Conservation Of Inherent Ignorance!

[Rade]

I would rather say that “my definitions” are an inherent part of my communications and very few people have any interest in considering those definitions. They already know what their definitions mean and are fully confidant no unwarrented presumptions have been made. Thus they really don't care to worry about what I mean.

Not at all DD, I do care about and have interest in "your definitions"--it is just that I do not agree with all of them. Thus, if two people begin discussion of some topic and they use different definitions (FOR THE SAME CONCEPT) then, sure, they will not reach agreement. I guess my question is, why does this upset you so much ? Your entire philosophy begins with the unwarrented presumption that the "something" of explanation does not require definition. Why does it upset you when others do not agree with your world view ?

 

Edit:

 

Here is a short list of concepts DD, where I do not agree with your definitions. But, since definition may change over time, if you would provide your most recent versions we can discuss.

 

Knowledge

Belief

Facts

Assumption

Science

Time

Edited August 16, 2010 by Rade

[Doctordick]

I disagree that the goal of science is to find an explanation of something and that something does not have to be defined, that something can be anything and yet be a "thing" that is of interest to science.

Ok, let's take this one line at a time. You disagree "that the goal of science is to find an explanation of something"?. So what is your proposition? That science is not interested in explaining anything? I think that is a rather ubrupt assertion!

 

You are clearly trying to put two issues together as if they concern the same thing. You are attempting to imply that I asserted that "the goal of science is to find an explanation of something and that something does not have to be defined". I did no such thing!! These are two different issues! The fact that the goal of science is to "find an explanation of something" stands by itself and is true even if I or you have not yet defined what that thing is.

 

For me the goal of science is not to explain the set of all possible "somethings", to me the goal of science is to explain a very specific singular "something" called THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE.

Where did I bring up the idea the explanation of interest was to "explain the set of all possible 'somethings'"? The only issue of interest to me is that it explains "something"!

 

What you seem to miss is the fact that, in my analysis, I do not define what that something is! The lack of definition is a constraint on my proof not a constraint on the definition of what is being explained.

 

Logically, it must be possible for there to be a set of other "somethings" that are outside the material universe.

Oh, are your trying to explain something?

 

In your philosophy DD, it is the goal of science to find explanation for this set of somethings outside the material universe

Outside, inside, -- why do you bring up such issues as they have utterly nothing to do with what I am talking about. I am talking about he issue of "explanation" itself; not what is being explained. That's all in your head.

 

So, it is your goal for science to find explanation for God (clearly an undefined something) ?

Rade, the literature is chock full of publications about why it is that many humans believe in "God". There are lots of people out there very concerned with explaining that issue. Are you trying to assert that a valid explanation of that phenomena can not possibly be seen as "scientific" and never will be possible? I think Anssi put it very well -- you need to think these things out a bit. That problem is exactly why I put you on my ignore list. (By the way, at the moment, you are the only one there!)

 

As you say, "if two people begin discussion of some topic and they use different definitions (FOR THE SAME CONCEPT) then, sure, they will not reach agreement. Your error there is to presume we are talking about (THE SAME CONCEPT). If that were true, we could use the same definitions but it is not. What you are talking about has no bearing at all on what I am talking about! This doesn't "upset" me; it's just a waste of time to reply to your posts. For example, your complaint about my "world view" is totally off subject; I have presented no "world view". My proof is entirely independent of any "world view". That is what I am talking about when I intentionally avoid defining certain things.

 

Have fun (you are certainly not taking anything I say seriously) -- Dick

 

PS I replied to your post because Tormod was asking for posts; not because I expected to reach you!

[AnssiH]

Hi Anssi, I thought a little positive feedback might be reasonable here. I am afraid Qfwfq is playing exactly the same game as is Rade. Both of them want to discuss everything in terms of their (presumed valid) world view. They simply cannot comprehend laying that solution aside as a presumption in itself. They can no more step outside their beliefs than a “religionist” of the dark ages could conceive of laying aside the presumed existence of God as a starting point of an argument.

 

I know what you are getting at, but perhaps it is not fair to say Qfwfq is playing a game, as it implies he would be just trying to confuse matters for personal fun. I don't believe he is doing that, so I'm just trying to focus on understanding what his thoughts are about this. And he probably doesn't like being considered a religionist when he doesn't see it that way at all. Clearly there are problems in the communication, but yeah, I do think your criticism about people refusing to follow your definitions is well founded...

 

Actually, Rade, on that note;

 

Not at all DD, I do care about and have interest in "your definitions"--it is just that I do not agree with all of them.

 

Agreeing with them doesn't imply agreement with a world view. As I'm sure you know, he is not arguing about ontological aspects of anything at all. Only epistemological aspects. Agreeing with his definitions just means you are making an attempt to understand his communication.

 

The best bet to actually understand his definitions is to carefully think about the OP of this and the "Laying out the representation to be solved" thread. Just let it be said, once again, that it probably helps to keep in mind that he is NOT arguing about ontology, and there are NO ontological conclusions in the end. All of it has to do with validity of a representation of something.

 

You were discussing plant intelligence in some other thread, and noted something to the effect that agreeing with that view is very much a matter of agreeing with a definition. Indeed, and consider then how very many things are a matter of agreeing with some definitions. Whether earth revolves around the sun is a matter of agreeing with very many careful definitions, including agreeing with what inertial frames are and how space and objects must be conceived. DD is very much talking about agreeing with definitions that give you your everyday conception of reality, as well as the more analytical physics definitions. The analysis cannot and does not suppose ontological basis onto any defined structures referring to the meaning of the data, and that includes space and time. His "validity" is always about ability to represent some information that way.

