What I believe an explanation is!

[modest]

I have elsewhere divided the information standing behind an explanation (i.e., the information being explained) into two very different categories: valid and hypothesized information. Valid information is defined to be the actual information to be explained and hypothesized information is an essential part of the explanation. That is to say, hypothesized information must be true if the explanation is to be valid; however, if the explanation is removed (discounted or disproved) the hypothesized information may also be removed. Valid information, on the other hand, being the actual information to be explained can not ever be removed: each and every explanation must explain that information.

Yes, that seems a reasonable way to categorize the information. Would I be correct that a parallel is to be made between hypothesized information (including the explanation) and a worldview?

 

I would like to simplify that argument a bit. Let me put forth the idea that anything which would allow one to predict information not known from information which is known could be called an understood explanation. Now again I bring up another subtle cavil. That idea, as specified, seems to require actual prediction. Let me suggest that an explanation need not actually do such a thing. If we turn the proposed solution around, one could say that, given an arbitrary prediction, an acceptable explanation could tell us if that prediction were acceptable or not. I do this because this point of view turns the situation to a relationship which can be easily expressed.

I would agree with that; however, I would put it a little differently. Any explanation of anything would, of necessity, add “hypothesized information”.

 

Would you agree modest or do you have some serious complaints with my position at this point?

 

Yes, I do. The only possible sticky point:

That idea, as specified, seems to require actual prediction. Let me suggest that an explanation need not actually do such a thing. If we turn the proposed solution around, one could say that, given an arbitrary prediction, an acceptable explanation could tell us if that prediction were acceptable or not.

An explanation would indeed tell us if a prediction were acceptable or not, but I prefer testing the prediction as a means of "testing" the explanation. I say this because additional information can invalidate a seemingly sound explanation. An obvious example is Newtonian mechanics. Michelson and Morley provided information that tested the mechanics (or the explanation) which had previously seemed acceptable. Actually, that may not be the best example given recent discussion. Let's say geocentrism used to be an acceptable explanation for the apparent motion of the sun and moon but that additional information invalidated the predictions and the explanation and required heliocentrism.

 

So, I'd say it's true that "given an arbitrary prediction, an acceptable explanation could tell us if that prediction were acceptable or not", but that would not necessary mean the prediction would be correct.

 

~modest

[Doctordick]

Hi modest, you seem to be awfully close to understanding what I am saying.

Would I be correct that a parallel is to be made between hypothesized information (including the explanation) and a worldview?

Well, I wouldn't put it that way (I think it oversimplifies the issue) but I guess the comment is not totally “off the wall”. Suppose we just let that idea slide for the moment as I don't really see that it adds anything to what I am saying.

 

Other than that, I find your response to be very acceptable except for one subtle misunderstanding. That has to do with my comment!

Let me suggest that an explanation need not actually do such a thing. If we turn the proposed solution around, one could say that, given an arbitrary prediction, an acceptable explanation could tell us if that prediction were acceptable or not.

You seem to think that specification is insufficient and I think you are wrong for a very important reason.

I prefer testing the prediction as a means of "testing" the explanation.

First of all, we are not talking about “testing the explanation” here. If we are going to “define” an explanation via the assertion, “an explanation transforms non-comprehensible and non-understandable information into comprehensible and understandable information” (which, by the way I agree with completely), we are directly faced with the problem of determining if an explanation is understood. This is a subtly different question and your constraint is just not sufficiently general to include all possibilities. At the same time, that very constraint is actually included in my specification. Let me try to clarify the situation with an example taken from the circumstance I have already presented.

So, how do we come to the conclusion that a body of information is “understood”? Actually, this is a problem faced by every teacher in the history of the world. They attempt to discover the answer to that question by testing their students. The tests can easily be seen as an interaction where the teacher provides some information and then examines the students response to that information (that is why they call them “examinations” :) ). If the student's response is consistent with the possible responses the teacher would give to the same information, then the teacher will presume the student understands the information. I think any conceivable test which can be given can be cast into that format.

There are many circumstances in many explanations where a specific answer does not exist (understanding something does not always lead to a single incontrovertible response to a specified circumstance). Furthermore, if you constrain the possibilities for a specific circumstance to a single specific answer (essentially a specific prediction) then you are actually testing the information available to the respondent, not his or her understanding of that information.

 

That is why I suggest turning the proposed solution around. Instead of allowing only one specific answer, allow all possible answers and require the explanation to tell us if the obtained response were acceptable or not. Your case, allowing only one specific response, is included in such a definition (all the explanation need do is yield “unacceptable” for all responses except the one specific response desired for the specific circumstance under examination) while at the same time the more complex circumstances mentioned above are still included.

I say this because additional information can invalidate a seemingly sound explanation.

