What can we know of reality?

[Doctordick]

This is a thread started to discuss a serious problem deeply embedded in the whole fabric of philosophical thought. idsoftwaresteve has referred this problem through the metaphor of a map of reality from which we can direct our thoughts and I suggested that the real problem is coming up with a method of drawing such a map when we don't know what we are talking about.

"what options do we have when it comes to drawing such a map?"

That is exactly the first question to be asked. The only answer is, we know something and we need a way of keeping track of it which does not depend on knowing what it is that we know. Does that sound confusing enough? The existence of that problem has essentially been recognized by philosophers for centuries. It is actually the reason for the philosophical division between epistemology (the study of knowledge and justified belief; essentially the basis of science) and ontology (the study of existence itself; exactly what are those “knowable” things).

 

All fields of science possess their own “ontology”, the fundamental things which are presumed to exist and upon which that science is built. Most all ontology is invented (a great majority arising through a phenomena I have called “squirrel” thought, essentially animal intuition who's validity is uncertifiable) as the basis of a specific epistemological structure which explains the scientific phenomena of interest. Most scientists take the success of that very scientific explanation as proof of the validity of the presumed ontology; from a philosophical perspective this is a clearly unjustifiable presumption. In many respects, the whole thing is a chicken vs egg thing. You cannot define the ontology until you posses and understand the epistemology (the epistemology would be the scientific explanation) while, at the same time, you cannot generate an epistemology without an ontology to work with.

 

This problem is particularly crucial if the epistemology consists of your world view and the ontology consists of what you know sincd that brings the chicken vs egg thing to a critical circumstance. You have utterly nothing to start with; no chicken and no egg.

That presumes I have an understanding of the process of drawing it. And if I do, wouldn't that mean that I was dealing with part of the map?:cheer:

Yes, indeedy do. The issue isn't that we must be working with nothing here but is rather the exact validity of the tools we use and all the steps we perform to draw that map. After all, English is itself a tool and we could not communicate if we were barred from using a language. What is disallowed is any step in drawing that map which cannot be proved valid.

 

As an opener, I will be using both logic and mathematics. I define logic to be a collection of steps (a procedure) which can be certified and agreed upon as valid and mathematics as any internally self consistent set of such procedures (in the spirit of Feynman's, “mathematics is the distilled essence of logic!”) I take mathematics to be a well defined and certified collection of operations which detail exact steps which will yield identical results no matter who performs them. Since the central issue of mathematical systems is that they be well defined and internally self consistent and many brilliant minds have worked diligently over thousands of years to assure their logical validity, I will take them as “rational”. That is to say, I am aware of no mathematical construct which “generates emotional doubts as to its validity”: i.e. mathematics is a "rational" structure.

 

As an aside, mathematics is a very effective example of the human mind's inability to make good use of logic. No mathematical proof can prove anything which is not embedded in the axioms behind that proof: i.e., whatever is proved is in fact, a direct logical consequence of the definitions asserted in the axioms behind the mathematics. Yet there are a great many proofs which no one would call obvious. If the mind did indeed have the ability to trace out all of the logical consequences of those axioms, all proofs would be obvious. It is quite clear that the human mind is limited to perhaps two or three conscious logical steps at its best.

 

But, back to our problem.

Ok, so that understanding is necessarily limited. Like a dim outline.

Limited yes, like a dim outline, no! That is exactly what I don't want and exactly why I altered “facts” to “ideas which raise no emotional doubts”. (If these ideas raise doubts later, the issue can be handled later; for the moment, they will be treated as one would logically treat “facts”.) The whole issue here is to avoid wasting time in mock battles and, instead, go directly to the logical deductions which can be developed from these “rational” assertions. This is done with the full confidence that the results are as fully dependable as are their original “rational” foundations. The object is to avoid being vague in the interest of being exact.

 

We can then use extended formal logic to deduce the consequences of these fundamental “rational” assertions, ignoring the “beliefs” which would otherwise impede our progress.

What are other options?

The first step is to understand that any explanation of reality amounts to an internally consistent epistemological construct based on a finite collection of ontological elements. The question is what can we say about these epistemological constructs without knowing anything about the ontological elements. There are two “rational” statements I believe I can make without knowing anything about either the epistemological construct or the ontological elements. These are issues any “map” of the circumstance must be able to represent.

 

First, whatever the ontological elements underlying this epistemological construct are, there exists a possibility that additional ontological elements may arise later which were unavailable when the the epistemological construct was conceived.

 

Second, there must exist a way to represent differences between the underlying ontological elements.

 

I think these two assertions are sufficient to terminate this post as I would like to have the rationality of them certified before solving the problems they introduce. What I want is acceptance of the idea that any representation of the ontological elements underlying any epistemological construct must satisfy these two issues which have absolutely nothing to do with what the ontology is or the nature of the epistemological construct built upon that ontology.

 

Looking to see a response -- Dick

[Qfwfq]

Great question. Judging from 20th century physics, I'd say very little.

 

Most scientists take the success of that very scientific explanation as proof of the validity of the presumed ontology; from a philosophical perspective this is a clearly unjustifiable presumption.

Well I wouldn't quite say "most", when talking about modern physics. Models are not taken too literally, although there's a natural tendency to consider that something must exist, somehow.

 

First, whatever the ontological elements underlying this epistemological construct are, there exists a possibility that additional ontological elements may arise later which were unavailable when the the epistemological construct was conceived.

 

Second, there must exist a way to represent differences between the underlying ontological elements.

Fair enough....