 

That is why agreeing with his definitions does not mean agreeing with any of his beliefs, at all. If you think that this conclusions are beliefs, consider that the consequences of his definitions are arrived at via algebraic work.

 

I've been saying that, in order to draw a conclusion (conservation law) as a consequence of a fact (ingorance, as Dick calls it) one must know the fact to be true.

Notice how he deftly slides away from quoting what I actually said, “information which is not available can not be produced by any algebraic procedure”. So what is he saying? He does not know that fact to be a basic axiom of mathematics? Or perhaps he dislikes my use of the word “ignorance” to portray the absence of the specific information.

 

Well, I'll just try to explain what goes on in my mind. My interpretation is that Qfwfq's comment arose from not having picked up correctly what kind of ignorance/symmetry you were talking about; He seems to be saying that those symmetries can't be taken to be "certain" for all valid explanations, but I think he would agree they exist "by definition" if he had all the associated definitions in mind properly, i.e. had he properly understood what you meant.

 

I do not know what he is thinking about exactly, but I thought he'd get pretty far in convincing himself if he considered how the symmetries appear in obvious form ONLY when an explanation is actually represented in your notation. I.e. how contradicting it would be to think that expectations could be connected to some arbitrarily chosen aspects of the notation itself, as oppose to connecting them to the actual data patterns. Plus the fact that an explanation does not have to be expressed in your notation to be valid, and how in that case the symmetries could be embedded into the definitions

in very unobvious ways (probably would not call them symmetries).

 

(Qfwfq, let me know if I'm even on the right ballpark as to what you are thinking...)

 

But, we are certain that those specific ignorances exist; we are certain they exist in terms of the definitions that were given, as long as we are certain that we don't explicitly know the meaning of the information-to-be explained. I.e. at this junction, we are merely certain about our uncertainty towards the real meaning of the information.

Beautiful, we certainly don't know these things if we intentionally never define the problem. I find it rather astonishing that Qfwfq is driven to “puff on his bong” by such a simple statement.

 

Well, once again my interpretation; I think he said it because I said "we are certain about uncertainty"; it probably reminded him of the word games people play way too much here. But as I said, I said it because it's important to understand that those symmetries/ignorances would probably NOT appear if the meaning of some information was already known, even partially so. Or if the meaning of some information was just pre-supposed to be known prior to understanding what some explanation implies it means. (i.e. undefendable assumptions were made)

 

In other words, I just wanted to point out how the certainty of not explicitly knowing the meaning of the information to-be-explained (which I think Qfwfq can agree with) means certainty to the existence of those specific symmetries, by the definitions given (which I think Qfwfq could agree with only if he understood all the associated definitions properly, in order to understand why those symmetries are the other side of the same coin)

 

You would be an absolute master of everything I have put forth if only you had the training in physics and mathematics sufficient to comprehend all the mechanisms of the arguments;

 

Thank you, and yes, I feel the issue is pretty clear in my mind. And it's clear we are agreeing with each others' terminology well enough to understand each others easily.

 

Also the fact that we consistently point out the same problems in the objections of others should be an indication that there is something to be understood in there. I'm not parroting what DD's told me, I'm talking about things I see in there after thinking about things a bit. I'm not talking about philosophical preferences or beliefs, I'm talking about things that logically follow from some premise.

 

...and on that note;

I disagree that the goal of science is to find an explanation of something...

 

...to me the goal of science is to explain a very specific singular "something" called THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE

 

What DD was trying to say was that the goal of science is to find an explanation to something that is - prior to an explanation - entirely unknown.

 

Your definition, "to explain material universe" implies that what-is-to-be-explained is already known to be "material universe" (or whatever the reader supposes material universe is) at the get-go. The problem is that you are implying that some (uncommunicated) set of beliefs is a good starting point for explaining reality.

 

Now, I don't think you said what you said in order to argue about the issue I am pointing at in the above paragraph; I believe your comment arose more from simply wanting to define "science" differently.

 

however, if you had that training, I suspect you would also possess their unwavering belief in the validity of their perspectives.

 

Maybe. Although, I think my attitude towards science/physics has always been pretty similar to yours. While it's striving to only focus on things that can actually be known, it's still way too often talking about aspects that are (quite obviously) only features of a single specific representation of something. And that's a bit painful to watch. I don't like the apparent high some people get from explaining how "reality might actually be this way or that way", without seeming to understand how it's one thing to have a valid representation of reality, and another thing entirely to argue that the features of that representation are also true to ontological reality.

 

I think the real problem is that human beings feel a strong need to know the answers to their questions. The need is so strong that having an answer actually becomes more important to them than the validity of the answer.

 

Well yes. I think people like to say and read things like "reality may be made of colliding branes", without ever bothering to try and understand what is meant by "branes". And without considering, that if a representation like that is valid, what exactly is that supposed to say about the actual structure of reality? Why are they talking about what "reality may be like" when they are forced to make very many arbitrary (unprovable) choices in order to create an understandable representation.

 

So yes I do understand exactly what you mean by religious tendencies of science (within the more common views as well)... Had they instead wrote something like "it is possible to represent reality as two colliding branes", then I might believe they are restricting themselves onto arguing about something that can actually be known.

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

From DD: You are attempting to imply that I asserted that "the goal of science is to find an explanation of something and that something does not have to be defined". I did no such thing!!

Yes you did, and you continue to do it, so, in the same reply we find this contradiction:

From DD: What you seem to miss is the fact that, in my analysis, I do not define what that something is!