Once again, you indicate that you do not understand what Anssi and I are talking about. We have mentioned many times that the explanations we are talking about are “flaw-free”; that means that no information is available which invalidates the explanation. New information invalidating an explanation merely makes that explanation no longer flaw-free and thus no longer a member of the possibilities we are interested in.

So, I'd say it's true that "given an arbitrary prediction, an acceptable explanation could tell us if that prediction were acceptable or not", but that would not necessary mean the prediction would be correct.

Nowhere have Anssi or I suggested that any explanation under consideration was “correct”. What we said was that it was flaw-free, a very different matter. This whole presentation has to do with designing a flaw-free explanation of arbitrary given information. To do that, I need to define exactly what is meant by “an explanation”. I very much like your definition: “an explanation transforms non-comprehensible and non-understandable information into comprehensible and understandable information” (it is very much exactly what I have in my mind for the definition). And that definition requires a method of determining whether the explanation is understood.

 

An explanation which is either not understood or not flaw-free is a pretty worthless construct. Does any of this make sense to you?

 

Have fun -- Dick

[modest]

Hi modest, you seem to be awfully close to understanding what I am saying.

Thank you. I have understood fine everything you've said in this thread. Moreover, I've not yet disagreed with any of it.

That is why I suggest turning the proposed solution around. Instead of allowing only one specific answer, allow all possible answers and require the explanation to tell us if the obtained response were acceptable or not.

That's fine. If information is explained then the explanation provides a means of relating a subset of information (A) to another subset of information (:(. With the explanation in hand a person could predict the contents of B given A and given some arbitrarily predicted B the explanation would say if it is indeed a valid prediction of A.

 

You seem to open up the possibility that there is more than one possible B given A and the explanation and I'd agree with that. I can certainly think of examples... so, yeah, I'm OK with that.

 

Your case, allowing only one specific response...

 

I really didn't mean to imply that, but given there are multiple valid predictions that can be generated with some information and an explanation, I'd agree the most concise way to express what we're saying would be: "given an arbitrary prediction, an acceptable explanation could tell us if that prediction were acceptable or not".

 

So, I'd say it's true that "given an arbitrary prediction, an acceptable explanation could tell us if that prediction were acceptable or not", but that would not necessary mean the prediction would be correct.

Nowhere have Anssi or I suggested that any explanation under consideration was “correct”. What we said was that it was flaw-free, a very different matter.

Good. Then we agree. I don't mean as a criticism that "given an arbitrary prediction, an acceptable explanation could tell us if that prediction were acceptable or not" does not make the explanation correct [edit:does not mean the prediction is "correct"]. It's simply true, and you agree. So, there's no need for you to get along with your "you don't understand what I'm doing" thing.

 

This whole presentation has to do with designing a flaw-free explanation of arbitrary given information.

 

Good. That makes sense.

 

So, how do we model this explanation?

 

~modest

[Boerseun]

How about the following:

 

An "explanation" is the determination of the relationship between certain variables.

 

Like the 112 example in a previous post, the relationship can be explained as 1+1=2.

 

And the "2" will not be a "result" in the classical sense; it, too, will be a variable - to be used in some other relationship - which is the reason the question was asked in the first place.

[Doctordick]

How about the following:

My problem with what you say is that it is essentially “an approach by example”: i.e., it is not a definition (which I see as a prescription for determining membership to a category) but rather an approach which presumes one will eventually develop a definition on their own. It isn't a basis for deduction but is essentially a problem identical to the problem under discussion; the problem of understanding.

 

So, to get back to the issue under discussion.

Good. That makes sense.

 

So, how do we model this explanation?

It is very important that no possibility be eliminated: i.e., the model must be without any presumptions so there is a need to be careful. The first issue to be handled is the fact that we must allow for a change in the information being explained; no matter what is being explained, it is possible that we might obtain additional information and our model must accommodate that fact. That is where I develop my definition of time, a definition which is applicable to the analysis of any problem even if the conventional idea of “time” has no bearing on the problem.

 

I define time through the following procedure: I define “the past” to be the information to be explained, “the future” to be information not available and “the present” to be a change in the information available to be explained. (The concept “information” has not yet been defined; remember, we want to make no presumptions.) Under my definition of “the past”, the past can be seen as a collection of presents: i.e., we can start with no information and proceed to build the past from a collection of presents.

 

This definition seems to me to be the only way of encompassing the possibility of an explanation changing. The definition is applicable to examination of any information conceivable, even in a circumstance where the common idea of “time” is not considered pertinent, and yet the definition is perfectly in accordance with the common everyday concept of time: the idea of time being a sequence of “presents”; the idea that the past cannot be changed and, finally, the fact that the future is “unknown”. The last may seem to be a violation of the common everyday concept but, in actual fact, it is not. Anytime a “prediction” is made (under the presumption that the future can be predicted), a test of that prediction requires the circumstance to become part of the past before such a test can be checked. What I am getting at is the fact that the idea that the future can be predicted is an illusion; such an idea can never be tested as all tests merely certify that the past is consistent with the explanation, the test then being part of the past.