[ldsoftwaresteve]

DoctorDick, assume that you are a chess master and I am a novice. My ability to play the game is directly related to the depth of my understanding of the pieces, how they move, how they relate to one another, and how they can be used to attain the goal. I appreciate your confidence in me but I'm afraid you are asking me to go bowling with a 100 pound ball. We either need to make the ball lighter or I need to build muscle mass. Have patience.

The first step is to understand that any explanation of reality amounts to an internally consistent epistemological construct based on a finite collection of ontological elements. The question is what can we say about these epistemological constructs without knowing anything about the ontological elements. There are two “rational” statements I believe I can make without knowing anything about either the epistemological construct or the ontological elements. These are issues any “map” of the circumstance must be able to represent.

ok. We build something epistemological from blocks made of ontological elements. It may be obvious to you, but I need an example. You will need to use an epistemological construct to describe an ontological element, right? It's pointless to proceed unless I get this straight.

 

The question is what can we say about these epistemological constructs without knowing anything about the ontological elements.

Oops, I missed that. So my previous question can't be asked or answered. And I guess that makes sense, sort of. Although, the implication is that we DO know something about the ontological elements: they are used to build epistemological constructs. We just can't describe them using something lower down in the food chain because we are assuming they are at the bottom of it. And that's another thing we know about them.

And that there is a finite number of them and that there might be more than one.

[Doctordick]

Although, the implication is that we DO know something about the ontological elements: they are used to build epistemological constructs.

Well, yes we do know that. And how is it that we know that? We know that because you and I (and apparently Qfwfq) agree that ontological elements are the building blocks of epistemological constructs: i.e., it is now a certified “rational statement” (within this group) and can be used in further deductions as if it were a fact without endangering the rationality of the discussion.

 

This brings up the issue of “truth by definition”. Unless a definition can be shown to be inconsistent with itself or earlier definitions, it can be held as a rational assertion and likewise used in deductions as if it were a fact. This is a simple consequence of the fact that a definition is little more than a symbolic substitution for concepts already accepted as rational.

We just can't describe them using something lower down in the food chain because we are assuming they are at the bottom of it. And that's another thing we know about them.

I am presuming that is no more than a statement of the form, “we know we don't know” which of course is the basis of this analysis.

And that there is a finite number of them and that there might be more than one.

I hate to be picky but the issue is that any epistemological construct must be built upon knowledge of a finite number of valid ontological elements, not that “there IS a finite number of them”. Furthermore, both zero and one are “finite numbers”, in fact the assumption of “zero” is what is meant by the concept of “solipsism” so solipsism is included in this analysis.

 

Except for my complaints above (which I suspect are rather trivial), I find your responses to be rational. So I will continue.

 

Notice that above I have used the term “valid ontological elements”. Since I have added an adjective, I need to specify exactly what that adjective is supposed to indicate. I define “reality” to be the complete set of “valid ontological elements”. Clearly there are two problems with that definition. First, it is meaningful only internal to itself (it is tautological in nature) and second there clearly exists no way of determining whether a particular ontological element is indeed a member of the set; however, it does posses one significant characteristic not possessed by ontological elements which are not members of that set. That characteristic is that all flaw free epistemological constructs must explain those particular elements whereas there can exist other ontological elements which are part and parcel of the epistemological construct itself: and might not exist in an alternate construct.

 

And I have now introduced another concept: a “flaw free epistemological construct”. This concept is central to my exposition as I am not at all concerned with generating epistemological constructs but rather with discovering the inherent constraints on such things. Thus it is that I will presume that the only epistemological constructs of interest to us are “flaw free”: i.e., there exists no known information which will invalidate them. (If known information exists which invalidates them, that is a search problem: i.e., it is the job of researchers to discover the flaws and such a discovery simply removes the epistemological construct from our interest).

 

The only epistemological constructs of interest here are thus totally flaw free.

 

Are we still in agreement? -- Dick

[ldsoftwaresteve]

DoctorDick:

I hate to be picky but the issue is that any epistemological construct must be built upon knowledge of a finite number of valid ontological elements, not that “there IS a finite number of them”. Furthermore, both zero and one are “finite numbers”, in fact the assumption of “zero” is what is meant by the concept of “solipsism” so solipsism is included in this analysis.

Are you including zero in this to allow for the fact that our constructs can be false?

Notice that above I have used the term “valid ontological elements”. Since I have added an adjective, I need to specify exactly what that adjective is supposed to indicate. I define “reality” to be the complete set of “valid ontological elements”. Clearly there are two problems with that definition.

My dear friend, 'clearly' is not a word I would use here.

My clarity isn't equal to yours. My mind is racing trying to put boundaries on what you've said. Now if I substitute 'things that can be sensed' with 'ontological elements' it clears it up a little. If I allow that I might not be able to sense all ontological elements in reality, that clears it up a little bit more. Are you okay with that? That gives me a first hand connection to the concept.

 

First, it is meaningful only internal to itself (it is tautological in nature)

..... you just slipped 'meaningful' into the conversation and I have a lot of baggage with that term. That implies (to me) a living thing, since it is only to a living thing that meaning applies. Therefore, you have given

I define “reality” to be the complete set of “valid ontological elements”."

implied life. Now it is clear (I almost used the word 'true') that since it is a construct of yours, and that it has meaning to you (and if I comprehend it, me too) that you are the reason it has life.

