Conservation Of Inherent Ignorance!

[Qfwfq]

I likewise got the error message about allowed quote blocks.

 

Like I said, the difference between DD's analysis and all the other approaches I know of is that there are no ontological assumptions nor conclusions nowhere to be found in DD's work. If the features of your world view are not features of reality but features of your categorization of reality, the seemingly idealistic features suddenly make perfect sense, don't they?

Not all that suddenly.

 

If there are other treatments that derive QM from absolutely no assumptions about the meaning of information they are set to explain/predict, then whatever steps they are making, should be meaningful in exactly the same way as the steps that DD is making. If they are making entirely universally applicable steps, then their result to me says exactly the same as DDs result. If that's already common understanding, why are people mystified by the features of quantum mechanics? I certainly wouldn't be :shrug:

Perhaps mystified isn't the right word. I think we are failing to understand each other here too.

 

Most physicists are more concerned with delivering the wares than with eliminating assumptions, ontology and all that jazz. They don't try to make any more sense of things than the formalism; if you like, they adopt the so called "shut up and calculate" point of view. Many of them also tend to consider the corpuscular nature as ultimately being the reality. These are the ones that most consider the oddities as mysterious... so much that they prefer a God-only-knows attitude about how the corpuscle can also have the optical behaviour and how to sort everything out without contradictions.

 

As for the word particle, it currently is just the same old tag, kept for a concept which is no longer regarded as being the classical one. That's why I use the word corpuscle when I refer to this aspect of the "particle" (whatever in hell may it be). In general, the mathematical formalism can be viewed as simply the way to describe what we know, epistemology rather than ontology. In this manner the only mystery is due to not knowing what it really is that we are analysing. Now this does not mean we should simply say OK then, everything is fine cuz there's no contradiction. Some people are analysing these matters, consider them counter-intuitive rather than self-contradictory but try to unravel them. I don't see what Dick's presentation adds or how it helps with the most subtle issues, such as Bell inequalites.

 

Ummmm... no... I don't understand why you think I might be talking about electromagnetism...

I did not think so at all. I tried to grab an example by analogy that you ought to easily understand. It's unfortunate that you missed the meaning of my sentence. To assume that lines of flux "actually exist" is very obviously unwarranted; despite this they are a great tool for any electric engineer designing appliances. Was this the kind of thing you meant? If so, a lot of phenomenologists refer to them as models.

 

So I was just commenting on the idea that some (most) people have, that a valid world view is fundamentally based on making correct guesses, i.e. having made correct unwarranted assumptions about reality by chance, until you strike upon something that works. Well, it should be interesting that no such assumptions are needed to arrive at modern physics, and certainly there are "metaphysical implications" to that issue.

I really doubt that no such assumptions are necessary. If you are talking about models as I illustrated above, they shouldn't really be regarded as "assumptions" but they are very helpful. As for your first sentence, I doubt you can eliminate the need to check which "guesses" work. Would you seriously agree with Descartes? If not, what exactly do you mean?

 

Seriously guys, is it possible at all to get over the idea that we'd be making claims about the ontological structure of reality? Pretty please with sugar on top?

I haven't been convinced of this for quite a while, although it took ages to make out the basics of what Dick meant, after his first posts around here.

[Rade]

...You could say he [DD] is making an assumption that "it is possible to generate an explanation for unknown information", but I have very hard time taking that as an assumption per se...

Ok, thanks, this helps me, because I was thinking he was talking about "undefined information", and not "unknown information"--these are two completely different concepts.

 

So, just so I am clear on what you are saying, DD would NOT then be making an assumption that "it is possible to generate an explanation for undefined information"--is this correct ? That is, DD would claim that it is impossible to generate an explanation for "undefined information"---the information has to be "unknown" in order for an explanation to be generated--correct ?

 

I will not add anymore questions until I get the above correct in my mind.

[AnssiH]

Dynamic symmetries are a subset. If you like, you could call them "actual" as opposed to "possible" symmetries. It is a much broader thing than just translations. In QM it works just like Dick's shift symmetry but much more in general, the requisite of not changing the computed probability means it can be associated with a unitary operator.

 

So essentially these are symmetries related to the behaviour of some defined entities? While I don't understand that subject, I'm pretty confident that it is somewhat different topic from symmetries to the expectations associated with a valid world-view being mapped in terms of DD's universal notation. I.e. I think you must be reading too much into this part of the presentation to make that connection.

 

I'm saying that, without having defined any such thing as the dynamics, it is moot to bring Noether's theorem in. Even to just talk about its significance, accusing all and sundry of never having understood it properly, just seems feeble to me.

 

I think DD should comment why Noether's theorem is brought in. I believe he sees an analogy between the theorem and the epistemological shift symmetry, but like I said, I followed the presentation to the shift symmetry without really understanding Noether's theorem, and if bringing it up confuses people, that could be considered to be a problem with the presentation. What do you think DD?

 

If I grant his claim of having related it to the basics of QM, all I could say is that shift symmetry is a translation of the whole universe; its total momentum is conserved. I don't see the great discovery in this single aspect.

 

That is exactly how simple this step is, except that this is not even related to QM yet at all. Hence DD's frustration of explaining this; people try to understand it in terms of some specific world view (such as the concepts of QM), and only see incompatibility.

 

Shift symmetry is going to play an important role later, when it serves as a constraint (in the fundamental equation) through the various algebraic steps. Like I said, there are quite a few approximations and universal definitions to be made before the validity of QM is apparent from this perspective at all.

 

I mentioned Wigner's theorem to be quick'n'dirty, a way of pointing at something with a label slapped on it. In analytical mechanics you can take any invertible transformation of the so called canonical variables of a dynamic system and ask whether it is a canonical transformation. The Hamilton-Jacobi method is based on this. A basic understanding of these topics, and an understanding of how the quantum formalism can be based on them, might help you to bridge your gap. It can be studied as pure mathematics with no such thing as ontology. Maybe after that point you could help me see how Dick succeeds in making the dynamics pop out of what would otherwise appear to be pure kinematics.

 

Yes it would certainly be useful, and I'm doing that here and there when I have time. Makes things easier when you can speak the same language with people!

 

I have no trouble with the existence of the shift symmetry. I'm just too dumb to see how his presentation can have so many implications.

 

Heh, I don't think there are any implications visible at all at this stage yet anyway. It's was at the very end of the derivation of Schrödinger's Equation when I started seeing what this was really about. And more after walking through the derivation of special relativity. I think you are just trying to see the implications too early, and I'm sorry if I'm getting way too far ahead in my own comments :lol:

 

I believe you may be reading too much into some parts of the analysis, relating it to traditional physics in incompatible ways. Anything that has any resemblance to modern physics is much further down the road, and entails a lot of approximations and universal definitions, yet to be made... (It is actually pretty damn hard to tell at this stage how some aspects of modern physics might map into this notation)

What is "traditional" physics? All I have ever done is to try to understand how his presentation can bear the implications he claims, but of course whenever I did I was presuming my worldview to be valid. He is never subject to the same limitation.

 

By "traditional physics" I'm referring to any conception that people typically may hold about the world, via the typical definitions we all have made. Be it the everyday conception, or any physics model. Any useful world view really. Basically I'm just saying the implications between DD's universal notation and any typical world view are not visible at this stage at all anyway. His coordinate system does not translate to the coordinate systems of physics models in readibly obvious manner, and it's a mistake to try to relate them to each others in some straightforward intuitive sense.

 

Your comment is very interesting though. I remember when DD was explaining the universal notation and the associated shift symmetry etc (i.e. the topic of the OP of this thread), and he was intentionally holding back any of the philosophical implications or conclusions that would be found in the end. I did not know he was aiming to derive the laws of modern physics, and apparently he was not telling me because saying it too early had caused people to lose interest in disbelief, without really looking at the analysis.