[Rade]

What DD was trying to say was that the goal of science is to find an explanation to something that is - prior to an explanation - entirely unknown

No, not how I see it. What DD is saying is that, prior to explanation, the "something" is "undefined", not that it is "unknown". I mean, if the something was "unknown" prior to the explanation process, then logically there would be "no-thing" to explain. When we say we explain, it implies that something is known (to exist) that is being explained. Now, I am not saying that you know the something as a specific thing, only that you know the something as something that exists--two completely different statements.

 

Think about the statement...the goal of science is to explain the unknown...(this is what you claim DD is trying to say). And, when I say the goal of science is to explain the material universe, I do not mean that I define or know anything of specific. It is no more than saying ...the goal of science is to explain existence, with only one presumption needed, the axiom that existence exists.

[Rade]

Rade, the literature is chock full of publications about why it is that many humans believe in "God". There are lots of people out there very concerned with explaining that issue. Are you trying to assert that a valid explanation of that phenomena can not possibly be seen as "scientific" and never will be possible?

Yes, that is exactly what I am saying--but you see--using your goal of science you can NEVER make this claim. The fact that you claim above that you think it is a valid goal for science to seek a "valid explanation of the phenomena (God)" puts in a nut shell how your approach to science differs from mine.

[AnssiH]

No, not how I see it.

 

Then I don't think you are making a good attempt to understand what is being said...

 

And, when I say the goal of science is to explain the material universe, I do not mean that I define or know anything of specific.

 

Then why do you use the words "material universe"? Like I said, there are very good reasons why DD is not using those words; when you do, you are implying some characteristics onto the what-is-to-be-explained. Even if you didn't mean to, that would be pretty bad communication.

 

Think about the statement...the goal of science is to explain the unknown...(this is what you claim DD is trying to say).

 

Yes and don't forget what he means by "explanation" and "explaining"

 

the goal of science is to explain existence, with only one presumption needed, the axiom that existence exists.

 

I don't know what you mean by the process of "explaining existence"... Do you mean "explaining what exists"? Are you saying that in your opinion, "science" is (or should be?) interested in finding an "ontologically correct representation" of reality, as oppose to just finding valid predictions?

 

Consider how the latter entails working with "what can be known" (and remaining agnostic about many aspects of reality), while the former entails accepting aspects that can only be believed, not known. Which one would you rather call science?

 

And most of all, consider how irrelevant it is to argue about the meaning of a word, as oppose to actually making an attempt to understand HOW different people use their words. At least DD is very carefully trying to explain what he means by his words, but as far as I can see, you are only voicing your disagreement, and then making short statements where you use the same words very differently.

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

Are you saying that in your opinion, "science" is (or should be?) interested in finding an "ontologically correct representation" of reality, as oppose to just finding "valid predictions" [of reality]? Consider how the latter entails working with "what can be known" (and remaining agnostic about many aspects of reality), while the former entails accepting aspects that can only be believed, not known. Which one would you rather call science?

I have no idea why you propose a false either-or proposition. Neither statement is correct. The process of science is interested in describing reality (your former statement), with uncertainty, in such a way to propose valid predictions (your latter statement). The two processes combine to allow for explanation of reality. There is 0.0% prediction of reality without prior description of reality. There is 0.0 % belief in the process of science [the word from Latin means "to know"], but, what is critical to understand is that science is 100% "uncertain knowledge".

 

Also, AnsiiH, you do understand that DD has specifically defined "to know" as being "what you belief". I had a disagreement with him over this in another thread.

Thus, to say that the approach of DD of finding valid predictions is somehow limited "to know" and finding representations is limited "to belief" is just not correct--this goes against how DD defines the words "to know" and "to belief". And yes, I completely agree with you that I use words in one way and you and DD use the same words in another way. Of course we cannot reach agreement when DD defines "to know" = "to belief" and I do not.

[Qfwfq]

Well I hardly know why I still bother trying to get anything across, but here's the post that went missing with the migration. Fortunately Anssi was suscribed and received an email copy of it:

 

I'm sorry but I don't understand this comment

Presumably because Dick never indoctrinated you about the matter which some folks call the difference between physical symmetries and dynamic symmetries. Unfortunately there is a lot of confusion about terminology but, by the former, I mean that which in QM was shown by Wigner to be described by a unitary or anti-unitary operator while, by the latter, I mean that which Noether's theorem concerns.

 

What you are saying about shift symmetry in Dick's presentation boils down to the statement that it is the former, regardless of whether it is the latter. Yet, in order for it to implie a conservation law, it needs to be of the latter type. The QM formalism makes it quite simple to state: It is of the latter kind iff it commutes with the Hamiltonian.

 

Heh, no, that's not what I was getting at, I was just saying I would like to discuss the differences between DD's analysis, and pretty much all the other previous attempts to take the collapse of the wave function (or whatever one wants to call that issue) as simply resulting from a cumulation of "more facts" about a situation. I was saying that because I remember you once commented, quite rightly so, something to the effect that it is quite problematic to explain away the quantum strangeness by taking it as a purely epistemological effect. It is problematic as long as one supposes there is ontological correctness to the identities of their defined entities. As long as you do that, your defined entities will keep doing funky things one way or another, no matter how you try to make the pieces fit... (At least, it appears so to me, of course I have not exhaustively investigated all the possible ways to define reality :D )

It's all a very subtle mattter, riddled with semantic issues.