 

and second there clearly exists no way of determining whether a particular ontological element is indeed a member of the set;

To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, "I determine it thus! (he kicks the tree)".

however, it does posses one significant characteristic not possessed by ontological elements which are not members of that set. That characteristic is that all flaw free epistemological constructs must explain those particular elements

Ah, I'm having a referential moment. "Brothers and sisters have I none, this man's father is my father's son". Your ability to skewer a referent and hold it in place is masterful. Unfortunately, with me, it's like trying to pick up a drop of water with my fingertip.

"All flaw free epistemological constructs must explain those particular elements".

And there is the connection to explanation. So, in short, an epistemological construct is an explanation in the abstract sense. I'm looking at the explanation itself, not at the thing it is explaining. Yes, and I think this is what drove you to explain it in mathematical terms.

whereas there can exist other ontological elements which are part and parcel of the epistemological construct itself: and might not exist in an alternate construct.

I suspect that my failure to understand this can be explained by my previous confusion. Keep in mind Dick that you arrived at these observations over time. In addition, did you ever see the cartoon character "wrongway peachfuzz"? He was ship's captain that did not know the meaning of the term, 'straight line'. Well, thing of him as me.

 

And I have now introduced another concept: a “flaw free epistemological construct”. This concept is central to my exposition as I am not at all concerned with generating epistemological constructs but rather with discovering the inherent constraints on such things.

This really is the nut of the whole thing, isn't it?

 

Ok. So, the meaningful thing to you here is to 'discover the inherent constraints on epistemological contructs'. And you want to use only constructs with a 'white plume' (Thank you Cyrano) in your exploration. That makes sense.

Thus it is that I will presume that the only epistemological constructs of interest to us are “flaw free”: i.e., there exists no known information which will invalidate them.

The only epistemological constructs of interest here are thus totally flaw free

Ok. I'm not far enough off the ground that I'd get hurt with that.

[Qfwfq]

Just to make sure:

(If known information exists which invalidates them, that is a search problem: i.e., it is the job of researchers to discover the flaws and such a discovery simply removes the epistemological construct from our interest).

I can get your drift if I suppose you meant "unknown" and that researchers must discover the "new" info, unless you meant a lacking logical argument, yet to be found. Which way should we read it?

[ldsoftwaresteve]

DoctorDick:

Well, yes we do know that. And how is it that we know that? We know that because you and I (and apparently Qfwfq) agree that ontological elements are the building blocks of epistemological constructs: i.e., it is now a certified “rational statement” (within this group) and can be used in further deductions as if it were a fact without endangering the rationality of the discussion.

I missed the significance of this. I missed that it is identical to making a mathematical statement. We would do that if we were looking at a formulation.

This is hard for you to do, isn't it. You're attempting to put into words the content of your formulation on explanation. You have that in mind at all times, whereas we don't. So, when I wander off subject, you have to deal with something you wouldn't have to deal with if we were staring at the math. It's hard to contemplate the same thing happening there.

In addition, when we talk we are used to letting emotion drive the way we say what we say. That is not true in mathematics. So, in a real sense, we have to learn how to discuss from scratch.

[Doctordick]

Are you including zero in this to allow for the fact that our constructs can be false?

I am assuming that by “our constructs” you are referring to the ontology under discussion and not any specific epistemological construct. (I am subtly confused by your comment because, as I have defined it, the valid ontology is not a construct; it is no more than what really exists and what the epistemological construct was created to explain.) Now certainly all of our epistemological constructs (our scientific explanations) are based upon created (or constructed) ontologies so the issue of invalid ontological elements must be taken on eventually and I will give you my take on that issue shortly; however, for the moment, I am merely pointing out that the foundation I am laying out (that any explanation is based on some “real” foundation, even if that “real” foundation is NULL) does not assume solipsism is invalid (i.e., essentially that this is all nothing more than a figment of my imagination). The fundamental issue being, even if that scenario seems totally ridiculous to all of us, I can not “prove” it is false and I am merely pointing out that my attack does not presume it is false. If we are to be truly rational, we need to suspend belief in unsupportable issues.

My dear friend, 'clearly' is not a word I would use here.

My clarity isn't equal to yours. My mind is racing trying to put boundaries on what you've said.

This is exactly the kind of response I want to see. If I say something which you find to be unclear, I want to know about that so I can clarify my comments. First, there is the issue of “something real” out there which we are trying to understand: i.e., philosophically speaking, “What can we know of reality?” is itself a very vague thing to ask. It immediately brings up the issues of, what do you mean by “know” and what do you mean by “reality”. We can get ridiculous and ask, what do you mean by “what”. From a fundamental philosophical perspective, English itself is a “squirrel” construct and you cannot prove your understanding of the meanings of any of these terms is identical to mine; this is why I made so much noise about being “rational”. I am willing to leave the meanings of the rest of the words in that sentence as rationally understood by all of us; however, the two words “know” and “reality” are another matter. Their exact meaning is so important to the discussion that I want to do my best to assure you understand what I mean. (In fact, understanding is another rather important word.)

 

My first comment, that defining reality to be a valid ontology was a tautological definition, was there to clarify the fact that I was intending to use the idea that ontology was the study of what exists to imply that the entirety of (whatever it is that is actually behind our world view) was fulfilled by the thing being referred to as a “valid ontology”. That is to say, if you knew the entirety of that ontology, you would know the entirety of reality. At that point the only problem still confronting you is to understand and/or explain that reality. (Though, philosophically speaking, the words explain and understand sort of lose meaning if you truly were to know all there was to know of reality; that's an issue which becomes clearer down the road.)

Now if I substitute 'things that can be sensed' with 'ontological elements' it clears it up a little.