 

But perhaps the problem has not been so much a disbelief, as it is that people start to try and relate the aspects of this analysis to the physics models themselves too early, in some straightforwad manner that just makes them see incompatibilities. It is not exactly trivial to find the connection between these symmetries and modern physics (DD has commented many times it took him years and years to get from the fundamental equation - i.e. the expression of the universal symmetries - to modern physics)

 

Yeah so anyway, you understand, when you say the shift symmetry or some other aspect of the universal notation is invalid because [add some relationship from the definitions of modern physics], his response would be exactly that you are concentrating on your pre-existing world-view instead of following exactly and only the definitions he gave (which were related to epistemology anyway, not ontology).

 

To assume that lines of flux "actually exist" is very obviously unwarranted; despite this they are a great tool for any electric engineer designing appliances. Was this the kind of thing you meant?

 

Ah, okay. Well no, that was not exactly the kind of thing I meant, albeit yes lines of flux are also a defined "thing" that is referring to some amount of information whose meaning is not known. I.e. it is also an interpretation of some information. But so is any idea of reality, and that was more what I was referring to. You know, about the very first foundations of a world conception.

 

If there is no starting point (like a rosetta stone) for starting to interpret some information, people might say that you can only start guessing (so to speak), and see if your guesses lead you to an interpretation that "makes sense" (or in this case, produces correct predictions).

 

DD's analysis has to do with laying out the kinds of limitations that are ALWAYS valid, when you translate some information into a form of "a bunch of defined persistent entities". And the derivations of modern physics occur by laying out approximations and definitions that can always be made, i.e. they are essentially just statements of how the information is to be interpreted, no matter what it may be.

 

So that is why I said that it is interesting that something perfectly analogous to the definitions of modern physics can be arrived at without making any guesses about what the information-to-be-explained actually means.

 

I really doubt that no such assumptions are necessary.

 

Well that was also my view couple of years ago. The benefit of this analysis is that it can be used to analytically explore that exact belief about the necessity of assumptions.

 

But let's be careful here, I think you can understand, that it's easy to get entangled into all sorts of semantics here. The ability to express the same exact reality in multiple (semantically) different ways means that assumptions are necessary for our everyday conception of reality (i.e. when you choose one representation over others). The point is that you can arrive at those essential relationships (no matter how you choose to represent them) without assumptions. You just won't be able to choose between different ontological beliefs!

 

As for your first sentence, I doubt you can eliminate the need to check which "guesses" work.

 

Yeah, I see traditional research work as a little bit different topic though.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

Ok, thanks, this helps me, because I was thinking he was talking about "undefined information", and not "unknown information"--these are two completely different concepts.

 

Not the way I mean the words. In my mind they are exactly the same thing; but I should clarify that I tend to shorten "information whose meaning is unknown" as "unknown information".

 

So "undefined information = "information whose meaning is unknown" = "unknown information".

 

I did not mean to say, that the information is unknown as in "not given" at all. It's just that there's no way to refer to it because nothing in it has got any meaning, prior to definitions having been attached to some recurring features.

 

 

Btw, while looking for information about Wigner, I ran into this text which is somewhat related to the subject;

 

http://www.dartmouth.edu/~matc/MathDrama/reading/Wigner.html

 

The topic he is talking about is advanced quite a bit by DD's analysis, so after you've read that, I have couple of comments about it;

 

The law of nature is contained in the statement that the length of time which it takes for a heavy object to fall from a given height is independent of the size, material, and shape of the body which drops. In the framework of Newton's second "law," this amounts to the statement that the gravitational force which acts on the falling body is proportional to its mass but independent of the size, material, and shape of the body which falls.

 

That is "a law of nature" only if the "falling bodies" you are looking at are indeed natural objects. If they are something you defined as objects from a plethora of information, then you are talking about the laws of objects you defined, not laws of objects that exist in nature. (This is exactly the same thing as being able to define "lines of flux" or "kindness" or "hate", even if they don't necessarily "exist in nature" per se, without someone having decided what sorts of patterns constitute such things for usefulness sake)

 

The present writer had occasion, some time ago, to call attention to the succession of layers of "laws of nature," each layer containing more general and more encompassing laws than the previous one and its discovery constituting a deeper penetration into the structure of the universe than the layers recognized before.

 

Or, to the structure of your own definitions.

 

All the laws of nature are conditional statements which permit a prediction of some future events on the basis of the knowledge of the present, except that some aspects of the present state of the world, in practice the overwhelming majority of the determinants of the present state of the world, are irrelevant from the point of view of the prediction.

 

Or, we are generating the kinds of object definitions which permit such associated laws, that are as independent as possible. It would probably be possible to generate object definitions where their expectations were highly dependent on very many other defined objects, but that would not be a very useful world view in terms of practical predictions.

 

The two theories [Relativity and QM] operate with different mathematical concepts - the four dimensional Riemann space and the infinite dimensional Hilbert space, respectively. So far, the two theories could not be united, that is, no mathematical formulation exists to which both of these theories are approximations. All physicists believe that a union of the two theories is inherently possible and that we shall find it.

 

Indeed... What would you call it when the validity of both theories (as an approximate representation of the SAME exact information) has been shown to arise from the same epistemological necessities? That is essentially an explanation as to WHY both representations apply to the same reality. I'd be prone to call that a unification...

 

One more thing;

 

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:tdkuqEGQDb8J:web.ihep.su/library/pubs/tconf98/ps/vizgin.pdf+empirical+law+of+epistemology&cd=10&hl=fi&ct=clnk&gl=fi

 

Wigner's concept "empirical law of epistemology" refers to the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics to describe nature", and he keeps saying how "magical" or "wonderful" it is that nature just so happens to be constructed in such a way that these relatively simple mathematical tricks can so accurately describe it.

 

That to me is like saying how wonderful it is that all the animals just so happen to live in the environments where they can cope. He is overlooking the fact that he assumes his basic perception of reality as a representation of reality itself, as oppose to an interpretation of some unknown information. There are some entirely logical reasons behind the kind of interpretation that we are all using, and if you understand modern physics as an expression of those entirely logical reasons (having to do with data ordering rather than the meaning of the data itself), then you can also understand why it seems like "nature" can be described so accurately via such simple relations; You are not really describing nature, you are describing your categorization of nature! The entities you defined are simple, not nature.

 

I don't see what Dick's presentation adds or how it helps with the most subtle issues, such as Bell inequalites.

 

This is probably jumping too far ahead, but let it be said that I think DD's analysis is the first thing that actually explains Bell inequalities to me without suggesting some undefendable ontology.

 

Those "apparent objects" related to Bell inequalities (or any experiment of) are shorthand references to some recurring patterns in some information. They are not necessarily "realistic" objects at all, they are merely a representation of information, as far as we know.

 

The associated laws that give you the expectation of Bell inequalities, are laws that are embedded to those very definitions; you know they are embedded in there because if you follow those definitions, you have that expectation that Bell inequalities SHOULD be violated.

 

And Bell inequalities are violated - in probabilistic sense - simply because those object definitions are a valid representation of recurring patterns of some information. DD's analysis is an explanation as to WHY they are valid, even without necessarily being realistic representation of reality.

 

It is only once you start trying to believe into a specific ontology (specific reality behind those patterns) that you end up with somewhat strange reality. I would say, it is only once you try to actually believe into ontological identity being tacked to your defined objects.

 

That's my crude version of it anyway, there are probably some far more subtle issues to it, but I need to understand the associated physics definitions little bit better to understand those myself.

 

-Anssi

[Doctordick]

I'm pretty confident that it is somewhat different topic from symmetries to the expectations associated with a valid world-view being mapped in terms of DD's universal notation. I.e. I think you must be reading too much into this part of the presentation to make that connection.