 

In basic QM there is a topic called "measurement theory" which is a straightforward argument about the minimum alteration of the state that could be caused by the interaction that determines an eigenvalue, it is represented by a projection operator and this is the so-called "collapsing wave function" that we so often hear about. The argument actually is based on what you are saying: adding the extra information. However it also requires a few assumptions in order to say that the alteration of the state is actually that given by applying the projector; these assumptions are not meant to be quite realistic and there is no universal way of predicting the exact state after the interaction by just knowing the eigenvalue. One would really need to use a detailed QM description of the method of measurement.

 

Apart from matters of feasibility, the great problem of the past century is on much more subtle matters of how to reconcile various things with each other. It isn't so easy to solve these problems by just saying we must free ourselves from unwarranted assumptions. Those who are really working on these problems (especially issues of Bell inequalities and local realism) are into epistemological acrobacies that aren't easy to follow and often get into metaphysical implications too. They carefully weed out assumptions as well as they can.

 

In short, a "traditional attempt" here refers to any attempt that tries to explain what sorts of entities/structures reality is REALLY made of, instead of focusing onto why information can be represented in such and such ways (and why such and such symmetries to that representation can lead to such and such apparently conflicting features to the definitions).

Quantum formalism is based on a universal manner of representing the information that we call a physics experiment. Aside from what you might find in divulgation, or even in some quick'n'dirty physics courses, it can be cast in a form with scarcely an assumption about ontological elements.

 

I think it is entirely possible to argue at that point that perhaps some explanations can contain a very fortunate undefendable assumption, that just so happens to lead to correct predictions. I think it is somewhat besides the point though; it should interest people that those assumptions are NOT NEEDED to get to the validity of modern physics.

To me it sounds like you're talking about models. Would you consider those so-called "lines of flux" in classical electromagnetism an example of what you mean?

 

Qfwfq has already commented that, being trained as a physicist, he refrains from making too many presumptions.

I am a trained nonphysicist! :lol:

 

Qfwfq cannot, and never will be able to see that “forest” as a figment of his imagination.

Again, your stock attack on any attempt to discuss these things that doesn't follow the leader.

 

Notice how he deftly slides away from quoting what I actually said, “information which is not available can not be produced by any algebraic procedure”. So what is he saying? He does not know that fact to be a basic axiom of mathematics? Or perhaps he dislikes my use of the word “ignorance” to portray the absence of the specific information. At any rate, he certainly is not going to presume any ignorances on his part.

Maybe I was talking about what *I* said. Yes, I was criticizing the use of the word ignorance. It just struck me a bit misleading.

 

And once again we find Qfwfq worrying about how solutions are arrived at.

I haven't been worrying about that for quite a while, I was just discussing something Anssi said. :)

 

I have a suspicion that this is little more than a reflection of Qfwfq's refusal to work with my definition of time. He's a trained physicist and he is throughly confident that his presumptions concerning that issue are absolutely essential!

Do you mean the definition of time according to what you don't yet know and what you already know? As a trained nonphysicist I am throughly confident that the shift symmetry in your presentation is just one possible physical symmetry and that there is no presumption in the notion of these. I have never been able to engage you in a reasonable discussion of these matters.

[AnssiH]

I have no idea why you propose a false either-or proposition.

 

Because I am purposely trying to make a separation between undefendable and defendable aspects of world models. Because the defendable aspects very much boil down to valid interconnection between definitions, i.e. their collective self-coherence. (And, it turns out, to their universal applicability for interpreting information)

 

Of course world models always do contain undefendable aspects in some sense (if that's what you were trying to say), but that doesn't mean that science needs to pick and choose between multiple valid options (think of ontological interpretations of QM for one)

 

On a related note, think about those approximations and definitions that are made in the derivation of Schrödinger's Equation. For instance, the definition of "mass". It is "undefendable" also, in the sense that nothing in the information-to-be-explained requires such a definition. On the other hand, it is also entirely universal, in that its applicable to any data. You could say, that the whole analysis revolves around how things CAN be seen, as oppose to how things "are".

 

Neither statement is correct. The process of science is interested in describing reality (your former statement), with uncertainty, in such a way to propose valid predictions (your latter statement). The two processes combine to allow for explanation of reality. There is 0.0% prediction of reality without prior description of reality. There is 0.0 % belief in the process of science [the word from Latin means "to know"], but, what is critical to understand is that science is 100% "uncertain knowledge".

 

Now, depending on how you mean this, there might not be anything in there that I would readily disagree with, but why are you saying it, in the context of DD's analysis? Are you saying, that since traditional scientific process includes the process of making undefendable assumptions, therefore DD's analysis cannot be valid if it also does not make undefendable assumptions?

 

Or, is it rather that you just don't believe it would be possible to generate universally applicable definitions that yield a conception of similar entities as is defined by modern physics? And therefore you don't want to follow the algebra to find out?

 

Also, AnsiiH, you do understand that DD has specifically defined "to know" as being "what you belief". I had a disagreement with him over this in another thread.

Thus, to say that the approach of DD of finding valid predictions is somehow limited "to know" and finding representations is limited "to belief" is just not correct--this goes against how DD defines the words "to know" and "to belief". And yes, I completely agree with you that I use words in one way and you and DD use the same words in another way. Of course we cannot reach agreement when DD defines "to know" = "to belief" and I do not.

 

I think there's just way too much semantical sloppiness associated with those words to unravel this issue. So, your best bet is just to try to understand what could it mean that the expectation differentials are supposed to be universally applicable to self-coherent definitions... Don't get too tangled up with exact meanings of words; it should be expected that this is very hard issue to talk about in english!