The problem with that scenario is that it presumes the epistemological construct referred to as “your senses” is a valid epistemological construct. We can't do that as the whole issue here is to discover the exactly what constraints exist on such constructs. If we presume any specific construct to be valid, we have violated the constraints on the problem: we have presumed something we cannot prove to be valid.

 

What is very important for you to understand the difference between being rational and being correct. They are not at all the same thing. We are being rational with regard to the communications here but we are making every attempt to be correct with regard to the logic of our analysis: A must always follow B, we cannot become vague on any issue of those logical steps.

If I allow that I might not be able to sense all ontological elements in reality, that clears it up a little bit more.

The issue is not that you are unable to sense these ontological elements but rather that they are simply not available to you. An epistemological solution can not be a function of information which is simply not available. Why that information is not available to you is not an issue of the discussion. In fact, it is possible that the entire ontology is available but I don't think that would be a provable assertion. Any rational argument must assume you are not “all knowing”: i.e., the validity of such a statement generates severe doubts in my mind as to its validity.

..... you just slipped 'meaningful' into the conversation and I have a lot of baggage with that term. That implies (to me) a living thing, since it is only to a living thing that meaning applies. Therefore, you have given implied life. Now it is clear (I almost used the word 'true') that since it is a construct of yours, and that it has meaning to you (and if I comprehend it, me too) that you are the reason it has life.

Well, I didn't take the meaning to be so serious. What I meant was simply that the definition I gave carried very little information with it and serves little purpose beyond mere substitution. I, personally, can't think of another definition for the term which does not introduce unprovable material and I really hate the idea of using the term “valid ontology” over and over as “reality” just seems more convenient in many cases.

To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, "I determine it thus! (he kicks the tree)".

The problem with that is that it also presumes his world view is valid, but that is the central issue under examination here. The only kind of proof which begins with the assumption that the central issue is valid, is one who's purpose is to prove it is not (i.e., a proof by contradiction). And here, I will accede to the fact that I cannot prove his statement invalid but that does not mean that it is valid (think "brain in a vat" sort of thing).

Your ability to skewer a referent and hold it in place is masterful. Unfortunately, with me, it's like trying to pick up a drop of water with my fingertip.

I am not exactly sure of your intention here; was this a complement or are you trying to display confusion about something I have said?

And there is the connection to explanation. So, in short, an epistemological construct is an explanation in the abstract sense. I'm looking at the explanation itself, not at the thing it is explaining. Yes, and I think this is what drove you to explain it in mathematical terms.

Well, yes the connection is there but I am of the opinion that the connection has to be more firmly established so that we can understand exactly what the problem is we are trying to solve. It is held by many people that epistemology is the essence of science (as opposed to ontology which is the essence of “metaphysics”). All of us, I think, have our own interpretation of what is meant by this (what makes sense to us).

 

The Wikipedia Encyclopedia says:

Much of the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth, belief, and justification. It also deals with the means of production of knowledge, as well as skepticism about different knowledge claims. In other words, epistemology primarily addresses the following questions: "What is knowledge?", "How is knowledge acquired?", and "What do people know?".

I read in that a rather general statement of the philosopher's perspective on science itself. I would say that the one word expressing what is being searched for there is “understanding” (though the word “understand” is used but once in the Wikipedia entry I quoted from).

 

The question I ask is, how does one judge the existence or nonexistence of understanding? In yourself it is a hard question to answer as it amounts to what I consistently refer to as a “squirrel” decision: when you understand, you just feel like you understand. So, in the interest of being objective, I move the question over to, how does one judge the understanding of another. As you try to communicate a new idea to another, what is it that moves you to believe that they understand? Certainly their saying that they understand is no real evidence, that's why professors create tests.

 

I suggest that, since you generally have a firm belief that you understand what you are trying to communicate, you will judge that the listener understands when his (or her) responses begin to become consistent with what you feel are reasonable responses had you been in their shoes so to speak. That would be when your expectations of events and their expectations of events begin to become essentially the same (their reactions with regard to the pertinent issues are no longer surprising). So it appears that the issue of expectations is central to understanding itself: i.e., when you understand something, you possess definable related expectations. I present this only as the chain of thought which led me to conclude that the ability to “explain” something is the central issue of understanding it.

 

By this means, I came to define “an explanation” as a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. I think that is an accurate representation of the common meaning of the term explanation. If you are to disagree with me then it behooves you to either give me an example of “an explanation” which engenders no expectations (something which is considered to be an explanation which does not satisfy my definition) or a method of obtaining expectations from information which would not be accepted as an explanation (something which satisfies my definition which is not an explanation).

 

Essentially, I view an epistemological construct as a formally defined explanation and it is indeed the “nut of the whole thing”. The issue I am examining is, “can one put any logical constraints on the possibilities here (without specifying the underlying ontology: i.e., knowing anything of reality) or are the possible valid explanations totally unconstrained”.

Just to make sure:I can get your drift if I suppose you meant "unknown" and that researchers must discover the "new" info, unless you meant a lacking logical argument, yet to be found. Which way should we read it?

I am not at all sure what you mean by “lacking logical argument”. Nonetheless, there is an issue here which I need to clarify. My position is actually quite simple. By a flaw free explanation (where I am now presuming that any reference to an epistemological construct can be referred to as an explanation) I mean that it is an explanation within which no flaw can be found: i.e., the explanation is perfectly consistent with all known information and contains nothing which can be used to prove it is wrong (no internal inconsistencies). If a flaw can be found, sufficient work will find it and, once that flaw is uncovered, that explanation can no longer be accepted as valid and, more importantly, would not have been accepted as valid the moment it was suggested, had the flaw been evident then.

