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[coberst]

“Classical metaphysical realism cannot be true”

 

Cognitive science has introduced a new way of viewing the world and our self by declaring a new paradigm which I call the embodied mind. The primary focus is upon the fact that there is no mind/body duality but that there is indeed an integrated mind and body. The mind and body are as integrated as is the heart and the body.

 

The human thought process is dominated by the characteristic of our integrated body. The sensorimotor neural network is an integral part of our mind. The neural network that makes movement and perception possible is the same network that processes our thinking.

 

The unconscious categories that guide our human response to the world are constructed in the same way as are the categories that make it possible of other animals to survive in the world. We form categories both consciously and unconsciously.

 

Why do we feel that both our consciously created and unconsciously created categories fit the world?

 

Our consciously formed concepts fit the world, more or less, because we consciously examine the world with our senses and our reason and classify that world into these concepts we call categories.

 

Our unconsciously formed categories are a different matter. Our unconsciously formed categories fit our world because these basic-level categories “have evolved to form at least one important class of categories that optimally fit our bodily experiences of entities and certain extremely important differences in the natural environment”.

 

Our perceptual system has little difficulty distinguishing between dogs and cows or rats and squirrels. Investigation of this matter makes clear that we distinguish most readily those folk versions of biological genera, i.e. those “that have evolved significantly distinct shapes so as to take advantage of different features of their environment.”

 

If we move down to subordinate levels of the biological hierarchy we find the distinguishing ability deteriorates quickly. It is more difficult to distinguish one species of elephant from another than from distinguishing an elephant from a buffalo. It is easy to distinguish a boat from a car but more difficult distinguishing one type of car from another.

 

“Consider the categories chair and car which are in the middle of the category hierarchies furniture—chair—rocking chair and vehicle—car—sports car. In the mid-1970s, Brent Berlin, Eleanor Rosch, Carolyn Mervis, and their coworkers discovered that such mid-level categories are cogently “basic”—i.e. they have a kind of cognitive priority, as contrasted with “superordinate” categories like furniture and vehicle and with “subordinate” categories like rocking chair and sports car” (Berlin et al 1974 “Principles of Tzeltal Plant Classification”; Mervis and Rosch 1981 Categorization of Natural Objects, “Annual Review of Psychology” 32: 89-115))

 

The differences between basic-level and non basic-level categories is based upon bodily characteristics. The basic-level categories are dependent upon gestalt perception, sensorimotor programs, and mental images. “Because of this, classical metaphysical realism cannot be true, since the properties of categories are mediated by the body rather than determined directly by a mind-independent reality”

 

In humans basic level categories are developed primarily based upon our bodily configuration and its interrelationship with the environment. For other animals almost all, if not all, categories are basic-level categories.

 

What is classical metaphysical realism?

 

Quotes from "Philosophy in the Flesh" by Lakoff and Johnson

[jedaisoul]

“Classical metaphysical realism cannot be true”

 

Cognitive science has introduced a new way of viewing the world and our self by declaring a new paradigm which I call the embodied mind. The primary focus is upon the fact that there is no mind/body duality but that there is indeed an integrated mind and body. The mind and body are as integrated as is the heart and the body.

In what way does this conflict with classical philosophical realism (a.k.a. metaphysical realism)?

 

You appear to be saying that the mind is not a separate entity from the brain. I would agree with that.

 

I also agree with philosophical realism, which says that the universe exists outside our perception of it.

 

I see no conflict between these statements. Indeed:

Cognitive science tends to view the world outside the mind much as other sciences do. Thus it too has an objective, observer-independent existence.

 

Please explain why you suggest that your claims indicate that philosophical realism cannot be true? Also explain how this relates to Cognitive Science, which makes no such claim?

 

Oh, and it's a small point, but you seem to have used the word "paradigm" to mean a theoretical context. It doesn't.

[coberst]

In what way does this conflict with classical philosophical realism (a.k.a. metaphysical realism)?

 

You appear to be saying that the mind is not a separate entity from the brain. I would agree with that.

 

I also agree with philosophical realism, which says that the universe exists outside our perception of it.

 

I see no conflict between these statements. Indeed:

 

 

Please explain why you suggest that your claims indicate that philosophical realism cannot be true? Also explain how this relates to Cognitive Science, which makes no such claim?

 

Oh, and it's a small point, but you seem to have used the word "paradigm" to mean a theoretical context. It doesn't.

 

I question your statement "Oh, and it's a small point, but you seem to have used the word "paradigm" to mean a theoretical context. It doesn't"

 

I think that paradigm includes theory among other things.

 

As for the rest.