 

Anssi, you are spot on here. From the beginning, Qfwfq has refused to examine my proof and instead taken the tack of showing it to be incorrect via, as you say, “people try to understand it in terms of some specific world view (such as the concepts of QM), and only see incompatibility.” This is exactly what I was talking about when I repeatedly tried to convince Qfwfq that he was bringing too much baggage to the analysis.

 

Intentional or otherwise, Qfwfq invariably misses the entire point. What I am putting forth is a pure tautological construct which is bound by no constraints whatsoever beyond requiring internal consistency. The point is that the construction makes utterly no difference as to what kind of associations one makes. It is merely the fact that the associations, no matter what they actually are, are internally consistent with the past: i.e., the expectations derived from [math]\vec{\Psi}[/math] are consistent with what is actually known. Note that one is dealing with probabilities here; “consistent” means that the actual information being explained is consistent with the calculated probabilities, not that the probabilities are identical to observed probabilities. For example, the “what is” is “what is” explanation is totally consistent with “everything is of equal probability”. The actual circumstances being explained amount to required boundary conditions on [math]\vec{\Psi}[/math] and nothing more.

 

All defined associations are embedded in the definitions associated with my “i” index and there is no need to examine them whatsoever. The only point of interest is that the probabilities derived from [math]\vec{\Psi}[/math] must yield exactly those probabilities yielded by the explanation [math]\vec{\Psi}[/math] is representing. It is the fact that those probabilities are consistent with what is known which leads one to make the presumption that the explanation (whatever it is) will yield reasonable expectations in the future (what is not yet known). If it doesn't, then the explanation is no longer “flaw-free” and you need to get another one.

 

There is absolutely nothing in my fundamental equation which will provide any help whatsoever in finding valid explanations of anything. What it is, is a constraint on expectations due entirely to internal self consistency and that would be internal self consistency with “ALL” implied associations within those definitions expressed via that “i” index. (That means, no compartmentalized thinking allowed: i.e., no presumed meanings whatsoever.)

 

The only place I have found any indications that there are any errors in modern physics is with regard to GR and I have to admit that I may very well have made some errors there as “as far as I am aware, nothing I have done has ever been checked by any competent people”. And, Anssi, you are probably the most competent person to ever look at my presentation.

 

This reminds me of a rather funny association I made when I was in the second grade. The teacher had told us that it was against the rules to use a word in its definition as, if the word was used in the definition, you would have to know the meaning of the word before you could understand the definition. In my mind, that brought up the problem of not knowing the meanings of all the words in the definition. Clearly, if you didn't know what one of the words meant, you would have to look that word up before you could understand the original definition. The problem with that is that the problem extends out. If you don't know the meanings of any of the words in the dictionary, the dictionary eventually has to be circular.

 

In my child's mind, I didn't really comprehend the complexity of the possibilities there. I was curious as to how far one had to go before the circularity of the dictionary showed itself so I decided to try examining the problem. I went to the dictionary in the front of the room to look up a word and trace the implied path. Because, in my child's mind, it made no difference where I started, I started with the first entry in the dictionary. To this day I remember exactly what that entry said, “A -- The first letter of the alphabet, a pronoun ...”. I closed the dictionary and went back to my desk; confident of the fact that the teacher had just given us a “gullibility” test and that I had passed the test. The teacher and I were most assuredly on the same page. Essentially, every generation has to guess the meanings of a great many words; and I am of the opinion that that is why a “living language” changes from one generation to the next. (Oh, and by the way, I was an adult before it dawned on me that the the thoughts I presumed of her had probably never even crossed her mind.)

 

If the purpose of an explanation is to produce internally consistent predictions (think expectations) and what is being predicted can be described with numbers (think computer files) then it is quite obvious that each and every possible explanation can be identified with a mathematical function. That is exactly the definition of my [math]\vec{\Psi}[/math]: i.e., the mapping of the circumstances into the expectations. My fundamental equation arises purely from the requirements of internal consistency within the defined elements and their defined connections. It is a pure logical construct having utterly nothing to do with reality (it is pure mathematics and nothing more). As I have said many times it is no more than an internally consistent tautological construct.

 

It is also quite possible that my mentioning of Noether's theorem created more problems than it helped. All I was trying do was to point out how influential such a relationship can be: i.e., the real recognized power of symmetry arguments.

 

But perhaps the problem has not been so much a disbelief, as it is that people start to try and relate the aspects of this analysis to the physics models themselves too early, in some straightforward manner that just makes them see incompatibilities. It is not exactly trivial to find the connection between these symmetries and modern physics (DD has commented many times it took him years and years to get from the fundamental equation - i.e. the expression of the universal symmetries - to modern physics)

 

Again Anssi is right on; I was well aware of the validity of that equation for roughly fifteen or twenty years before I ever deduced any consequences. It seemed to me at the time that there ought to be an application for such a thing though I could find none. I showed the equation to a number of people asking if they had any idea as to how one might go about finding solutions. No one I ever showed it to came up with an attack for finding or making an analysis of possible solutions. The problem is the fact that it is essentially a many body equation and finding general solutions to such equations is usually seen as impossible.

 

Some time around 1982, in comparing it to Schrödinger's representation of many body problem and looking at the essential approximations necessary to reduce that representation to the common two body problem, I began to see the path of approximations necessary to map my equation into Schrödinger's. That mapping yielded the mathematical identifications and definitions I laid out for everyone in “Deriving Schrӧdinger's Equation from my Fundamental Equation”. After that, everything else sort of rolled right out; however, as Anssi commented, one has to follow that procedure in order to comprehend the appropriate definitions and, if you are not working with my definitions, you will never understand what I am saying.

 

And, Anssi, regarding “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences”, I don't think Wigner is the originator of that comment. From my experience, it is quite universal among scientific authorities and that reference was apparently written in 1960 (not that long ago from my perspective). In my head they totally miss the fundamental issue: any explanation of anything must be internally consistent with itself and mathematics could very easily be defined to be the study of “internally consistent systems”. Believe me, anyone who came up with a new “internally consistent system” which could not be mapped into known mathematics would find their system becoming a new branch of mathematics quite quickly. That is why much of modern mathematics traces its origins to the physical sciences. There is nothing “unreasonable” there at all; it is merely a requirement of any valid explanation of anything.

 

Have fun -- Dick

 

PS Five years ago, on July 2, 2005 at 11:05 AM, I posted a thread titled, “Defining the nature of rational discussion!”, within which I defined a term for a specific mode of “rational” thought (meaning a thought which a rational person would not qualify as to be rejected out of hand) which I wished to refer to as different from “logical thought” (which I defined to be the result of the application of formal logic). My point being that there exist conclusions which are not the outcome of formal logic which are nonetheless quite rational. I wished, for pure convenience and nothing else, to refer to this type of thought as “squirrel” thought (for reasons I gave in that post). Qfwfq adamantly opposed my use of this term with the assertion that no evidence existed that squirrels did not use formal logic to make their decisions.

Rational means based on reason. Even a squirrel can have it's reasons, although it couldn't afford the time to step through them during it's acrobatics.

At the time I thought this complaint was rather ridiculous as I, personally, have never met a squirrel who gave any indication to me that he had even been trained in formal logic. At the time I thought Qfwfq was being silly; I guess that he wasn't and, apparently, he had other motives (I suspect more to the tune of stirring the pot of confusion).

[Qfwfq]

I get more and more the impression that I'm just wasting too much of my time with these things. I had hoped Anssi could be a bridge over Dick's inability to communicate, instead I'm reminded of the six blind men arguing about what an elephant is like. One had collided with its belly, another had wrestled with its trunk, yet another had grabbed a tusk, the others had fondled an ear, embraced a leg and fiddled with its tail.