 

Understading what the fundamental equation actually refers to has much to do with understanding the symmetry/ignorance issue properly (see the OP, and the conversation between Qfwfq and me)

 

Well I hardly know why I still bother trying to get anything across

 

Well I'm glad you do if you are also making the attempt to interpret things a bit differently, just to see if the pieces start to fit (I certainly think they do)... Anyhow, I'll cook up a reply to your post later...

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

On a related note, think about those approximations and definitions that are made in the derivation of Schrödinger's Equation. For instance, the definition of "mass". It is "undefendable" also, in the sense that nothing in the information-to-be-explained requires such a definition. On the other hand, it is also entirely universal, in that its applicable to any data. You could say, that the whole analysis revolves around how things CAN be seen, as oppose to how things "are".

I do not see how you reach the conclusion that the definition of mass using the Schrödinger's Equation derived by "modern physics" is "undefendable". Is it not simply the case that the QM wavefunction (whatever it is) has "mass" because of the kinetic energy term in the Schrödinger's Equation, but that this wavefunction with mass is in configuration space, not physical real space ? Exactly why does DD hold the QM world view that this modern physics explanation of mass is not defendable ?

 

 

Now, depending on how you mean this, there might not be anything in there that I would readily disagree with, but why are you saying it, in the context of DD's analysis? Are you saying, that since traditional scientific process includes the process of making undefendable assumptions, therefore DD's analysis cannot be valid if it also does not make undefendable assumptions?

First, it is a major step forward, imo, that we seem to reach some agreement on something. I only offered the statement to help clarify for me what you where saying about representation and prediction as relates to explanation. And, what I am saying in regard to your last comment above, I find that traditional science, when done correctly, does not make undefendable assumptions. As long as DD in his approach also does not make undefendable assumptions, then sure his approach can be valid.

 

So, perhaps a list of all the DD assumptions is in order--then we look to see if any are undefendable. So, let me start with a list, you and others can add, then we discuss:

 

List of assumptions in the approach of DD (assumptions as defined by DD)

1.

2.

 

edit:

 

Not seeing any feedback, here I will post a fundamental assumption of the approach used by DD.

 

List of assumptions in the approach of DD

 

1.

I assert that the goal of science is to find an explanation of something: a totally abstract issue where I go out of my way to never define what it is [the something] that is being explained. I then presume[make an assumption] the problem has been solved

My comments for clarification added within[].

[Bombadil]

I don’t know if this will help but I think that it is perhaps a slightly different view on the problem.

 

Presumably because Dick never indoctrinated you about the matter which some folks call the difference between physical symmetries and dynamic symmetries. Unfortunately there is a lot of confusion about terminology but, by the former, I mean that which in QM was shown by Wigner to be described by a unitary or anti-unitary operator while, by the latter, I mean that which Noether's theorem concerns.

 

Qfwfq can you expand on this, it has been said elsewhere but I think that it has been overlooked each time. The problem is you seem to be saying that just because a symmetry exists is no reason to arrive at a conservation law unless the symmetry is dynamic. The problem here is that you seem to be trying to classify the shift symmetry that Docterdick is suggesting as the first kind of symmetry and I have no idea as to why.

 

No unitary or anti-unitary operator has been specifically defined at this point in the derivation. If there has been can you pleas point it out, so why should the shift symmetry be a physical symmetry?

 

What you are saying about shift symmetry in Dick's presentation boils down to the statement that it is the former, regardless of whether it is the latter. Yet, in order for it to implie a conservation law, it needs to be of the latter type. The QM formalism makes it quite simple to state: It is of the latter kind iff it commutes with the Hamiltonian.

 

 

In order for this statement to have any value at all a Hamiltonian must be defined. Before you go and use the standard definition for a Hamiltonian you need to have some reason to define it in that way. But how I understand it, the Hamiltonian is just the sum of the kinetic and potential energy of a system. Now lets pretend for a minute that we already agreed on Docterdick’s work up to his derivation of the Schrödinger equation. After Docterdick derives the Schrödinger equation we could define the Hamiltonian but if we did this in it’s most general form wouldn’t it make at least some sense to define this as the fundamental equation. If nothing else it would look a lot more like it then it does now. Even if this makes no sense for the fundamental equation to be the Hamiltonian. The fact that the shift symmetry is used in the defining of the Hamiltonian in this way should be enough to justify using shift symmetry to define a conservation law with your definition.

 

This is of course a rather circular argument if it can be used as we are already at a conclusion before we can start, but it should at least show that Docterdick’s use of shift symmetry as a dynamic symmetry has a defense even with your loose definition of a dynamic symmetry. I say loose because you have not even defined what you plan to use as a Hamiltonian.

 

At this point perhaps you can explain why you want to use this definition at all because according to the wikpedia page on Noether’s theorem the only requirement is that the symmetry be differentiable which Docterdick has already shown to be the case. At this point it would seem to be only a problem of using the correct definitions to remove anything that is not modern physics to arrive at your Hamiltonian which seems to me to make far more sense then trying to define physics by making a set of axioms with the only defense being in the end it seems to work. Or defining a Hamiltonian just to show that Noether’s theorem can be applied.

 

Apart from matters of feasibility, the great problem of the past century is on much more subtle matters of how to reconcile various things with each other. It isn't so easy to solve these problems by just saying we must free ourselves from unwarranted assumptions. Those who are really working on these problems (especially issues of Bell inequalities and local realism) are into epistemological acrobacies that aren't easy to follow and often get into metaphysical implications too. They carefully weed out assumptions as well as they can.