 

I am not talking about discovering additional information which invalidates that explanation. That issue is an entirely different thing. In fact that is exactly the issue I was referring to with my first constraint, “whatever the ontological elements underlying this epistemological construct are, there exists a possibility that additional ontological elements may arise later which were unavailable when the the epistemological construct was conceived”. The use of the words “later” and “when” should be a clue as to the issue of significance here. We are talking about circumstances changing. If an explanation is a method of obtaining expectations from “given known information”, we need a mechanism for allowing that “given known information” to change. It should be clear to you that the common mechanism (within the common world view) which yields such a possibility is called “time”.

 

In my arguments here, I will solve that problem with the introduction of a concept which I will call “time”; however, it is not exactly the common concept put forth by your subconscious. My concept is nothing except a defined mechanism which allows the given known information to change. I will define the past to be "what is known" and the future to be "what is not known". The present is defined to be "a change in what is known" (essentially, the boundary of the past). In this perspective, the past can be seen as a collection of presents and we can use the index “t” to refer to a specific present in that past.

 

I will use exactly the same mechanism to represent differences between the underlying ontological elements. It should be clear that exactly what any specific ontological element is, is something which is part and parcel of the explanation itself. That is to say understanding what the ontological elements are, is part of the problem of understanding the explanation itself: i.e., we actually have nothing to go by except the status played by that ontological element in the explanation and we must divine what is being meant from the references to it. What symbolism is used to reference those elements is an open issue as understanding the symbolism (learning a language) constitutes solving exactly the same kind of problem. The only information we have to go on are the apparent references. Thus it is that, in my universal map of reality, I will use numerical indices to identify these references to ontological elements. Oh, by the way, I use the term "element" to imply indivisibility as infinite recursion is not an achievable goal. It should be clear that we cannot "know" an infinite collection of ontological elements even if that were the correct representation of reality.

This is hard for you to do, isn't it. You're attempting to put into words the content of your formulation on explanation.

Yes it is hard, because I want you to see it as an absolutely general view. It is not being put forward as an accidental stab in the dark which just happens to be right but rather as a logical analysis which must be right. I am presenting a specific solution to a very important problem (important from the perspective of scientific objectivity). What I am laying out is a tautological construct capable of representing any possible explanation of anything. It is not a theory; no more than the Dewy Decimal System could be thought of as a theory: it is the fabrication of a logical mechanism for representing an explanation with out making constraints on what is being explained.

You have that in mind at all times, whereas we don't. So, when I wander off subject, you have to deal with something you wouldn't have to deal with if we were staring at the math. It's hard to contemplate the same thing happening there.

In addition, when we talk we are used to letting emotion drive the way we say what we say. That is not true in mathematics. So, in a real sense, we have to learn how to discuss from scratch.

There is probably a lot of truth to that. What I am doing is laying out a set of definitions which can be applied to any collection of information and I am going to show that these definitions lead to a mathematical relationship which can not be avoided: i.e., there always exists an interpretation of any explanation which must obey my fundamental equation (which we will get to down the line). Because it must apply to any explanation, it is important that all these meanderings off the subject be handled. After all, I want to be rational. I know I am not dealing with facts here, I am dealing with possibilities and it is imperative that I don't presume something which I can not defend as necessary.

 

If anyone has a problem with what I have proposed so far, let me know. -- Dick

[ldsoftwaresteve]

DoctorDick:

The only answer is, we know something and we need a way of keeping track of it which does not depend on knowing what it is that we know.

I had to go back to this statement because when I reread it I thought immediately that you were contradicting yourself. How do we know and don't know something at the same time? "we know something and we need a way of keeping track of it" .... ok, so I think "language, descriptions, etc." Keeping track of it with our memory is one way and that is just for one's self. Keeping track of it with language, illustrations, etc. implies a longer time frame than one's memory. It's safer, more open and available that way too. Then you continue with ..."which does not depend on knowing what it is that we know" and, well, now I realize that my focal point is wrong. Another possibility is that there is more than one viewing position.

 

To paraphrase the warden in Cool Hand Luke, "What we have here is a failure to referentiate". And yes, I was paying you a compliment when I said that you were a master at skewering a concept.

 

The quote is the entrance to this discussion. And I'm having a problem opening the door. Knowing is not the same as what I know. That much I think I understand. Knowing implies a different perspective, a different viewing position. Is that correct? One that is outside of one's own perspective. Now, if I hold that thought and bring in the idea of the mechanics of knowing, is that the correct approach? So, 'knowing' is viewing me from the perspective of the rules of knowing and seeing my implied 'knowing' rules contrasted against valid rules of knowing. Am I wiggling the handle at least?

[Doctordick]

Hi Steve and thanks for the compliment.

How do we know and don't know something at the same time?

Ah, wait a while and you will comprehend that state. I often go in the other room to get something and discover I don't know what it is that I need to get. Age is a great teacher. :phones: :lol:

 

Seriously, the problem here is the nature of language itself; the meanings of words can shift quite a way with context. To paraphrase a famous quote: “there are more interpretations of a circumstance than are conceived of in your philosophy”, and I mean that sincerely (it's one of my major problems in communications).