 

Descartes widened and hardened the mind/body duality more, perhaps, than any other philosopher. Ideas became internal representations; some how capable of corresponding with outside reality.

 

The popular modern version of the representation theory has representations shrinking to a minimum—this is “symbol-system realism”. In symbol system realism the mind-world gap has morphed into an arbitrary set of symbols that are meaning-coded by the user.

 

Embodied-realism is a newcomer to this menagerie of reality. “Embodied realism, rejecting the Cartesian separation, is, rather, a realism grounded in our capacity to function successfully in our physical environments. It is therefore an evolution based realism. Evolution has provided us with adapted bodies and brains that allow us to accommodate to, and even transform, our surroundings.”

 

Realism is fundamentally about how well we function in the world. The creature that fails this test of realism quickly becomes toast. Embodied realism more accurately displays the characteristics that the Greeks of 2500 years ago imagined the world to be.

 

The direct realism of the Greeks can be said to have three aspects: (1) the realist aspect that assumes the world is real and that we can function successfully in it, (2) the directness aspect that rejects the mind/body gap, and (3) the absoluteness aspect that views the world as “a unique, absolutely objective structure of which we can have an absolutely, correct, objective knowledge”.

 

Analytic philosophy’s symbol-system reality “accepts (3) denies (2) and claims that (1) follows from three…Embodied realism accepts (1) and denies that we have any access to (3).”

 

Regarding the quickie from Wiki

 

I guess that the wiki statement was created by someone who knew nothing about the new paradigm of the embodied mind.

[jedaisoul]

I question your statement "Oh, and it's a small point, but you seem to have used the word "paradigm" to mean a theoretical context. It doesn't". I think that paradigm includes theory among other things.

I was speaking of it's scientific meaning. However, I acknowledge that in common parlance the word "paradigm" is used more loosely.

...Embodied realism more accurately displays the characteristics that the Greeks of 2500 years ago imagined the world to be. The direct realism of the Greeks can be said to have three aspects:

(1) the realist aspect that assumes the world is real and that we can function successfully in it,

(2) the directness aspect that rejects the mind/body gap, and

(3) the absoluteness aspect that views the world as “a unique, absolutely objective structure of which we can have an absolutely, correct, objective knowledge”.

 

Analytic philosophy’s symbol-system reality “accepts (3) denies (2) and claims that (1) follows from three…Embodied realism accepts (1) and denies that we have any access to (3).”

So, if I get it right, you have shown that a meaning that is no longer applied to the term "metaphysical realism" is incompatible with a modern theories of cognitive science. Well that was informative.

 

Furthermore:

a) You first say that "Embodied realism more accurately displays the characteristics that the Greeks of 2500 years ago".

:) You then say (3) that the Greeks "view(ed) the world as 'a unique, absolutely objective structure of which we can have an absolutely, correct, objective knowledge'”.

c) You then say "Embodied realism... denies that we have any access to (3).”

 

I'm confused. Exactly what relevance does this have to metaphysical realism?

[Thunderbird]

“Classical metaphysical realism cannot be true”

 

Cognitive science has introduced a new way of viewing the world and our self by declaring a new paradigm which I call the embodied mind. The primary focus is upon the fact that there is no mind/body duality but that there is indeed an integrated mind and body. The mind and body are as integrated as is the heart and the body.

 

 

 

 

In humans basic level categories are developed primarily based upon our bodily configuration and its interrelationship with the environment. For other animals almost all, if not all, categories are basic-level categories.

 

What is classical metaphysical realism?

 

 

 

 

If I may take this view point of taxonomic categorizations to further levels.

DNA is in fact a hierarchal memory bank.

This memory bank holds a blue print and constructs a hierarchal physiological structure.

The brain is one layer of this hierarchal structure.

The brains also contains a hierarchal structure that is emergent from the body as an evolutionary result.

In the area of the mind there is also a hierarchal memory structure containing layers of information.

Its interesting to note, that utilizing this view point and the views of quantum physicist, there does not exists a definite boundary between, not only the mind-body, but also no real defined boundary between the molecular-atomic/subatomic world, that we are perceiving.

 

This reflective fractal hierarchal system persists until we reach the quantum level were all things become one.

 

This leads me to view point that are minds and bodies are emergent from pre-existing information welling up out of the quantum world.

Intuitively and also from what I have studied, these systems can best be described as, “Emergent Chaotic Attractors”

[coberst]

Jedaisoul

 

"Classical metaphysical realism cannot be true, since the properties of categories are mediated by the body rather than determined directly by a mind-independent reality”

[jedaisoul]

"Classical metaphysical realism cannot be true, since the properties of categories are mediated by the body rather than determined directly by a mind-independent reality”

I note that you put that statement in quote marks, which indicates you are quoting a published author.