 

It is also quite possible that my mentioning of Noether's theorem created more problems than it helped. All I was trying do was to point out how influential such a relationship can be: i.e., the real recognized power of symmetry arguments.

Well now, isn't that a relief! :lol:

 

Couldn't you have said so, straight away? Dick you keep repeating that I don't get your whole entire point because you don't get mine. You never make yours clear but I know by now that you aren't talking about physics... except when you do talk about physics, but if anyone does except you it's only their worldview. :doh: You must however admit that in your presentation you associate shift symmetry with a unitary operator and this is why it doesn't change the modulus square which gives the probability. Just like Wigner's theorem, eh?

 

Anssi, given Dick's remark above about Noether's theorem, maybe it's not much use addressing most of your points; Friday I read through and I you seem to be talking like Dick. I don't get why you should place restrictions about "at this stage" and "further down the road" when I have already discussed things further down and I was mainly referring to the OP in this thread. Anyway I can't be sure of what you mean by some parts of your posts when we don't seem to agree on the meaning of the word elephant. As far as I can make out, I have some disagreements with your assessment of how the mathematical framework of physics is based on ontological assumptions. I'm not sure you get it straight about Bell's inequalities but, as far as I can sort out your remarks about it, in the end I don't think your view based on Dick's framework differs all that much from what Abner Shimony says.

 

Of course, I can't really compare your view with that but, if you examine it properly, you should see that the framework doesn't rely on assuming much about ontology; in fact the whole implication is that quantum nature of reality makes it necessary to adopt a very holistic view. As for bridging your gap with theoretical physics, I would suggest you first get the basics of classical analytical mechanics and then look up the von Neuman formalism of QM.

 

Oh, Dick, I would suggest you to deeply investigate the etymological history of the word rational.

[Doctordick]

I get more and more the impression that I'm just wasting too much of my time with these things.

Qfwfq, I would agree one hundred percent. Your only purpose appears to be to do your best to stir confusion and controversy and the number of people accomplishing that end are legion on these forums. When I first interacted with you, I thought you were more intelligent than that; however, you have begun to convince me that you are no more than a primary example of a signature I used to use many years ago.

 

Knowledge is Power

and the most common abuse of that power is to use it to hide stupidity

 

I had hoped Anssi could be a bridge over Dick's inability to communicate, instead I'm reminded of the six blind men arguing about what an elephant is like.

Well, neither Anssi, Bombadil, nor a few others I could list seem to have that much difficulty understanding me. I personally think the real problem is that you have no interest in what I am saying and, if that is indeed the case, please just “go away” as you are providing nothing except meaningless posts

 

Well now, isn't that a relief! :unsure:

What? A relief to you? Or are you just scattering derogatory comments for the fun of it?

 

Couldn't you have said so, straight away? Dick you keep repeating that I don't get your whole entire point because you don't get mine.

I get yours! You regard me as a crackpot and you want everyone else to do the same.

 

You never make yours clear but I know by now that you aren't talking about physics...

Qfwfq, I am talking about the philosophical issues central to problem solving and if you believe that has nothing to do with physics then you are indeed an idiot.

 

Just like Wigner's theorem, eh?

I can only add that people who insist on using Knowledge for the purpose of hiding stupidity do a disservice to humanity.

 

… when I have already discussed things further down and I was mainly referring to the OP in this thread.

Yeah, notice that he simply cannot comprehend working within the definitions I lay down (he “knows” his definitions are sufficient to see where these things lead and there is no need to even consider my definitions).

 

Anssi, you can argue with him if you want but I am afraid he has neither the intellect to understand what we are talking about nor the interest in understanding any of it. He simply does not understand that the definitions being used are important or that they are not the definitions he is used to using.

 

I know I am beginning to suffer from senility but Qfwfq has no idea of the constraints he has put on his thoughts. He is quite sure his “Knowledge” will protect him from needing to think.

 

I don't think your view based on Dick's framework differs all that much from what Abner Shimony says.

Anssi, I have carefully read that entire article by Abner Shimony and have found no relevance whatsoever to what we are talking about. His whole concern is with various explanations of the problem and not with the problem of internal consistency of the explanations themselves. From Shimony’s (and Qfwfq’s) perspective, internal consistency is a well understood issue and they don’t want to either think about it or discuss it.

 

As for bridging your gap with theoretical physics, I would suggest you first get the basics of classical analytical mechanics and then look up the von Neuman formalism of QM.

I think that translates to “leave it to the experts Anssi”.

 

Oh, Dick, I would suggest you to deeply investigate the etymological history of the word rational.

Oh, I think my usage of the adjective “rational” is well within common usage of the term as presented in the vague and poorly defined English language. Qfwfq would rather keep things vague and poorly defined so he can stir the pot of confusion. He certainly has no interest in working within the definitions I want to use. That might require him to “think” instead of just reacting with his inherent emotional reactions.

 

I apologize to everyone for being a cantankerous old man but I really think Qfwfq is overstepping the boundaries of decency one would expect of an administrator and his comments try my patience. If my post gets me banned, so be it. I have better things to do with my time.

 

Have fun -- Dick

[AnssiH]

I get more and more the impression that I'm just wasting too much of my time with these things. I had hoped Anssi could be a bridge over Dick's inability to communicate,

 

I'm hoping I can be of help as well, and, I wouldn't be so sure you are wasting your time. Look;

 

...all I could say is that shift symmetry is a translation of the whole universe; its total momentum is conserved. I don't see the great discovery in this single aspect.... ...I have no trouble with the existence of the shift symmetry.

 

Great! Now, there's no real reason to get all tangled up with the apparent implications or to any of that more philosophical stuff, it's much much more difficult to discuss about all that anyway (I just find it interesting, that's all). Your input is valuable if you can spot errors in the algebra, nevermind what it is supposed to "mean" in some sense.

 

So you know, if you can see something off in the OP, just voice up.

 

I don't get why you should place restrictions about "at this stage" and "further down the road" when I have already discussed things further down and I was mainly referring to the OP in this thread.

 

Simply because it would be a mistake to directly relate the behaviour of the discussed symmetries with the behaviour of some similar-looking symmetries of modern physics. It wouldn't work without having made some other appropriate definitions (the important bit with each one being, that they don't require a specific sort of data to be valid)

 

Mind you, I don't quite believe you are "stuck" to some undefendable beliefs quite the way DD seems to view the situation. I just think you raise concerns that would not be concerns at all much further down the road. You already said you have no troubles with the shift symmetry, and that's really all that DD wanted to hear, he is making baby steps with very many words because he is trying to remain as explicit and unambiguous as possible with his communication and definitions. It is important because if there are hidden assumptions made in these definitions (regarding the type of data that is to-be-explained), then that would have an impact at the end results too.

 

Anyway I can't be sure of what you mean by some parts of your posts when we don't seem to agree on the meaning of the word elephant. As far as I can make out, I have some disagreements with your assessment of how the mathematical framework of physics is based on ontological assumptions. I'm not sure you get it straight about Bell's inequalities but, as far as I can sort out your remarks about it, in the end I don't think your view based on Dick's framework differs all that much from what Abner Shimony says.

 

Well this is the "it doesn't really matter" part, so don't worry if we still don't seem to understand each others, I'll just give a quick comment of my thoughts.

 

I could say that the important difference between DD's epistemological analysis and the physics models is that DD's analysis is carefully only using the kinds of universal definitions that are valid for absolutely any information streams, whose meaning is unknown (i.e. basically a matter of insisting on a certain interpretation via making a certain definition), whereas the latter cases always seem make assumptions of some sort about the character or the structure or behaviour of what it is that is being described by those definitions (i.e. it is assumed the models produce correct probabilities only about this reality; they are not meant to be related to the possibilities open to us in the interpretation of any undefined information)

 

In the latter case, in the page you linked to, as soon as they bring in concept like, say, locality, they are implying characteristics to space and to ontological entities inhabiting that space etc.