 

That last fact leads me to the idea of a “flaw-free” explanation: i.e., an explanation which is perfectly consistent with all available information. I am not asserting that any given explanation “is” flaw-free but rather that we need not concern ourselves with explanations which are not “flaw-free”. Discovery that an explanation is flawed (inconsistent with the past as defined) is sufficient to discount that explanation.

 

If you have any complaints with the above let me know and (assuming for the moment that they are misunderstandings) I will try clarify my intentions.

 

Have fun -- Dick

[modest]

I again apologize for the delay. I’m very interested in this topic and I do want to be very involved in the discussion. I’m, unfortunately, rebuilding my deck which is taking most of my ‘free’ time.

 

It is very important that no possibility be eliminated: i.e., the model must be without any presumptions so there is a need to be careful.

 

I take a presumption as an assumption that is taken for granted. I therefore agree they should be avoided. I really don’t have a problem, on the other hand, with assumptions so long as they are clearly recognized for what they are so that the completed model is understood to require the validity of those assumptions.

 

The first issue to be handled is the fact that we must allow for a change in the information being explained; no matter what is being explained, it is possible that we might obtain additional information and our model must accommodate that fact.

 

This is a big step for me. I didn’t realize you would be modeling a changing explanation or accounting for changing information (other than the change that accompanies the transformation of unexplained info to explained info). I would have expected concepts of change and ‘time’ to be part of the information needing an explanation and not necessarily an a priori mechanism of the model. But, I’m looking with an open mind and certainly willing to give all benefit of any doubt...

 

I define time through the following procedure: I define “the past” to be the information to be explained, “the future” to be information not available and “the present” to be a change in the information available to be explained. (The concept “information” has not yet been defined; remember, we want to make no presumptions.)

 

You keep stressing “no presumptions” and I’m less and less sure what you mean by that.

 

I could define the future as information informing the explanation, the past as information not yet available, and the present as a change in the information being explained (i.e. information loss). That would make perfect sense to me if the arrow of time were reversed. The future would cause the present. For example, a shattered and spilled glass of water on the floor amounts to information which needs explained. There are a number of possibilities predicted by the explanation. There is then a change in the information where the mess on the floor changes into a single glass of water sitting on the table. The system being described has now lost information (a well-ordered system amounts to less information than the same system in a disordered state). There are now less possibilities predicted by the explanation.

 

This explanation could be imagined as going further and further back into the past finally reaching a point where the system has zero entropy and any information is completely explainable and predictable. The probability of successfully predicting any given unknown element would be 100%.

 

So it seems to me that your definition of past, present, and future rely in a subtle way on our intuitive notions of causality. Saying that information in the past is what gets changed (and specifically: added to) is comparable to the idea of information in the past causing the change in the present. But, if we’re not relying on our senses and intuition to tell us this is the way it should work then we would just as easily conclude using pur force of logic that information from the future gets changed—that it causes the change. So, this does seem like an assumption is being made about the arrow of time pointing toward the future.

 

This definition seems to me to be the only way of encompassing the possibility of an explanation changing... the idea of time being a sequence of “presents”; the idea that the past cannot be changed and, finally, the fact that the future is “unknown”.

 

I'm having a hard time seeing "past" and "future" as necessary for encompassing the possibility of the explanation changing. I could, for example, write a computer program to generate the first n primes and each instance of the program (or each iteration) it could increase n by 1 by altering itself. In this case the explanation of the data were we to examine it would be the program. The function of the program is also the explanation of the data. The data changes (as does the explanation) without the need for the program being modeled after definitions of past and future.

 

I don't see how such concepts are necessary to maintain the integrity of the concept of change. I'm also not sure about "change" being necessary to maintain the integrity of an explanation.

 

~modest

 

PS—I'm not dismissing your approach, just thinking critically about it.

[Doctordick]

I again apologize for the delay. I’m very interested in this topic and I do want to be very involved in the discussion. I’m, unfortunately, rebuilding my deck which is taking most of my ‘free’ time.

If I had the time, I would tell you about all the stuff I have on my agenda. Don't worry about it.

I really don’t have a problem, on the other hand, with assumptions so long as they are clearly recognized for what they are so that the completed model is understood to require the validity of those assumptions.

I have defined “an explanation”; if I add assumptions now, that means I have to redefined “an explanation” otherwise, there could be explanations which do not fit into my model. Thus an assumption would introduce an error; it follows, therefore, that I must be very careful not to make assumptions.

This is a big step for me. I didn’t realize you would be modeling a changing explanation or accounting for changing information.

I am building a model of the concept “an explanation”. As information changes, it is certainly possible that a flaw-free explanation might also change. Allowing for such change does not require a change but disallowing such change does constrain the model to explanations which do not change and that would be, in my opinion, a rather extreme assumption about explanations in general.