 

In one case, I am referring to “whatever it is that is behind the things you think you know” (the “valid” information your world view is based upon; ergo, what you really “know” ) as seen when your realize that you simply don't “know” what that is (the issue being that you cannot prove the validity of anything you “think you know”). Perhaps I should have used the word “noumenon”. That is to say, “we know something and we need a way of keeping track of it which does not depend on knowing what it is that we know” should be replaced with “we need a way of keeping track of noumenons which are behind our understanding without defining the the impact of these “noumenons” (which would, of course, be be our world view itself). Again, the issue is objectivity: i.e., we aren't being objective if we assume our world view is valid and it is very difficult to think things out in the absence of a world view. I am trying to direct your attention to how this can be done.

Knowing is not the same as what I know. That much I think I understand. Knowing implies a different perspective, a different viewing position. Is that correct?

I am using the word “know” to mean that there is information available to you. There is another word which applies directly to the issue under discussion. That word is “understand”. It happens to be a very overwhelming intuitive feeling in everyone that “knowing” always includes “understanding” and I think you are having difficulty separating the two.

Now, if I hold that thought and bring in the idea of the mechanics of knowing, is that the correct approach?

No, it really isn't. The idea of the mechanics of “knowing” is itself an epistemological construct; it amounts to an explanation of “knowing”. Proceeding to that point clearly requires a “world view” of some sort. The question here is, how does one develop a rational “world view” from undefined noumenons?.

 

I hope I have made the issue a little clearer -- Dick

[ldsoftwaresteve]

DoctorDick:

Again, the issue is objectivity: i.e., we aren't being objective if we assume our world view is valid and it is very difficult to think things out in the absence of a world view.

This I agree with. It fits into my world view. :confused:

 

As the Chief Inspector says, "Now we are getting somewhere".

the issue being that you cannot prove the validity of anything you “think you know”

At least not in the sense of 'knowing' as you used it in the doorway statement.

 

Ok, I'll buy that. But it's because it fits into my world view. If it didn't, I would have to accept that idea if we were to proceed, correct? Having accepted that, where do we go now?

[Doctordick]

Ok, I'll buy that. But it's because it fits into my world view. If it didn't, I would have to accept that idea if we were to proceed, correct?

Well sort of, yeah; but you make it sound like I am holding something over your head. I hope you don't think that I am forcing you into something.

 

I think we have a starting point. Maybe it would be best if we just used the word “noumenons” to indicate the nature of reality instead of my “valid ontological elements”. Or maybe we can call “valid ontological elements” to be ontological elements which can be directly related to these noumenons. I really don't see any real conflict there as, from my perspective, neither can be exactly “known”. What is important is that the purpose of our world view is to explain “what we know”: i.e., these noumenons or valid ontological elements, whatever we choose to call them. Unless you complain, I will use the the two terms as if they mean exactly the same thing and, when I use the term “know” I will be referring to exactly this same collection of noumenons totally sans understanding.

 

My first step in constructing that “map” of what we know is to assert that then number of these noumenons which reside behind our explanation has to be finite. I assert this because the word “infinite” means literally that no matter how many are explicitly taken into account as being behind your current world view, there are more that are not yet included. It follows that, if you have a current world view, the number behind that world must be finite otherwise, you are not including some.

 

Just as an aside, there are those who would say that it is possible to have something which is infinite behind that world view; I hold that such a view is unacceptable as that infinite entity is either one thing or it is divisible in which case it is not “elemental”. The issue is that you cannot take into account an infinite number of elemental entities as individual entities, not that an infinite number of elemental entities can not exist.

 

I invented and presented my definition of time as follows: “the past” is what we know (those noumenons on which the map is built); “the future” is what is not known (those noumenons which have yet to become relevant to that map). “The present” is the boundary of the past: i.e., noumenons added to those which are already part of our map.

 

The purpose of “time” was to allow our world view to accommodate changes in “what is known”: i.e., new noumenons. From the above it should be clear that “the past” can be seen as a collection of “presents”. We can see what we know as proceeding from “nothing” to what we now know as a collection of changes in “what we know”. Again, the number of “presents” we can actually know must be finite (same argument as above). If their number is finite, they can be indexed and I will call the index “time” and represent it with a number referred to as “t”.

 

Likewise, I defined another numerical index, which I called x, to identify a specific noumenon making up a specific “present”. At this point you should see that “the present” has been conceived as possibly consisting of more than one noumenon. If that is the case, I am going to further state that “order”, with respect to one another, cannot be a characteristic of these simultaneous (simultaneous meaning “occurring at the same time”) noumenons as “time” was introduced for that exact purpose.

 

So, at this point, the noumenons (or valid ontological elements available to construct that map) can be seen as a collection of discreet points in an (x,t) plane. The important point being that there exists no collection of noumenons which cannot be so displayed.

 

Now I earlier defined an explanation to be a method of generating expectations from known information. At this point, the “known information” in our map consists of a set of numbers. Now, down the road, when one has a viable explanation of reality, these noumenons (or valid ontological elements) will be identified by that explanation. The totality of the explanation includes explaining the meanings of the words used to identify those elements. The actual symbols used to identify these elements is of no real significance at all. It could be in English, it could be in French, it could be in Chinese or it could even be in Linear A (a currently undecipherable language) which someone would have to learn first. Actually, people seem to forget learning the other languages is also an important necessity prior to understanding an explanation in one of them. So the only real difference is that a specific explanation requires a specific set of indices which are internally consistent under that explanation: i.e., the idea that our references are numerical indices is no limitation on the explanation at all.

 

Earlier I stated that my only interest was in flaw free epistemological constructs (explanations lacking a flaw of any kind). Qfwfq was apparently confused by my justification for such a step so I don't know if he has just decided to vacate this discussion as irrational or was appeased by my attempt at clarification given in post #8 (this thread). At any rate, the next step is to begin the analysis of explanations in general given the basis outlined above (a collection of discreet points in an (x,t) plane).