 

Whereas in DD's case, those characteristics are not assumed to be found from the data per se, but they arise from the behaviour of those universal definitions that are made. Any defined persistence (or identity) to any "entity" is actually just a tack on some recurring activity, so;

 

Do you think that even causality is too bold an assumption?

 

yes causality is also taken as entirely an epistemological effect of our definitions. The idea is that it is based on familiarity of patterns, but that does not warrant the assumption that some defined entity is really there, moving from one location to another location (the simplest case of causality). Nor that the characteristics of space are revealed by the characteristics of such defined entities (e.g. the momentum is conserved via the epistemological requirement of shift symmetry to your data tracking, which has got nothing to do with the character of reality or the information-that-was-so-explained/interpreted).

 

I.e. the existence of space is something that is meaningful only if you can define information in some meaningful manner (of persistent entities), and so on.

 

With the same breath though, I have to say that it is of course very very difficult for me to follow that page you linked to exactly. It would take me quite a while to digest it properly. Are they saying that in their analysis, any information can be interpreted - if we so choose - in a terminology that makes QM definitions valid (prediction wise), and in that case the violation of Bell inequalities quite expected epistemological effect of that chosen view? If they are, they are in perfect agreement with the findings of DD, and in that case you should understand what implications we are talking about. If not, don't stress over it too much! :unsure:

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

C'mon Dick, don't be so grumpy, just cuz I don't play Follow The Leader. Anyway, the squirrel has its reasons which Reason doesn't know.

 

Your input is valuable if you can spot errors in the algebra

I wasn't looking for them at all.

 

Simply because it would be a mistake to directly relate the behaviour of the discussed symmetries with the behaviour of some similar-looking symmetries of modern physics. It wouldn't work without having made some other appropriate definitions (the important bit with each one being, that they don't require a specific sort of data to be valid)

Shift symmetry as described by Dick has exactly the form of what Wigner's theorem is about, the description can be changed without changing what is observable: expectations for outcomes. A definition is required only for some of them to be a subset called "dynamic symmetries" and, no, they don't require a specific sort of data; it can be done purely in the von Neuman mathematical framework.

 

I just think you raise concerns that would not be concerns at all much further down the road.

Actually I was addressing concerns that are in the OP and even seemed to be the essence of it but, after Dick's remark about it, it seemed I don't need to discuss even the OP so I can spare myself a lot of trouble! :)

 

In the latter case, in the page you linked to, as soon as they bring in concept like, say, locality, they are implying characteristics to space and to ontological entities inhabiting that space etc.

Oh don't worry, I'm aware of that, The fact is that in order for Bell to define a meaning of the phrase "local realism" he had to be such a sneaky cheat as to already have a notion of space and time! Anyway the crime of taking these short cuts is quite typical of physicists in there work. I wasn't claiming that article to be doing exactly what Dick does, starting exactly where he does. You might notice though that they use a very general framework, there aren't ontological assumptions further to the essential for giving meaning to what Bell called "local realism" and for the rest they are putting all in terms of observables, something I find quite comparable to the datasets you guys discuss; in the end they discuss implicatons that strain our usual ideas of space-time and local causality so, instead of starting without them and then making them somehow appear they go the opposite way, they find reasons to question them (see the section Philosophical Comments). Rational enough?

 

yes causality is also taken as entirely an epistemological effect of our definitions........

 

I.e. the existence of space is something that is meaningful only if you can define information in some meaningful manner (of persistent entities), and so on.

Uhm, one asks why there are recurrances that induce us to consider models in which causality plays a key role. I remain skeptical about Dick's presentatoin explaining it away as non existent. I can contemplate the notion of our perception of time and even space ultimately coming from causality, via our neurosensory data streams, but I'm skeptical of causality being only an appearance while logic and mathematics remaining a basis for any inference about reality and I think that spatiotemoral extent has some kind of objective character regardless of how we perceive them by interpreting these data streams.

 

Are they saying that in their analysis, any information can be interpreted - if we so choose - in a terminology that makes QM definitions valid (prediction wise), and in that case the violation of Bell inequalities quite expected epistemological effect of that chosen view?

All I can say is that QM makes some predictions that are not compatible with the requisites that stand for "local realism" or "hidden variable theories" that were hypothesized on grounds of Lorentz covariance. In essence, those requisites turn out to be too stringent but the matter is subtle.

 

I don't see it as choosing a terminology ad hoc to make QM definitions valid; the violation of Bell inequalities is implied by the very very basics of how to describe a state, for which there are given expectations for each observable's outcomes. If I am talking Hindi then you would need to get the most basic things of the von Neumann framework, coming before any definition of dynamics or even kinematics. The description of states as normalized vectors of some Hilbert space, with probabilities given by the modulus squared rule and the roles of different types of operators, is all due to quite basic matters of what can be observed and it includes what Dick has in his notation. Mathematically, any self-adjoint operator is "an observable" (whatever the heck it is) and its eigenvalues are the possible outcomes of "observing" it (however the hack that is accomplished).

[Doctordick]

C'mon Dick, don't be so grumpy, just cuz I don't play Follow The Leader.

Oh, you can go your own way if you wish; that doesn't bother me a bit. I have watched the scientific community's thoughtless machinations for my whole life and have little hope of penetrating that wall of authority. The only thing I question is your purpose in posting on my threads. At least the other authoritarians go away. I find it difficult to accept that you are as dense as you pretend to be.

 

With regard to my presentations, there are only two issues of significance: one is the question as to whether or not my “fundamental equation” is a tautological construct and the other is whether or not I have made any logical errors in my assertion that the approximations I make lead to the relationships I develop. The fact that you avoid both of these issues like the plague leads me to the conclusion that your only interest is is sowing authoritarian confusion.

 

I find quite comparable to the datasets you guys discuss; in the end they discuss implicatons that strain our usual ideas of space-time and local causality so, instead of starting without them and then making them somehow appear they go the opposite way, they find reasons to question them (see the section Philosophical Comments). Rational enough?

”what conclusions can be drawn about the structure and constitution of the physical world”

Sure, that's rational enough for idiots. On the other hand, if I have made no errors, the answer is trivial. What conclusions can be drawn about the structure and constitution of the physical world? The answer is an unequivocal None!

 

Physics is itself no more than an extremely complex tautology totally equivalent to the religious tautologies of the dark ages. That is the philosophical issue I would like to get to and the one I think you find so frightening. It is, on the other hand, an excellent way of cataloging what has happened and that issue is very interesting.

 

I'm skeptical of causality being only an appearance while logic and mathematics remaining a basis for any inference about reality and I think that spatiotemoral extent has some kind of objective character regardless of how we perceive them by interpreting these data streams.

Yeah, don't you think both Anssi and I are well aware of that fact? Look at what you have just said, you are skeptical of the possibility that what you believe is false. That is the skepticism of religious faith.

 

Either show me where I presumed there was causality or order in the data being explained or show me an error in my deductions!

 

Uhm, one asks why there are recurrances that induce us to consider models in which causality plays a key role.

Give me an example of an explanation which lacks causality and makes good predictions. Can you not comprehend that such a thing would be an oxymoron. It is the explanations which require causality not the things being explained. If you took the trouble to examine my work instead of your interpretation of it, you might come to understand it.

 

I don't see it as choosing a terminology ad hoc to make QM definitions valid ...

All I do is define an explanation; transform that definition into mathematics and deduce the consequences. There is nothing ad hoc about it at all. Unless you can show an error, it is absolutely general!