You keep stressing “no presumptions” and I’m less and less sure what you mean by that.

Every instance fulfilling the definition of “an explanation” must be included in the model.

I could define the future as information informing the explanation, the past as information not yet available, and the present as a change in the information being explained (i.e. information loss). That would make perfect sense to me if the arrow of time were reversed.

It seems to me that you are presuming the validity of “time” as you perceive it in your world view. You should understand that I am doing two things here. I am first defining a thing I am going to call time. Time is no more than an index explicitly denoting a change in what is known: i.e., a change in the information that flaw-free explanation is to explain. I then point out that this thing I have defined can be mapped into the common concept of time. That second step is actually not necessary but is rather little more than pointing out how that definition maps into the common concept: i.e., an excuse for calling the index “time”.

 

You want to use a somewhat different definition of time. I do not really understand how you intend to use your definition. First of all, do you mean to say “the future as information in forming the explanation”? If not, you will have to define what you mean by “informing”. If you are going to use the index to indicate “loss of information” then the analysis does not seem to make much sense: we start off with “all possible information” and form a flaw-free explanation. We then forget some information and this is to engender a change in that flaw-free explanation but the purpose of an explanation is to reproduce information from subsets of that information. Thus, if we have a flaw-free explanation for “all the information” and then lose some of the information, we can use that explanation to reproduce the lost information. There is thus no required change in the explanation at all.

 

Unless of course, we also lose the explanation with every change in information; but if that is the case, every present requires a new explanation. I don't understand what you have in mind with your definition of time and am very suspicious that you haven't thought the issue out.

The future would cause the present.

”Cause”? Aren't you presuming that every explanation includes causality? I think I can give you a very simple explanation which requires no causality at all. Anssi and I have discussed that explanation as a starting point. That would be the ”what is” is “what is” explanation. Causality plays no roll at all in such an explanation.

The probability of successfully predicting any given unknown element would be 100%.

With an explanation based on no information? I have no idea what you have in mind.

So, this does seem like an assumption is being made about the arrow of time pointing toward the future.

No it does not. The index “t” as defined has no direction associated with it, as defined, it is merely an index on a specific change in information. It is your explanation which assigns order to the indices.

I'm having a hard time seeing "past" and "future" as necessary for encompassing the possibility of the explanation changing. I could, for example, write a computer program to generate the first n primes and each instance of the program (or each iteration) it could increase n by 1 by altering itself. In this case the explanation of the data were we to examine it would be the program.

Again you are using an example where you presume to know the specific explanation, you are not concerning yourself with the general case.

I'm not dismissing your approach, just thinking critically about it.

I have included the idea that you are not all knowing and the creation of your explanation might be erroneous because of the the fact that there might be information you are not aware of. I am using the index “t” to handle this kind of problem. Don't worry about the fact that I call it “time”. Perhaps it does not map perfectly into your concept of time (though I doubt that) the important issue is that it handles the fact that the information on which the explanation is based can change.

 

Have fun -- Dick

[modest]

I could define the future as information informing the explanation, the past as information not yet available, and the present as a change in the information being explained (i.e. information loss). That would make perfect sense to me if the arrow of time were reversed.

...First of all, do you mean to say “the future as information in forming the explanation”? If not, you will have to define what you mean by “informing”. If you are going to use the index to indicate “loss of information” then the analysis does not seem to make much sense: we start off with “all possible information” and form a flaw-free explanation.

 

Yeah, I didn’t make any sense there. I was intending, but somehow failed miserably, to define the future as lost information, the present as a change in information, and the past as the source of information (the information which gets changed). I’m intending to point out that your definition of past and future assume that the change in information is futureward rather than pastward. Of course, our experience and intuition tell us this is true, but if you’re eliminating all possible presumptions then I’m quite sure that an explanation can cope with information changing from future to past.

 

To give an example, there is a coin on a table positioned heads-up while a video camera records it. This makes a closed system which we might represent with information. The screen on the video camera (and the camera’s memory) will show the image of a heads-up coin which amounts to a subset of information. With an explanation involving the nature of video cameras and coins and patterns of that sort we can predict another subset of information—the heads/tails value of the actual coin.

 

When the information changes we now have a coin spinning on the table. The camera’s memory and screen contain no subset of information revealing the coin’s value. Information has been lost in the change. This information loss amounts to a lowering of information entropy as the complete state description of the system has gotten smaller. Without advocating a definition of time, I’ll just point out (as you well know) this lowering of entropy amounts to an arrow of time opposite what physicists normally attribute our universe.

 

I'd really like to know you understand what I mean before moving on.

 

~modest

[Doctordick]

Modest, I want you to know that your interest is very important to me. Above you I might only place Qfwfq and Erasmus00 but Qfwfq has apparently found other interests and Erasmus00 seems to have found questioning modern physics to be blasphemy. I appreciate very much the willingness to examine other possibilities.