 

Has it occurred to you that the statement "classical metaphysical realism cannot be true..." is an opinion (my italics). Simply re-stating it does not make it a fact. It is perfectly possible that classical metaphysical realism could be true.

 

Now, I happen to believe that our perception of reality is mediated by the senses. All perception is subjective. But stating that view does not make classical metaphysical realism false. All that has been done is to propose an alternative. It is true to say that both views cannot be true, but which one is false is an opinion.

 

Do you see the point I'm making?

[coberst]

I note that you put that statement in quote marks, which indicates you are quoting a published author.

 

Has it occurred to you that the statement "classical metaphysical realism cannot be true..." is an opinion (my italics). Simply re-stating it does not make it a fact. It is perfectly possible that classical metaphysical realism could be true.

 

Now, I happen to believe that our perception of reality is mediated by the senses. All perception is subjective. But stating that view does not make classical metaphysical realism false. All that has been done is to propose an alternative. It is true to say that both views cannot be true, but which one is false is an opinion.

 

Do you see the point I'm making?

 

The quote comes from the same book used in the OP. This book is not offering opinion it is offering hypothesis/theory.

 

I would say that there is opinion—that which happens to be flying by the mind when something is needed, everyone has an opinion about almost everything, opinions are a dime-a-dozen; then there is considered opinion, which is opinion fortified by serious thought; then there is judgment which is fortified by study and analysis; then there is hypothesis/theory, which has received serious attempt to disprove.

[jedaisoul]

The quote comes from the same book used in the OP. This book is not offering opinion it is offering hypothesis/theory.

That still does not make it established fact. We are not dealing here with hard science. We are dealing with beliefs and ideas, however you may wish to categorise them. So the statement “Classical metaphysical realism cannot be true” is not a statement of fact, it is opinion. I do not use that word to denigrate it. It may be the most refined sort of opinion, but it is not fact.

[coberst]

That still does not make it established fact. We are not dealing here with hard science. We are dealing with beliefs and ideas, however you may wish to categorise them. So the statement “Classical metaphysical realism cannot be true” is not a statement of fact, it is opinion. I do not use that word to denigrate it. It may be the most refined sort of opinion, but it is not fact.

 

Since you do not want to use my definition then you must supply the definitions of 'opinion', 'established fact' and hard science. Does cognitive science qualify as a hard science?

[jedaisoul]

Since you do not want to use my definition then you must supply the definitions of 'opinion', 'established fact' and hard science. Does cognitive science qualify as a hard science?

I have no intention of getting into a semantic argument about the meanings of the words. I have said that I do not imply a denegration by using the term "opinion".

 

Are you suggesting that you regard Cognitive Science as a hard science (as the term is generally used)? If so, on what do you base that view?

[coberst]

I have no intention of getting into a semantic argument about the meanings of the words. I have said that I do not imply a denegration by using the term "opinion".

 

Are you suggesting that you regard Cognitive Science as a hard science (as the term is generally used)? If so, on what do you base that view?

 

I do not generally use that phrase "hard science" because it appears too pejorative. But if I did I would be inclined to call the natural sciences as being hard sciences and the human sciences being soft sciences. Is cognitive science a natural science? It deals with human cognition, which is a natural science, but it also is a human sciences. So it must be a moderately hard science. That is why I seldom use the phrase.

 

The book “Philosophy in the Flesh” defines what I call the new paradigm for cognitive science. It is an empirical science engaging primarily linguists, neuroscientists, philosophers, and I have one book “A Clearing in the Forest” authored by Steven Winter the Walter S. Gibbs Professor of Constitutional Law and director of the Center for Legal Studies at Wayne State University Law School.

 

In my judgment this cognitive science is not just something off the top of the head that contains little or no value. It is much more than a collection of opinions.

[fresco]

Cobert's claim that he (or Lakoff) is introducing "new" ideas is banal. We can trace the questioning of "metaphysical reality" from Kant, through Vico, Piaget and Wittgenstein (amongst many others). For those interested see my "Santiago Theory of Cognition" thread on this forum, or google "Maturana" the current main reference.

 

If you are a "scientist", you are correct in questioning the status of the label "cognitive science", with the proviso that questions about "reality" make concepts like "truth" and "facts" subject to deconstruction by association. For example Von Glaserfeld, commenting on Maturana's system, points out that the Latin origin of "facts" is facere (to make) thereby encompassing Maturana's view that "reality" is constructed by the actions of a living system.

 

A good overview of these ideas is Fritjof Capra's "The Web of Life". IMO Cobert's "Lakoff reference" is a side show written by linguists anxious to get in on the act for publication purposes.