 

This approach just seems backwards to me. If you are trying to find what assumptions have been made then there must have been a reason to make those assumptions in the first place, and if those assumptions resulted in the removing of information then the only way that you can precede is by assuming that you assumed something and trying to guess what was removed.

 

Wouldn’t the approach of deriving a equation that you know will be approximately satisfied by what you are looking for, and then carefully removing possible solutions from that equation make far more sense?

 

That is, building a solution from possible ontological combinations of elements by defining possible interpretations literally building a world view of the situation rather then looking at some world view and trying to break it down into the smallest definable part. If something is not defined doesn’t that mean that we are ignorant of what it is. Isn’t this whole derivation based on the idea of representing that ignorance in a way that lets us define combinations of ignorance’s.

 

Or maybe you just want to be self consistent with your definitions in which case I ask you this - what are you defining and how can you tell the difference between one definition and any other definition?

[Qfwfq]

It takes a lot of patience when people think I'm mistaken because I don't know what I'm talking about, instead of getting my point. Bombadil, I addressed a point by Ansii and you seem to be missing what I was replying to and what I meant. I told him that what he said can be translated into those terms.

 

No unitary or anti-unitary operator has been specifically defined at this point in the derivation. If there has been can you pleas point it out, so why should the shift symmetry be a physical symmetry?

I made a remark that explicitly concerned QM formalism, you sound like Dick here.

 

In order for this statement to have any value at all a Hamiltonian must be defined.

Know what? This was pretty much the reason behind me having said it's one of the misgivings I have about Dick's discussions. Don't blame mme for talking about Noether's theorem without having defined any kind of action.

 

At this point perhaps you can explain why you want to use this definition at all because according to the wikpedia page on Noether’s theorem the only requirement is that the symmetry be differentiable which Docterdick has already shown to be the case.

The wiki you link to starts saying that the theorem states that "any differentiable symmetry of the action of a physical system has a corresponding conservation law". The reason it says action is that, in the most general case, one may use Lagrangian or Hamiltonian formulation for analytical mechanics. There are reasons why I mentioned one and not the other but I've no interest in going into them. For anyone following Dick's presentation and wanting to judge his implications about physics, it would be a good thing to have an adequate understanding of the physics, including analytic mechanics and quantum formalism. But, of course, anyone who does is a member of the Holy Office of Inquisition.

 

This approach just seems backwards to me. If you are trying to find what assumptions have been made then there must have been a reason to make those assumptions in the first place, and if those assumptions resulted in the removing of information then the only way that you can precede is by assuming that you assumed something and trying to guess what was removed.

 

Wouldn’t the approach of deriving a equation that you know will be approximately satisfied by what you are looking for, and then carefully removing possible solutions from that equation make far more sense?

 

That is, building a solution from possible ontological combinations of elements by defining possible interpretations literally building a world view of the situation rather then looking at some world view and trying to break it down into the smallest definable part. If something is not defined doesn’t that mean that we are ignorant of what it is. Isn’t this whole derivation based on the idea of representing that ignorance in a way that lets us define combinations of ignorance’s.

 

Or maybe you just want to be self consistent with your definitions in which case I ask you this - what are you defining and how can you tell the difference between one definition and any other definition?

Oh! Ye'll take the high road, and I'll take the low road,

And I'll be in Scotland afore ye,...

 

What do you think about Bell's inequalites and local realism, and the results of investigations into them? Do you think that even causality is too bold an assumption? Or do you thimk it might be possible to tell ourselves what happened, so that we knew it before it was going to happen? Maybe I'm just too too dumb an *** but I can't see how you guys can help with figuring these things out.

[AnssiH]

Sorry I'm slow to respond, I just bought an electric guitar and I've been trying to learn how to play :D

 

Consider, that the existence of "shift symmetry" in the universal notation (keep its definitions in mind), is not dependent on what the information-to-be-explained was. Because that symmetry, as its stated, arises as a feature of the universal notation itself. Consider, that the original meaning of the information is unknown at the get go, and after there is an explanation for it - i.e. after it has been transformed into a form of "a set of persistent objects" - and those defined objects have been mapped into a coordinate system following the definitions of the universal notation, then their associated expectations cannot be a function of their placement inside the coordinate system; it's a coordinate system that we just made up!

This is what is (especially in QM) called physical symmetry but isn't always dynamic symmetry. Oddly enough, Nöther's theorem concerns the latter, in which case the statement does constitute information. This is one of the misgivings I have about Dick's discussions.

I'm sorry but I don't understand this comment :(

Presumably because Dick never indoctrinated you about the matter which some folks call the difference between physical symmetries and dynamic symmetries. Unfortunately there is a lot of confusion about terminology but, by the former, I mean that which in QM was shown by Wigner to be described by a unitary or anti-unitary operator while, by the latter, I mean that which Noether's theorem concerns.

 

What you are saying about shift symmetry in Dick's presentation boils down to the statement that it is the former, regardless of whether it is the latter. Yet, in order for it to implie a conservation law, it needs to be of the latter type. The QM formalism makes it quite simple to state: It is of the latter kind iff it commutes with the Hamiltonian.

 

As you know, it's a bit tricky for me to respond to your comment from the physics perspective, since I am not familiar with the subject. I did some Googling to try and figure out what you are referring to, and looking at the Wiki page for "Wigner's Theorem", I am getting the impression that physical symmetry in QM refers to various translations in a state space of some sort. That also means it refers to symmetrical features of some specifically defined entities, right?