I’m intending to point out that your definition of past and future assume that the change in information is futureward rather than pastward.

Change in information is change in information; the actual “t” index assigned to that change in information is an open issue. I have not defined that assignment. The actual assignment is to be provided by the explanation. The definitions, as I have given them, are still open.

To give an example, there is a coin on a table positioned heads-up while a video camera records it. This makes a closed system which we might represent with information. The screen on the video camera (and the camera’s memory) will show the image of a heads-up coin which amounts to a subset of information. With an explanation involving the nature of video cameras and coins and patterns of that sort we can predict another subset of information—the heads/tails value of the actual coin.

 

When the information changes we now have a coin spinning on the table. The camera’s memory and screen contain no subset of information revealing the coin’s value.

I am afraid that you have misinterpreted what is meant by “the past is the information available”.

Information has been lost in the change. This information loss amounts to a lowering of information entropy as the complete state description of the system has gotten smaller.

There is a very great difference between “the information available” and the information contained in a particular present. What is or what is not available to the production of an explanation is quite a different issue.

Without advocating a definition of time, I’ll just point out (as you well know) this lowering of entropy amounts to an arrow of time opposite what physicists normally attribute our universe.

Yes, I am quite aware of this issue and I actually find it to be a distraction from the central issue. I hope you can recognize the problem embedded in the attitude expressed here.

I'd really like to know you understand what I mean before moving on.

Of course I think I do; however, it is your opinion which of interest here. Do you think I understand what you mean?

 

Have fun -- Dick

[modest]

I should also add, because this is interesting:

 

If you are going to use the index to indicate “loss of information” then the analysis does not seem to make much sense: we start off with “all possible information” and form a flaw-free explanation. We then forget some information and this is to engender a change in that flaw-free explanation but the purpose of an explanation is to reproduce information from subsets of that information. Thus, if we have a flaw-free explanation for “all the information” and then lose some of the information, we can use that explanation to reproduce the lost information. There is thus no required change in the explanation at all.

 

Yes, if you consider the change in information to move pastward then the change in information (the loss of info) can be reconstructed with the explanation. Likewise, if we consider the change to be futureward then the change (the addition of info) can be constructed with the explanation. Either way it amounts to predicting the future, which as you rightfully point out, can be done if "all the information" is known. I'd add that the info would need to be deterministic as well.

 

~modest

 

EDIT: you posted your reply above while I was making this post. I will reply to your post above...

[Doctordick]

Yes, if you consider the change in information to move pastward then the change in information (the loss of info) can be reconstructed with the explanation. Likewise, if we consider the change to be futureward then the change (the addition of info) can be constructed with the explanation. Either way it amounts to predicting the future, which as you rightfully point out, can be done if "all the information" is known. I'd add that the info would need to be deterministic as well.

Once again, you are speaking in terms of a mental view of “an explanation” of some sort and not the issue of modeling “the defined entity” (an explanation).

 

What I am getting at is the fact that we have apparently agreed as to the definition of “an explanation”. We now have that definition to work with and, to go on from there, we need to model the thing which was defined; not something you may have in your mind. If you are complaining about the definition, then we should discuss that issue; if not, examples of explanations don't really play a roll in what follows for two very serious reasons. First, we don't know what information exists to be explained (our model is to be absolutely general) and second, we do not know how to achieve that explanation. In other words, actually discussing any specific explanation of anything is pretty much a waste of time: we need to work with the definition itself.

 

Hope that makes sense to you -- Dick

[modest]

I am afraid that you have misinterpreted what is meant by “the past is the information available”.

 

Perhaps. Seeing the past defined as "information to be explained" along with the qualifier that additional information could be added and then the deduction "This definition seems to me to be the only way of encompassing the possibility of an explanation changing."... threw up a bit of a red flag in that I could conceive of a slightly different way of encompassing the possibility of change—or at least a different way of defining it.

 

But, it was only your definition of past, present, and future which I was questioning as assumptive. That may be completely beside the point, as I find this very agreeable:

 

Change in information is change in information; the actual “t” index assigned to that change in information is an open issue. I have not defined that assignment. The actual assignment is to be provided by the explanation. The definitions, as I have given them, are still open.

 

This sounds good. I can certainly agree that modeling change (any kind of change) requires an index (some kind of ordering).

 

Without advocating a definition of time, I’ll just point out (as you well know) this lowering of entropy amounts to an arrow of time opposite what physicists normally attribute our universe.

Yes, I am quite aware of this issue and I actually find it to be a distraction from the central issue. I hope you can recognize the problem embedded in the attitude expressed here.

 

A bit perplexing. My use of "entropy" and "arrow of time" were an attempt to explain an example of what I meant by "loss of information" and "pastward" which themselves were presented only as a counterexample. If I was raising an issue or expressing an attitude with that example then I am unaware of it and I do not recognize the 'embedded problem'.