 

If I am talking Hindi then you would need to get the most basic things of the von Neumann framework, coming before any definition of dynamics or even kinematics. The description of states as normalized vectors of some Hilbert space, with probabilities given by the modulus squared rule and the roles of different types of operators, is all due to quite basic matters of what can be observed and it includes what Dick has in his notation. Mathematically, any self-adjoint operator is "an observable" (whatever the heck it is) and its eigenvalues are the possible outcomes of "observing" it (however the hack that is accomplished).

Sounds a lot like authoritarian drivel to me. You are asserting one would need the most basic things of God and heaven before one would be able to follow my logic. Why is it that Anssi is able to follow my logic? He wants to understand physics so he can reassure himself that my results do indeed correspond to their results; not because their perspective is required to understand my results. Your problem is the simple fact that you believe your perspective is required and you have no intention of ever considering the alternative.

 

Have fun Anssi -- Dick

[AnssiH]

I wasn't looking for them at all.

 

Then I assume you are interested of talking about the philosophical implications a bit, that's fine by me.

 

In the latter case, in the page you linked to, as soon as they bring in concept like, say, locality, they are implying characteristics to space and to ontological entities inhabiting that space etc.

Oh don't worry, I'm aware of that, The fact is that in order for Bell to define a meaning of the phrase "local realism" he had to be such a sneaky cheat as to already have a notion of space and time! Anyway the crime of taking these short cuts is quite typical of physicists in there work. I wasn't claiming that article to be doing exactly what Dick does, starting exactly where he does. You might notice though that they use a very general framework, there aren't ontological assumptions further to the essential for giving meaning to what Bell called "local realism" and for the rest they are putting all in terms of observables, something I find quite comparable to the datasets you guys discuss;

 

Well we are closing in to the problem here; it is certainly mistake to compare an analysis that has these short cuts, with DD's analysis which is carefully trying to eliminate all such assumptions. It is very important characteristic of his analysis that the notion of space (incl. locality etc) arises as a feature of the data ordering/interpretation mechanism, as oppose to being an ontological assumption. If its existence/properties arose as an ontological assumption in his analysis, it would not imply anything about the violation of Bell inequalities, as we would be just at the same spot as modern physics, asking exactly the questions they are asking about the ontological character of nature.

 

in the end they discuss implicatons that strain our usual ideas of space-time and local causality so, instead of starting without them and then making them somehow appear they go the opposite way, they find reasons to question them (see the section Philosophical Comments). Rational enough?

 

It's completely different topic; they are (partially) examining the consequences of their ontological assumptions are they not? (i.e. there are consequences to those exact shortcuts they have made)

 

I.e;

 

...upon assumption that the logical and methodological questions are answered positively' date=' what conclusions can be drawn about the structure and constitution of the physical world, in particular is nature non-local despite the remarkable success of relativity theory?

[/quote']

 

...why would they be asking that question, if they were doing something parallel to DD's analysis? I.e. if they had drawn a connection between epistemological symmetries, universal definitions, and violation of Bell inequalities? If they had done that, they would immediately recognize that the answer is unequivocally "there is nothing to conclude about nature; it could be local, non-local, entirely random, or entirely deterministic, and yet Bell inequalities would be a valid feature of a valid transformation when an undefined information is interpreted via generating definitions from its recurring features"

 

I guess it's fair to say, that they end up with those metaphysical questions because they have some ontological assumptions laid down as the basis of their arguments, and they know those assumptions are undefendable by themselves. I.e. as long as there are ideas about nature left at the premise, they don't know what aspects of their conclusions are epistemological (or purely logical), and what aspects are consequences of those few remaining ontological assumptions. That is why they are still asking questions about locality in nature.

 

In DD's analysis, if it is valid, it implies the violation of Bell's inequalities is completely non-mysterious feature of our definitions, as in, there are epistemological reasons behind the issue; in our defined world view, the probability that a measurement X is made in the circumstance that measurements Y and Z were made (some of these entangled via our definitions), is exactly what quantum mechanical definitions say it is. It is NOT fair to assume that real entities actually moved from one apparatus to measuring devices, unless one is making those few last undefendable assumptions that are mentioned Abner Shimony's article. Those exact extra assumptions about ontological reality are found to be entirely inconsequential to the validity of Bell inequalities being violated.

 

What DD really wants is just that people examine the logical steps of his analysis. He is not looking for people to just accept with his conclusions and being all grumpy if they don't, he just doesn't want people to disagree without even understanding the steps he makes to get there. I really find that circumstance similar to someone disagreeing with the possibility of quantum mechanics without understanding the definitions of quantum mechanics.

 

Uhm, one asks why there are recurrances that induce us to consider models in which causality plays a key role.

 

Yes but I find that to be a bit off-topic, because it goes to make questions about the ontological character of the "information-to-be-explained". I think the issue is rather, that if it was not possible to recognize familiar patterns, it would not be possible to have any expectations about anything either.

 

Perhaps something can be said about the logical possibilities in picking up recurring patterns from random information, but it seems that's also slightly beyond the scope of the OP...

 

And btw, "causality" in this context also refers to any persistence to any defined entity. I.e, if there's a rock just sitting there on the yard, there is an expectation that it is sitting there in the next moment too, an the next, and the next. You could say "it being there causes it to be there the next moment too", i.e. some recurring pattern made it possible to define it.

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

He wants to understand physics so he can reassure himself that my results do indeed correspond to their results;

That's exactly what I've been trying to do, but you keep mistaking my effort for all these things you accuse me of.

 

Have fun Anssi -- Dick

I'm sure Anssi is having a whale of a time.

 

Then I assume you are interested of talking about the philosophical implications a bit, that's fine by me.

What could interest me is getting to the actual sources of some bold conclusions that Dick appears to draw. Trouble is that it is hard enough to even be sure what his conclusions are and what they are not.

 

Well we are closing in to the problem here; it is certainly mistake to compare an analysis that has these short cuts, with DD's analysis which is carefully trying to eliminate all such assumptions.

It seems you haven't really got the point of what I've been trying to get across. I still don't see what implications Dick's analysis can have on the Bell inequalities further to the predictions of quantum mechanics, if even as much.

 

It's completely different topic; they are (partially) examining the consequences of their ontological assumptions are they not? (i.e. there are consequences to those exact shortcuts they have made)

OMG no, it seems you haven't got their point either.

 

If they had done that, they would immediately recognize that the answer is unequivocally "there is nothing to conclude about nature; it could be local, non-local, entirely random, or entirely deterministic, and yet Bell inequalities would be a valid feature of a valid transformation when an undefined information is interpreted via generating definitions from its recurring features"

How would you support this statement?

 

Are you convinced that, if only I could change my internal mapping of neurosensory input, I could interpret the same datastream coming from the same reality to believe I have always been wealthy and happy, that I've never been trodden on and that I'm happily married to Claudia Schiffer? I'm not even asking for a totally different worldview, it's only a slight alteration compared to a cosmos with totally different physics and so on. I ask for very little in comparison and yet, it would be... a dream!

 

And yet no, because Dick talks about whether a worldview is valid and remains so with further input. I would be dreaming in the constant risk of my dream being shattered, of getting rudely woken from it.

 

I guess it's fair to say, that they end up with those metaphysical questions because they have some ontological assumptions laid down as the basis of their arguments, and they know those assumptions are undefendable by themselves. I.e. as long as there are ideas about nature left at the premise, they don't know what aspects of their conclusions are epistemological (or purely logical), and what aspects are consequences of those few remaining ontological assumptions. That is why they are still asking questions about locality in nature.

Maybe it's fair to say that they have already been woken from the Einstein dream, which can be traced back to him saying that God doesn't play dice.