 

As an aside, it should be clear that any flaw free explanation must explain each and every ontological element upon which it is based whether those ontological elements are valid or not. Any demonstrable error in that explanation will invalidate it. Thus we can be confident that a flaw free explanation must explain all valid ontological elements as they are a mere subset of the ontological elements it is required to explain. It follows that there is no real need to worry about whether or not the actual ontological elements required for that explanation are valid.

 

The absolute first step in that analysis is to recognize that, under my definition of an explanation, there exists only one explanation which requires no epistemological construct at all. That is what I call the ”what is”, is “what is” explanation. That explanation amounts to nothing more than a table of ontological elements available at a specific time. It is a table of the x indices associated with each t index which constitute the past (what is known). A flaw free ”what is”, is “what is” explanation is one which is consistent with the known past. (A valid ”what is”, is “what is” explanation would be one which was a table of valid ontological elements available at each specific t.)

 

One problem with the ”what is”, is “what is” explanation is that it gives us not a hint as to what to expect; but that does not mean that it yields no expectations. The expectations yielded by the ”what is”, is “what is” explanation are: exactly what was seen so long as the index t refers to the past and exactly equal probability for all possibilities when the index t refers to the future.

 

If one's expectations are to be seen as given by a mathematical function of those points defined by the indices in that (x,t) plane then the abrupt change in the nature of that function at the boundary of the past (i.e., the function changes abruptly in what has been defined as the present) is a very interesting phenomena. It is essentially equivalent to the phenomena often referred to as “the collapse of the wave function: our expectations go from zero everywhere (from a mathematical perspective, the (x,t) space is continuous so equal probability for every point is exactly zero) to one for every entry in our ”what is”, is “what is” table of indices and zero for every point not in that table.

 

Note that the above analysis is valid for all pasts within the referenced data. Prior to any specific present becoming part of “the past” the expectations are exactly as describe in the previous paragraph (there is no prediction) and immediately after that present becomes part of the past the entries in the table become fixed (and the actual indices in no way contradict the expectations as they could have been anything).

 

What makes that explanation “flaw free” is that it yields exactly the ontological elements upon which it is built (including the temporal relations). What makes it worthless is that it makes utterly no usable prediction. What makes it interesting is that it defines exactly what kind of conditions any “flaw free” explanation must fulfill: it must match the ”what is”, is “what is” table exactly. The only difference between a valuable explanation and our ”what is”, is “what is” explanation is that the “valuable” explanation yields non uniform expectations outside that defined ”what is”, is “what is” table: i.e., it establishes some kind expectations above and beyond “anything goes” and gives non zero expectations outside the established past (it is capable of making predictions).

 

If you have arguments with what I have said, I am ready and willing to defend them further. If you feel my deductions so far are rational and acceptable, I will proceed further.

 

Looking to hear from you -- Dick

[Qfwfq]

Qfwfq was apparently confused by my justification for such a step so I don't know if he has just decided to vacate this discussion as irrational or was appeased by my attempt at clarification given in post #8 (this thread).

No, haven't vacated this discussion, just following. Your clarification was OK, seems to match up with what I had called a lacking logical argument; at first I had thought you meant unknown noumena.

 

'What is' is 'what is', hmmmm... reminescent of The Name! ;)

[Doctordick]

Qfwfq, Thanks for your response; feedback is always enlightening.

 

'What is' is 'what is', hmmmm... reminescent of The Name! :doh:

I googled “The Name!” and got a reference to a Dilbert plot. Was that your intention? ;) :lol:

[Qfwfq]

Goodness, no, The Name is how the Jewish often refer to yod-he-vau-he, to avoid writing or pronouncing it. Its meaning is rooted in the verb "to be" and this is closely tied to the words in Exd 3:14, translated in various ways from the Latin version (ego sum qui sum) which however is somewhat a first person singular version of the name you gave to your basic explanation. Just seemed amusing, the meaning of The Name is basically much like saying existence.

[ldsoftwaresteve]

Well sort of, yeah; but you make it sound like I am holding something over your head. I hope you don't think that I am forcing you into something. No, not at all. well, uh, you're making me try to think more clearly than I am capable but I'll let that pass

 

I think we have a starting point. Maybe it would be best if we just used the word “noumenons” to indicate the nature of reality instead of my “valid ontological elements”. Or maybe we can call “valid ontological elements” to be ontological elements which can be directly related to these noumenons. I really don't see any real conflict there as, from my perspective, neither can be exactly “known”. What is important is that the purpose of our world view is to explain “what we know”: i.e., these noumenons or valid ontological elements, whatever we choose to call them. Unless you complain, I will use the the two terms as if they mean exactly the same thing and, when I use the term “know” I will be referring to exactly this same collection of noumenons totally sans understanding.Ok. I think I'm starting to catch on here. The noumenons refer to what actually is and they happen to be outside of our belief systems or world views. It's what actually is, in spite of what we think.

 

My first step in constructing that “map” of what we know is to assert that then number of these noumenons which reside behind our explanation has to be finite. I assert this because the word “infinite” means literally that no matter how many are explicitly taken into account as being behind your current world view, there are more that are not yet included. It follows that, if you have a current world view, the number behind that world must be finite otherwise, you are not including some. Ok.

 

Just as an aside, there are those who would say that it is possible to have something which is infinite behind that world view; I hold that such a view is unacceptable as that infinite entity is either one thing or it is divisible in which case it is not “elemental”. The issue is that you cannot take into account an infinite number of elemental entities as individual entities, not that an infinite number of elemental entities can not exist. Ok. I actually agree with this too.