 

I'd really like to know you understand what I mean before moving on.

Of course I think I do; however, it is your opinion which of interest here. Do you think I understand what you mean?

 

Yes, and I consider this:

Change in information is change in information;

the actual “t” index assigned to that change in information

is an open issue. I have not defined that assignment. The actual assignment is to be provided by the explanation. The definitions, as I have given them, are still open.

to have set the issue straight. So... what's next...

 

~modest

[Rade]

In reading the first post on this thread, I find that it is false to suggest that first is needed 'something' to have an explanation. It is also possible to explain 'nothing'. Given that no definition of this 'something' is provided in OP statement, logically it must be assumed it is an existent, some 'thing' that exists. Explanation however is possible not only to the 'being' but also the 'nothingness'.

 

To begin a study of explanation itself, one must begin with a 'process' via communication. One does not begin with a 'something', the 'something' is after the fact of the process. Let me provide an example. Suppose you are asked to 'explain' to a child for the first time (for them and you) how to put together the pieces of a 10 piece puzzle. You do not begin your explanation with a 'something' (either the whole puzzle or any specific piece), you begin with communication of a process, in this example a process of a becoming. The explanation is not of some past information, but of the future process. It thus is false to claim that ...the past is defined as information to be explained...what needs to be explained is the process of how the present (the 10 puzzle pieces) evolve to the future (the puzzle as whole). The past requires no explanation, it requires understanding, which is a completely different concept.

 

For 'something', to have 'information', there must be constraint on variety, but, many 'something'(s) that I or he or she can categorize have absolutely no 'kind of information', thus it is false to claim that an explanation need do anything to (or for) information, as is claimed in the first post on this thread.

 

The study of explanation itself, after identification of a process, is to categorize the process. It thus follows that "an explanation" is communication that puts constraint on variety of different categories of process. The human mind (i.e., thought) does not DO ANYTHING TO (or for) INFORMATION, it is information (the constraint on the variety) that does something to the human mind (think of how the red-green-yellow information of the traffic light does something to your mind as you drive the auto).

 

Now, there are three types of processes (1) those of a becoming (2) those of a doing away with (3) those of staying the same. Thus it follows that there are three types of explanation: (1) those concerning the process of 'something' becoming in the future as relates to the present (2) those that involve the process of 'something' being taken apart (3) those that involve the process of staying the same. Thus, explanation itself is the sum over the history of all such possibilities of process.

[arkain101]

In reading the first post on this thread, I find that it is false to suggest that first is needed 'something' to have an explanation. It is also possible to explain 'nothing'.

 

I read through your whole post, but I had difficulty understanding some of your original thoughts.

 

Can you provide such an example?

 

Lastly, this topic is DD's effort to communicate fully what "he" thinks an explanation is. I assume he expects our contradictory thoughts to patiently wait until DD's effort is complete, or possibly be directed to another topic all together.

 

You supply information worth discussing in my opinions, however, as I have been reading through this topic, the main purpose is to follow DD's process of step by step confirmation and understanding untill he has fully explained this belief he has in an successful process of communition.

[Doctordick]

Hi modest, I am sorry to be so slow in responding but I wanted first to be confident that I had done the best of my abiltiy to be clear. I have just changed the opening entry on the WikipediA page, UniversalExplanation, to the following:

First of all, in order to have an explanation, one needs something to explain. Whatever it is that is to be explained, it can be certainly be categorized as some kind of information. It thus follows that "an explanation" is something which is done to (or for) information. The central issue is then, if we are to define "an explanation" in general, we must lay down exactly what an explanation does to (or for) that information.

 

Many people have put forth the idea that an explanation makes information understandable. This idea requires one clarify exactly how the existence of understanding is to be determined. This is a problem faced by every teacher in the history of the world. They attempt to discover the answer to that question by testing their students. The tests can easily be seen as an interaction where the teacher provides some information and then examines the students response to that information. If the student's response is consistent with the possible responses the teacher would give to the same information, then the teacher will presume the student understands the information. So the central issue of understanding anything is obtaining results in “agreement with expectations”.

 

In accordance with that observation, I will define “what an explanation must do for information” as “it must provide expectations of subsets of that information”. That is, it seems to me that if all the information is known, then any questions about the information can be answered (in fact, that could be regarded as the definition of "knowing"). On the other hand, if the information is understood (explainable), then questions about the information can be answered given only limited or incomplete knowledge of the underlying information: i.e., limited subsets of the information. What I am saying is that understanding implies it is possible to predict expectations for information which is not known and that an explanation of that information constitutes a method which provides one with those rational expectations for unknown information consistent with what is known.

 

Thus I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information.