 

And dynamic symmetry then seems to refer to symmetries related to "the laws governing the dynamic behaviour of constituents of matter", i.e. likewise it refers to symmetrical features of some specifically defined entites.

 

So you are essentially saying that, my comments seem to suggest that DD is talking about physical symmetries, while Noether's Theorem implies conserved quantities only in cases of dynamic symmetries.

 

My first problem is that I don't understand at all why my comment seems to suggest some type of symmetry that is (to my understanding) a feature nested very deep into the specific definitions of quantum mechanics.

 

And second, my understanding of Noether's Theorem is very limited also, but I am not really sure why it needs to be understood in order to follow the analysis to the expression of shift symmetry. I.e. putting aside entirely what Noether's Theorem is related to in terms of traditional physics, is there something you think might be off in the logical steps of the OP, up to the point of the expression [math]\frac{d}{da}P(z_1,z_2,\cdots, z_n,t)=0[/math]?

 

And/or are you still concerned that the existence of the shift symmetry might not be certain? Did my comment clarify that issue at all; that to not have that symmetry appear when a world view is expressed in the universal notation, would mean an explanation bases its expectations to immaterial aspects of an imaginary coordinate system (which is there for "data storage/tracking", so to speak)

 

I believe you may be reading too much into some parts of the analysis, relating it to traditional physics in incompatible ways. Anything that has any resemblance to modern physics is much further down the road, and entails a lot of approximations and universal definitions, yet to be made... (It is actually pretty damn hard to tell at this stage how some aspects of modern physics might map into this notation)

 

I'm breaking my response to 2 posts because of the 10 quote block limit...

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

...I remember you once commented, quite rightly so, something to the effect that it is quite problematic to explain away the quantum strangeness by taking it as a purely epistemological effect. It is problematic as long as one supposes there is ontological correctness to the identities of their defined entities.

 

It's all a very subtle mattter, riddled with semantic issues.

 

Yeah, tell me about it...

 

In basic QM there is a topic called "measurement theory" which is a straightforward argument about the minimum alteration of the state that could be caused by the interaction that determines an eigenvalue, it is represented by a projection operator and this is the so-called "collapsing wave function" that we so often hear about. The argument actually is based on what you are saying: adding the extra information. However it also requires a few assumptions in order to say that the alteration of the state is actually that given by applying the projector; these assumptions are not meant to be quite realistic and there is no universal way of predicting the exact state after the interaction by just knowing the eigenvalue. One would really need to use a detailed QM description of the method of measurement.

 

Yes and most importantly, those attempts are built upon the foundations of QM definitions, are they not? I.e. they work in terms of entities that are supposedly representing the structure of reality... ->

 

Apart from matters of feasibility, the great problem of the past century is on much more subtle matters of how to reconcile various things with each other. It isn't so easy to solve these problems by just saying we must free ourselves from unwarranted assumptions. Those who are really working on these problems (especially issues of Bell inequalities and local realism) are into epistemological acrobacies that aren't easy to follow and often get into metaphysical implications too. They carefully weed out assumptions as well as they can.

 

Yes, and what would you say is the metaphysical implication, when it is show that quantum mechanical entities arise as valid "containers" to represent recurring features of unknown information?

 

Remember, that any persistent entity - when you take it merely as a "container" or shorthand reference to some amount of recurring patterns - is not known to carry any real identity. Note that as long as you don't make any ontological assumptions, any defined entity is exactly that; a shorthand reference to some recurring patterns. All that apparent wave/particle duality is embedded straight into their definitions.

 

If those exact definitions of QM, containing wave/particle behaviour, are shown to appear as a consequence of certain universally applicable definitions/transformation to any data, does it not mean that they are simply inherent features of the methods we use to predict (the recurring features of) reality?

 

Like I said, the difference between DD's analysis and all the other approaches I know of is that there are no ontological assumptions nor conclusions nowhere to be found in DD's work. If the features of your world view are not features of reality but features of your categorization of reality, the seemingly idealistic features suddenly make perfect sense, don't they?

 

Quantum formalism is based on a universal manner of representing the information that we call a physics experiment. Aside from what you might find in divulgation, or even in some quick'n'dirty physics courses, it can be cast in a form with scarcely an assumption about ontological elements.

 

If there are other treatments that derive QM from absolutely no assumptions about the meaning of information they are set to explain/predict, then whatever steps they are making, should be meaningful in exactly the same way as the steps that DD is making. If they are making entirely universally applicable steps, then their result to me says exactly the same as DDs result. If that's already common understanding, why are people mystified by the features of quantum mechanics? I certainly wouldn't be :shrug:

 

I think it is entirely possible to argue at that point that perhaps some explanations can contain a very fortunate undefendable assumption, that just so happens to lead to correct predictions. I think it is somewhat besides the point though; it should interest people that those assumptions are NOT NEEDED to get to the validity of modern physics.

To me it sounds like you're talking about models. Would you consider those so-called "lines of flux" in classical electromagnetism an example of what you mean?

 

Ummmm... no... I don't understand why you think I might be talking about electromagnetism... I meant simply that the entire foundation of the analysis is to investigate the possibilities as long as no unwarranted assumptions are allowed. Not allowing any assumptions is what ensures that something like shift symmetry exists, in terms of the expectations in [math]x,y,z,\tau[/math]-space.