 

Anssi, have you understood that some predictions of QM contradict the Bell inequalities? I still can't figure your words well enough to be sure that you have got this straight, along with a few other details about that topic. I believe I have already said that those folks are questioning a lot more assumptions than they are making.

 

What DD really wants is just that people examine the logical steps of his analysis.

But he never makes it easy. In lack of this, how can I judge his whole argument to be conclusive?

 

I think the issue is rather, that if it was not possible to recognize familiar patterns, it would not be possible to have any expectations about anything either.

This somewhat evades the fact that the world does so fiendishly decieve us. Would you seriously say that we simply find some self coherent interpretation of what is only total chaos? Should I really believe that you don't exist, any more than the internet and the PC and my hands typing on the keyboard, my eyes reading your posts on the screen? Is this really the meaning of Dick's analysis?

 

As for keeping in line with the OP, I thought Minitrue had burnt it when it annuled my objection against applying Noether's theorem to any kind of symmetry, without having defined the dynamics. This of course annuls the title too, we can't have any grounds on which to discuss conservation of inherent ignorance.

[Doctordick]

With regard to my presentations, there are only two issues of significance: one is the question as to whether or not my “fundamental equation” is a tautological construct and the other is whether or not I have made any logical errors in my assertion that the approximations I make lead to the relationships I develop. The fact that you avoid both of these issues like the plague leads me to the conclusion that your only interest is is sowing authoritarian confusion.

Clearly Anssi has no trouble understanding that my “fundamental equation” is a tautological construct. His problem is that he doesn't know enough physics and mathematics to be so sure the resulting approximate solutions are both correct and, indeed, the common relationships developed by the physics community: i.e., Schrödinger's equation, Dirac's equation, Maxwell's equation and , roughly, Einstein's GR.

 

He wants to understand physics so he can reassure himself that my results do indeed correspond to their results; not because their perspective is required to understand my results.

That's exactly what I've been trying to do, but you keep mistaking my effort for all these things you accuse me of.

And all this time I presumed you knew enough about differential equations and the classical physics results to recognize that my algebraic approximations do indeed lead to exactly those mathematical relationships presented by "classical physics". Oh'migod; how could I have been so blind! I guess I am just stupid as hell.

 

Qfwfq, if you actually think what you have been trying to do bears any resemblance at all to what Anssi is trying to understand, you are indeed totally ignorant of the issues being discussed. His comprehension of the philosophic implications is far better than yours; the only problem he has is whether or not the algebraic conclusions are accurate. I think my perspective of your motives is accurate

 

Your problem is the simple fact that you believe your perspective is required and you have no intention of ever considering the alternative.

Otherwise, how is it that, in spite of his lack of mathematical training, Anssi has no problem finding errors in my algebraic deductions whereas you never find a one, other then the fact that you have never looked? And then you totally skip the issues of the mathematical results themselves and want to assert that I cannot be correct “for philosophic reasons”. There is no reason to discuss the philosophic implications if you don't understand what is being shown!

 

This of course annuls the title too, we can't have any grounds on which to discuss conservation of inherent ignorance.

More intentional misrepresentation of what I said. When I speak of "conservation of inherent ignorance", I thought I made it quite clear that I was speaking of the fact that mathematics can not generate information not contained in the presumptions upon which the mathematics is based. Or is it that just another fact which is beyond your comprehension too?

 

Have fun -- Dick

[AnssiH]

What could interest me is getting to the actual sources of some bold conclusions that Dick appears to draw. Trouble is that it is hard enough to even be sure what his conclusions are and what they are not.

 

Well, like I said, I figured out what those conclusions are after thinking through the steps he makes in the algebra. But I think there's some truth to him saying that it's my lack of familiarity with physics that actually made it easier for me, as in, I don't have the tendency to interpret his work in terms of what it superficially looks like in terms of physics. I don't know physics well enough, so I was forced to work with his definitions in small baby steps (and believe me, backtrack very many times to make sure I had the definitions straight in my head)

 

I understand doing that is a lot to ask (compared to making quick superficial comments, as seems to be the name of the game in these forums), but you know... that issue is visible in the difficulty of communicating what DD's work even is.

 

It seems you haven't really got the point of what I've been trying to get across. I still don't see what implications Dick's analysis can have on the Bell inequalities further to the predictions of quantum mechanics, if even as much.

 

I think that is exactly the issue I was trying to explain. I.e. what it means to draw validity of quantum mechanical predictions from entirely epistemological grounds. And by entirely I really mean absolutely and completely, and that's important. It seems to me, it is the last few ontological assumptions that still exist in the explanation of the article you linked to, that give the appearance of ontological grounding to whatever relationships/conclusions they are talking about. (and cause all the ontological questions)

 

It's completely different topic; they are (partially) examining the consequences of their ontological assumptions are they not? (i.e. there are consequences to those exact shortcuts they have made)

OMG no, it seems you haven't got their point either.

 

Why do you say that? My comment was related to the issue of having made ontological assumptions, and thus supposing they are discussing the structure of reality (or possibilities of). I understand they are working with definitions related to observations and consequences to expectations, but as long as they also include the idea that it is this specific reality their work is related to, they are talking about different topic than DD.

 

I think I am really beginning to see why and how people with physics alignment tend to interpret this in terms of physics :/ *scratching head*

 

If they had done that, they would immediately recognize that the answer is unequivocally "there is nothing to conclude about nature; it could be local, non-local, entirely random, or entirely deterministic, and yet Bell inequalities would be a valid feature of a valid transformation when an undefined information is interpreted via generating definitions from its recurring features"

How would you support this statement?

 

DD's analysis is the best support, but in the meantime...

 

Are you convinced that, if only I could change my internal mapping of neurosensory input, I could interpret the same datastream coming from the same reality to believe I have always been wealthy and happy, that I've never been trodden on and that I'm happily married to Claudia Schiffer? I'm not even asking for a totally different worldview, it's only a slight alteration compared to a cosmos with totally different physics and so on. I ask for very little in comparison and yet, it would be... a dream!

 

...I really don't know about those slight alterations (since that would be slight alterations to very complex situations when all the required definitions are stated), but yeah the issue is exactly about how the most fundamental relationships of modern physics are features of our "internal mapping", if you will. Think about it from this perspective; all persistence/causality/expectations are fundamentally arising from recurring activity of some sort, and whatever familiarity there is to be found, it can be used as a basis for defining some entities. (in fact, what else is there to use when the information is undefined at the get-go?)

 

The shift symmetries are shift symmetries related to the mapping of those defined entities (i.e. "existence of, at each moment"), onto a coordinate system. Then, the possibilities are further limited by making certain universal definitions.

 

So the recurring activity behind it is just some sort of "noumena", and its actual nature (or some supposed actual ontology behind the information) is inconsequential to the discussed symmetries and their consequences. As long as just ANY recurring activity can be recognized, it is possible to work with it.

 

How convinced I can be about this issue, well, it's directly related to how convinced I can be about the validity of the algebraic steps. That confidence is high enough to give this issue some serious thought.

 

I know you are not convinced, but you have to admit, if the quantum mechanical features can be shown to be inherent features of data ordering of some recurring patterns, it makes the apparently idealistic features of QM a lot less mysterious. (by apparently idealistic I mean, the ways that observations affect our expectations)

 

Anssi, have you understood that some predictions of QM contradict the Bell inequalities? I still can't figure your words well enough to be sure that you have got this straight, along with a few other details about that topic.

 

Yes I believe I understand the issue, albeit obviously I understand it in a fairly "mainstream" way. I understand that entangled measurements being made with space-like separation appear to affect each others, i.e. "how" the measurements are made have an effect to what the measurements are at both ends.