 

It follows that a model of an explanation must posses two fundamental components: the information to be explained and the mechanism used to generate expectations for possible additional information. The first fundamental component is, "what is to be explained"; thus our first problem is to find an abstract way of representing any body of information. One very important characteristic of the “information to be explained” is that our general model of an explanation needs to be able to accommodate to changing information for two reasons. First, if our explanation cannot accommodate to changing information, it can not explain anything which is not already known and, second, any explanation which does not allow a change in information presumes we are all knowing, a rather extreme constraint for a general model.

 

Thus I define three concepts; the first I call “the past” which consists of the known information, the second I call “the future” which consists of what is not known and finally, “the present” which consists of a change in what is known. Under these definitions, the past can be seen as a collection of presents. Since the information available to be explained must be finite, it can be ordered and I will define the ordering index to be “time” which I will represent with the letter “t”.

which I hope is a clearer expression than what I had before. If anyone has any suggestion which they think would make what I am saying clearer, I would appreciate it.

 

Except for Rade that is, as I am really not interested in “explaining nothing” as it seems to me to be a rather worthless effort; I have always been told that an explanation which explains nothing is called BS. Besides that, without possessing at least the knowledge of these seven letters, “N-O-T-H-I-N-G”, I can not comprehend how Rade would begin an attempt to explain “nothing”.

I can certainly agree that modeling change (any kind of change) requires an index (some kind of ordering).

This comment raises one important issue which is worth talking about. Given an arbitrary set of things, the idea of “ordering” them (essentially the concept embedded in an “index”) can not be accomplished if the number of things in the set is infinite. One should remember that the original definition of “infinite” (and the one I use) is that, no matter how many you have examined, there are more which you have not examined (such an examination can not finish). Thus it is that suggesting that the “presents” going to make up “the past” can be indexed implies that the number known is finite. The same issue goes for the number of “valid” elements making up any specific present. The information upon which any explanation is based must be finite; however, since one must always include the fact that, no matter how much information we have to work with, the possibility of new information must be included implies that the information we are trying to explain is actually infinite (considerably more than “nothing”). Seriously, I don't think Rade has any comprehension of what Anssi and I are talking about.

So... what's next...

To begin with, I am now operating under the presumption that you have no real arguments with what I have said in the opening of this post. (Having no real arguments is not equivalent to agreeing that what I have said is clear; if you, or anyone else, have any comments on that issue I am interested.) Meanwhile, the central issue is still to “find an abstract way of representing absolutely any body of information”.

 

In order to open that issue, I would like to begin with what I think is the simplest explanation conceivable: that would be the ”what is”, is “what is” explanation. (By the way Rade, as explanations go, I think that one covers explaining “nothing” pretty well. :) ) My approach will be to generate a general explanation by means of a subtle string of modifications of that explanation. The issue of interest in starting with that explanation is that the whole problem is exactly, “finding a way of representing the body of information”.

 

Philosophers long ago established an important conceptual dichotomy, ontology vs epistemology. Ontology deals with questions concerning what entities exist and epistemology deals with the means of production of knowledge: i.e., the explanations based upon that ontology. Essentially the fundamental information consists of ontological elements. All epistemologies are constructed from such ontological elements of some kind or another. In the ”what is”, is “what is” explanation, there are no epistemological constructs; if we know the ontological elements, we know the explanation. So all we need is a language to label those ontological elements. In order to keep that language simple and absolutely general, I propose using numerical labels as the method of referring to those ontological elements.

 

At this point, “the past” (that which is to be explained or the collection of presents) is a labeled set of ontological elements and the explanation itself is that self same set of labels. The first thing I want to bring forth is the fact that the labels of the ontological elements are themselves a fundamental part of any explanation. If you have no way of referring to those ontological elements (or whatever title you wish to place on the known information) then you cannot build a epistemological construct based upon them. In effect, once you tell me we are discussing a specific explanation, you are confirming the existence of a set of specific labels you have placed upon these elements. In a ”what is”, is “what is” explanation, that same specific set of labels constitutes your explanation. Using numerical labels is no more than a convenience and constitutes no assumption concerning the character of those elements.

 

A very important subtle problem appears to exists in that set up. The problem arises from the fact that we are using exactly the same list for two different purposes. We need to maintain the actual conceptual difference between the two roles. The best way to do that is to think of the “explanation list” as a different thing from the “information list”. From that perspective, we can conceive of “having the explanation list” (no mention of how that result was achieved) without actually having the “information list”. If that is the case then it is possible to conceive of a information list which consists of less than the explanation list. This allows the ”what is”, is “what is” explanation to fulfill the single most important role required of an explanation: it provides a method of obtaining expectations from given known information. All we need do is look at our list.

 

Let me know exactly what problems you find with this assertion.

Lastly, this topic is DD's effort to communicate fully what "he" thinks an explanation is. I assume he expects our contradictory thoughts to patiently wait until DD's effort is complete, or possibly be directed to another topic all together.