 

So I was just commenting on the idea that some (most) people have, that a valid world view is fundamentally based on making correct guesses, i.e. having made correct unwarranted assumptions about reality by chance, until you strike upon something that works. Well, it should be interesting that no such assumptions are needed to arrive at modern physics, and certainly there are "metaphysical implications" to that issue.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

I do not see how you reach the conclusion that the definition of mass using the Schrödinger's Equation derived by "modern physics" is "undefendable".

 

I was just noting that it is not a definition that is somehow required or explicitly found in the information-to-be-explained. It's just a definition that can be universally used to interpret any data, i.e. certain features can simply be seen as meaning "mass". Don't worry if that doesn't make much sense to you right now, I guess you'd have to understand the steps all the way to the end of Schrödinger to make sense of that.

 

what I am saying in regard to your last comment above, I find that traditional science, when done correctly, does not make undefendable assumptions.

 

If you believe that traditional science has reached its definitions of objects without making undefendable assumptions (at least for the most part), you should find DD's conclusions quite plausible, and likewise you should see the logical steps of his analysis as a mechanical explanation as to how exactly those definitions are arrived at without making undefendable assumptions. That is what the analysis is all about.

 

As long as DD in his approach also does not make undefendable assumptions, then sure his approach can be valid.

 

So, perhaps a list of all the DD assumptions is in order--then we look to see if any are undefendable. So, let me start with a list, you and others can add, then we discuss:

 

List of assumptions in the approach of DD (assumptions as defined by DD)

1.

2.

 

edit:

 

Not seeing any feedback, here I will post a fundamental assumption of the approach used by DD.

 

Sorry I was slow to respond, but what I was supposed to respond is that there are no assumptions made about the meaning of the information-to-be-explained (this is pretty important for the validity of the analysis).

 

You could say he is making an assumption that "it is possible to generate an explanation for unknown information", but I have very hard time taking that as an assumption per se, being that we have all managed to do that. (Well, I guess I can only talk about myself, just to be sure :shrug: )

 

On that note;

 

I assert that the goal of science is to find an explanation of something: a totally abstract issue where I go out of my way to never define what it is [the something] that is being explained. I then presume[make an assumption] the problem has been solved

1. My comments for clarification added within[].

 

He is not suggesting that the solution is ontologically correct. He is saying, a valid solution exists. Once again, he is not suggesting anything about ontological reality. He is essentially saying, that modern physics is pulling out useful predictions (see his definition of explanation), nevermind how that solution was found.

 

Seriously guys, is it possible at all to get over the idea that we'd be making claims about the ontological structure of reality? Pretty please with sugar on top?

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

Sorry I'm slow to respond, I just bought an electric guitar and I've been trying to learn how to play

You mean Dick's fundamental equation isn't helpful enough? :shrug:

 

As you know, it's a bit tricky for me to respond to your comment from the physics perspective, since I am not familiar with the subject. I did some Googling to try and figure out what you are referring to, and looking at the Wiki page for "Wigner's Theorem", I am getting the impression that physical symmetry in QM refers to various translations in a state space of some sort. That also means it refers to symmetrical features of some specifically defined entities, right?

 

And dynamic symmetry then seems to refer to symmetries related to "the laws governing the dynamic behaviour of constituents of matter", i.e. likewise it refers to symmetrical features of some specifically defined entites.

Of course it is tricky for me to respond to your comment from the physics perspective. That's why I tend to doubt your ability to judge the implications of his presentation on physics.

 

Dynamic symmetries are a subset. If you like, you could call them "actual" as opposed to "possible" symmetries. It is a much broader thing than just translations. In QM it works just like Dick's shift symmetry but much more in general, the requisite of not changing the computed probability means it can be associated with a unitary operator.

 

So you are essentially saying that, my comments seem to suggest that DD is talking about physical symmetries, while Noether's Theorem implies conserved quantities only in cases of dynamic symmetries.

I'm saying that, without having defined any such thing as the dynamics, it is moot to bring Noether's theorem in. Even to just talk about its significance, accusing all and sundry of never having understood it properly, just seems feeble to me. If I grant his claim of having related it to the basics of QM, all I could say is that shift symmetry is a translation of the whole universe; its total momentum is conserved. I don't see the great discovery in this single aspect.

 

My first problem is that I don't understand at all why my comment seems to suggest some type of symmetry that is (to my understanding) a feature nested very deep into the specific definitions of quantum mechanics.

I mentioned Wigner's theorem to be quick'n'dirty, a way of pointing at something with a label slapped on it. In analytical mechanics you can take any invertible transformation of the so called canonical variables of a dynamic system and ask whether it is a canonical transformation. The Hamilton-Jacobi method is based on this. A basic understanding of these topics, and an understanding of how the quantum formalism can be based on them, might help you to bridge your gap. It can be studied as pure mathematics with no such thing as ontology. Maybe after that point you could help me see how Dick succeeds in making the dynamics pop out of what would otherwise appear to be pure kinematics. Before that, I really can't spend too much time going into detail answering your queries, I can only point out where I believe you would need more grounding.

 

And/or are you still concerned that the existence of the shift symmetry might not be certain?

I have no trouble with the existence of the shift symmetry. I'm just too dumb to see how his presentation can have so many implications.

 

I believe you may be reading too much into some parts of the analysis, relating it to traditional physics in incompatible ways. Anything that has any resemblance to modern physics is much further down the road, and entails a lot of approximations and universal definitions, yet to be made... (It is actually pretty damn hard to tell at this stage how some aspects of modern physics might map into this notation)

What is "traditional" physics? All I have ever done is to try to understand how his presentation can bear the implications he claims, but of course whenever I did I was presuming my worldview to be valid. He is never subject to the same limitation.