not doing something. The next question is how far does that extend? You cannot know since you are not that person. The only source of information you have on this is yourself.

 

I think people sometimes say things like, "Oh, I should have done so-and-so." I've even heard people say things like, "I'm so stupid! Why didn't I do X?" People often say that they should quite smoking, or lose weight, or the like, and they resolve to do it, but often they will not actually do it. So it seems that they believe they should do X, and yet they don't do X.

[HappytheStripper]

I think.. and I have thought about this thread for as long as it has been here..

 

Ought is really Nought without the N and implies what should be if there was no N .. and Can is really what ought could be.. had the N been available..

 

Where does free will fit in again..?? I'll be back..

 

Ashley