If you delay confirmation of your understanding until I finish, I am afraid my arguments are lost. I need your complaints as I present what I present. The chain of logic is not exactly "short".

 

Logic is the only connection between “what is” and “what can be!”

 

Have fun -- Dick

[Rade]

I read through your whole post, but I had difficulty understanding some of your original thoughts.Can you provide such an example?

Sure--nothing new about philosophic explanation of 'nothingness'--see this link to thinking of Sartre.

SparkNotes: Jean-Paul Sartre: Being and Nothingness

 

And of course, DD has no idea any of this type of philosophic thinking by Sartre, and the fact that it completely negates his attempt to define 'explanation', as we see from his comments below, posted here:

 

...Except for Rade that is, as I am really not interested in “explaining nothing” as it seems to me to be a rather worthless effort; I have always been told that an explanation which explains nothing is called BS. Besides that, without possessing at least the knowledge of these seven letters, “N-O-T-H-I-N-G”, I can not comprehend how Rade would begin an attempt to explain “nothing”.

 

Well, about all I can say is, while DD may find Sartre thinking about explaining 'nothing' to be a "rather worthless effort", Sartre most certainly would find the many errors in logic presented here by DD to be so. Which then explains why I find it rather silly to suggest that no one that reads this thread should not identify BS when it is so presented, which is clearly also a goal of DD.

[modest]

First of all, in order to have an explanation, one needs something to explain. Whatever it is that is to be explained, it can be certainly be categorized as some kind of information. It thus follows that "an explanation" is something which is done to (or for) information. The central issue is then, if we are to define "an explanation" in general, we must lay down exactly what an explanation does to (or for) that information.

 

Many people have put forth the idea that an explanation makes information understandable. This idea requires one clarify exactly how the existence of understanding is to be determined. This is a problem faced by every teacher in the history of the world. They attempt to discover the answer to that question by testing their students. The tests can easily be seen as an interaction where the teacher provides some information and then examines the students response to that information. If the student's response is consistent with the possible responses the teacher would give to the same information, then the teacher will presume the student understands the information. So the central issue of understanding anything is obtaining results in “agreement with expectations”.

 

In accordance with that observation, I will define “what an explanation must do for information” as “it must provide expectations of subsets of that information”. That is, it seems to me that if all the information is known, then any questions about the information can be answered (in fact, that could be regarded as the definition of "knowing"). On the other hand, if the information is understood (explainable), then questions about the information can be answered given only limited or incomplete knowledge of the underlying information: i.e., limited subsets of the information. What I am saying is that understanding implies it is possible to predict expectations for information which is not known and that an explanation of that information constitutes a method which provides one with those rational expectations for unknown information consistent with what is known.

 

Thus I define "An explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from given known information.

 

It follows that a model of an explanation must posses two fundamental components: the information to be explained and the mechanism used to generate expectations for possible additional information. The first fundamental component is, "what is to be explained"; thus our first problem is to find an abstract way of representing any body of information. One very important characteristic of the “information to be explained” is that our general model of an explanation needs to be able to accommodate to changing information for two reasons. First, if our explanation cannot accommodate to changing information, it can not explain anything which is not already known and, second, any explanation which does not allow a change in information presumes we are all knowing, a rather extreme constraint for a general model.

 

Thus I define three concepts; the first I call “the past” which consists of the known information, the second I call “the future” which consists of what is not known and finally, “the present” which consists of a change in what is known. Under these definitions, the past can be seen as a collection of presents. Since the information available to be explained must be finite, it can be ordered and I will define the ordering index to be “time” which I will represent with the letter “t”.

 

Hello Dr. Dick. I see now more clearly where you're coming from with this. I was thinking of the set of information to be explained comprising the present—but, you're saying it is the past. Setting that straight in my mind puts other things in perspective.

 

In order to open that issue, I would like to begin with what I think is the simplest explanation conceivable: that would be the ”what is”, is “what is” explanation.

 

The past, then, is the information to be explained. It is the "knowledge list".

 

A kind of explanation (the "what is, is what is" explanation) is the 'copy' of this set which can be thought of as a set of ontological elements comprising the "explanation list". This would, by extension, make the past somewhat equivalent to the explanation (in this case). I believe you indicate this here:

 

At this point, “the past” (that which is to be explained or the collection of presents) is a labeled set of ontological elements and the explanation itself is that self same set of labels.

 

So... I think I pretty-well understand, and all my questions involve what happens to that equivalence between the past and the explanation and what happens to the explanation itself when it is more than just a list of ontological elements—when an epistemology is 'present'. But, you haven't gotten into that yet. So, I await the thread's continuation and please assume I understand and have no objection to your description.

 

I'm also going to look at your wiki page this weekend. I'm curious, are you intending to present the math of your model in this thread?

 

~modest