 

I invented and presented my definition of time as follows: “the past” is what we know (those noumenons on which the map is built); “the future” is what is not known (those noumenons which have yet to become relevant to that map). “The present” is the boundary of the past: i.e., noumenons added to those which are already part of our map. Yes.

 

The purpose of “time” was to allow our world view to accommodate changes in “what is known”: i.e., new noumenons. From the above it should be clear that “the past” can be seen as a collection of “presents”. We can see what we know as proceeding from “nothing” to what we now know as a collection of changes in “what we know”. Again, the number of “presents” we can actually know must be finite (same argument as above). If their number is finite, they can be indexed and I will call the index “time” and represent it with a number referred to as “t”.I actually like this description of it. I like it very much. It puts the concept of time in its rightful place and :) fits into my world view as well.

 

Likewise, I defined another numerical index, which I called x, to identify a specific noumenon making up a specific “present”. well, yes. X is not just one thing or one identity. Otherwise you'd have just called is snorky or something. At this point you should see that “the present” has been conceived as possibly consisting of more than one noumenon. If that is the case, I am going to further state that “order”, with respect to one another, cannot be a characteristic of these simultaneous (simultaneous meaning “occurring at the same time”) noumenons as “time” was introduced for that exact purpose.Here I suspect that you mean 'order' in the 'sequence of events' sense. So, X(1) of T(5) is not dependent upon or the result of X(2) of T(5). By definition it would be 'caused' by things in T(4), etc.

 

So, at this point, the noumenons (or valid ontological elements available to construct that map) can be seen as a collection of discreet points in an (x,t) plane. The important point being that there exists no collection of noumenons which cannot be so displayed. Ok.

 

Now I earlier defined an explanation to be a method of generating expectations from known information. Now the rubber is meeting the road.At this point, the “known information” in our map consists of a set of numbers.I suspect that you mean number pairs. Very interesting. You didn't say existing in just one x,t plane though. So, I suspect that you allow for the inclusion in the set of numbers in many planes, hence you bring sequence of events into the explanation set. Now, down the road, when one has a viable explanation of reality, these noumenons (or valid ontological elements) will be identified by that explanation. The totality of the explanation includes explaining the meanings of the words used to identify those elements. The actual symbols used to identify these elements is of no real significance at all. It could be in English, it could be in French, it could be in Chinese or it could even be in Linear A (a currently undecipherable language) which someone would have to learn first. Actually, people seem to forget learning the other languages is also an important necessity prior to understanding an explanation in one of them. So the only real difference is that a specific explanation requires a specific set of indices which are internally consistent under that explanation: i.e., the idea that our references are numerical indices is no limitation on the explanation at all. Ok. I see.COLOR]

 

Earlier I stated that my only interest was in flaw free epistemological constructs (explanations lacking a flaw of any kind). Qfwfq was apparently confused by my justification for such a step so I don't know if he has just decided to vacate this discussion as irrational or was appeased by my attempt at clarification given in post #8 (this thread). At any rate, the next step is to begin the analysis of explanations in general given the basis outlined above (a collection of discreet points in an (x,t) plane).Yes. Without sweating any particular language and the skill of its user on either the presentation end or the listener's end. But it is implied that an actual explanation would be in some language.

 

As an aside, it should(?) be clear that any flaw free explanation must explain each and every ontological element upon which it is based whether those ontological elements are valid or not. Any demonstrable error in that explanation will invalidate it. Thus we can be confident that a flaw free explanation must explain all valid ontological elements as they are a mere subset of the ontological elements it is required to explain. It follows that there is no real need to worry about whether or not the actual ontological elements required for that explanation are valid. Ok.

 

I'll continue on with the rest later.

[Doctordick]

I have only one complaint with your interpretation.

Likewise, I defined another numerical index, which I called x, to identify a specific noumenon making up a specific “present”.

well, yes. X is not just one thing or one identity. Otherwise you'd have just called is snorky or something.

x is an index, a number which is available to refer to that specific noumenon.

At this point you should see that “the present” has been conceived as possibly consisting of more than one noumenon. If that is the case, I am going to further state that “order”, with respect to one another, cannot be a characteristic of these simultaneous (simultaneous meaning “occurring at the same time”) noumenons as “time” was introduced for that exact purpose.

Here I suspect that you mean 'order' in the 'sequence of events' sense. So, X(1) of T(5) is not dependent upon or the result of X(2) of T(5). By definition it would be 'caused' by things in T(4), etc.

Causality is an aspect of an explanation and is not yet an issue here. In fact, if it were (and we were in fact trying to come up with an explanation, causality does not necessarily require the causing event to be prior to the event being caused. Oh, in our common world view it does, but I can conceive of an explanation where the cause and the consequence are simultaneous. In fact, in common physics, any cause mediated by a photon can be seen as simultaneous in the photon's frame of reference.

 

The real issue here has to do with representing these indexed items as positions in that x coordinate. When that step is taken, any order in these indices which might be significant is lost. I am afraid you are looking at the numerical indices as yielding order information which they certainly are not. These indices are being used as numerical labels and no information resides in their actual value at all: i.e., order is a separate issue and, if order is important, that information is lost when the index is represented by a position on the x axis.

 

It is a little subtle but I will try to make it clearer if you have problems.

 

And Qfwfq, the private message was meant for you. If you were referring to the Dilbert cartoons, my comments would have made sense. Thanks for the clarification.

 

Have fun -- Dick