 

I understand it was QM formalism that originally gave the expectation that this would happen, and gave birth to EPR "paradox" (and DD's work has to do with why that expectation is valid in terms of predictive data ordering, not in terms of what ontological reality supposedly is)

 

And I understand how that issue is related to the idea of locality, and I understand what that has got to do with causality in terms of relativity (i.e. why the result is especially problematic in terms of relativity).

 

I understand how one can explain that result to themselves via various ontological assumptions, through various quantum interpretations if they want to, such as transactional or many worlds (As long as one is happy with obviously undefendable facets to their idea of reality).

 

I understand the QM predictions and the experiments produce the same result with various delayed choice and quantum eraser variations as well. As would be expected, if the result is a feature of our own (valid) data ordering mechanisms. But make no mistake, that does require that you take our ideas of space also as features of our data ordering mechanisms (i.e. getting its meaning from the definitions of persistent objects)

 

I think the issue is rather, that if it was not possible to recognize familiar patterns, it would not be possible to have any expectations about anything either.

This somewhat evades the fact that the world does so fiendishly decieve us. Would you seriously say that we simply find some self coherent interpretation of what is only total chaos?

 

No, I'm not saying exactly that, I'm saying I don't know what the information-by-itself is, and that it's a bit counter-productive to try to discuss what it is. How would you discuss "what noumena is"? It would be the same as trying to understand what "undefined-in-itself" is via "defining it".

 

That classical ontological/epistemological problem is what DD is trying to overcome by focusing to the epistemological symmetries to expectations, instead of "trying to define what 'really' lies behind our definitions" (which would be as oxymoronic as it sounds).

 

And it should be pretty easy to convince oneself, that the "real meaning" of the information is fundamentally unknown (i.e. the real ontological source/structure behind our perceptions is unknown), and that we can have expectations only if some recurring patterns can be recognized (barring undefendable assumptions).

 

Should I really believe that you don't exist, any more than the internet and the PC and my hands typing on the keyboard, my eyes reading your posts on the screen? Is this really the meaning of Dick's analysis?

 

No, take it more as, the real structure of reality is unknown, and there are many valid ways to categorize recurring patterns of reality into defined objects, but only some of those interpretation methods allow for simple ways to handle huge amounts of raw information (for prediction purposes).

 

The way I look at the issue is that, there's no ontological knowledge forcing us to identify objects around us the way we currently conceive them. In our current conception, there are a lot of dynamic situation where one defined object transforms into another defined object via some defined rules (i.e. we have expectations about those transformations).

 

The same way, it would be possible to generate some rules where just about any portion of reality would be seen as transforming into some other portion of reality. What portion transforms into what at a given moment, can be arbitrarily chosen, if the defined rules are allowed to be arbitrarily complex (the context can be seen as unique for every new circumstance since the "past" is always different), and if there's only finite amount of information-to-be-explained. (Just remember, we'd be allowed to define space and locality and all those things as we see fit, if we ignore the complexity issues)

 

That complex view can be seen as "valid", in that it "explains" all the information (and we don't have information about its ontological correctness), but it would also be inconceivable complex, i.e. rather useless for making easy predictions about the future.

 

That sort of gets us to the purpose of physics; it is possible to interpret the same raw information in very convoluted ways, or it is possible to interpret the same information in much simpler ways. Simpler is more useful for practical prediction purposes.

 

What DD is talking about is the epistemological methods/definitions for achieving that simple way of categorizing information (its recurring features), and it turns out the relationships of modern physics are embedded to those epistemological methods (as oppose to the "real meaning" of the information), thus, those features are part and parcel of our definitions, not part and parcel of the "real meaning of the information" (that - most people suppose - we just somehow sort of "guessed" right).

 

So when DD is talking about relationships that physicists see as ontological features, he is actually referring to epistemological features (of the chosen categorization method). The reason why it sounds a bit like idealism to you is that you are interpreting his discussion in terms of how it relates to idea of "skeleton-reality" you have in your head (those few "minimum assumptions"), i.e. you are thinking about "possibilities of interpretation" to some pre-defined premise. I think you are doing that because you are suppose it's not possible to interpret something completely unknown, without making some guesses about its meaning (you said something to this effect yourself). I.e. you are thinking that without those guesses, there's no way to "start with anything", right? That means, you are not focusing onto the topic of categorizing recurring features of unknown information in self-consistent ways.

 

Note that it is always possible to still assume that by an unbelievable co-incident, the ontological reality still just so happens to be exactly like we defined it. But, through the results of this analysis, there's absolutely no reason to make that assumption, because it would have no consequences to our world view, and it's an issue we could never prove (we always have that transformation between recurring features and our definitions in-between anyway).

 

Can you see that difference between what I called "traditional physics" (building on assumptions) and this epistemological analysis (building on universals)?

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

Anssi, unfortunately it seems like we can't effectively communicate unless you can bridge your gaps, you track Dick in mistaking my efforts of offering you help in this for being a member of the Holy Office. It also seems you mistake me for having claimed that Shimony's article does the same thing that Dick does; this is false, I see gross differences but I was trying to make a few points. It would be helpful if you specified exactly which two remaining ontological assumptions you refer to.

 

Well, like I said, I figured out what those conclusions are after thinking through the steps he makes in the algebra.

It's a smite more than following the calculus and seeing no mistakes. Mathematics is a pure exercise in logic, I've needed to make sense of what Dick is claiming about his equation's bearing on interpreting reality and it takes more patience than most people have. You've had more of it and perhaps a few less important other things to occupy your time with. I think I see what you mean about interpretations of reality but I doubt your ability to judge without having bridged your gap and, when you say:

But I think there's some truth to him saying that it's my lack of familiarity with physics that actually made it easier for me, as in, I don't have the tendency to interpret his work in terms of what it superficially looks like in terms of physics.

it runs the risk of meaning that you lack some elements on which to form judgement.

 

DD's analysis is the best support

I could have guess this far myself! :lol:

 

What I meant was more complicated but I think you'd have to bridge your gap before you could convince me of much. In essence I don't see how Dick's basic notation can conclusively add anything. I have often tried to get clarifications from him but he takes my queries for injunctions from the Holy Office. It's hard to even make sense of his presentation and arguments, how was I to get over parts that struck me non sequitur and potentially hiding assumptions? There were some parts where, from his replies, it was hard to make out whether his intention is of adding some fact or drawing it as a consequence. Considering most of your recent posts, it looks more and more to me as if he does nothing more than is included in theoretical physics, just in his own little way. It is hard though to sort things out where he appears to be making some very bold claims about his fundamental equation; I'm no longer 100% sure that you and him perfectly understand each other.

 

For the rest, Anssi, I see many of your points and you make much better clarifications than Dick does. Although I still can't be sure of exactly what you mean by all the things you say, I recognize things in them which I also find in theoretical research methodology where you think Dick is unique. I also see parts where you might be neglecting facts that can be considered as supported by observation and, more fundamentally, limitations there seem to be on what one may make physics be like by simply choosing a mapping. I think current theoretical methodology is less dependent on undefendable ontological assumptions than you put it. I've already tried to point out some semantic issues, but researchers certainly vary about these things; the crowd of them hardly cares to be bothered by considerations about Kant's ding an sich but the most theoretical stuff could hardly be called ontological assumption. It's mostly mathematical choices for phenomenological circumstances and the consequences of these choices that can be compared to data.

 

Concerning the Bell inequalities, I'm not 100% that you are distinguishing between saying that, according to a formalism, we "do not expect them to" hold and saying that we "expect them not to" hold. I'm not fully sure of what you mean when outlining your understanding of these things. For the weaker of these two propositions, it is sufficient not to hold the opinion of Einstein et al. (and translate it the way Bell did) so Dick's formalism certainly isn't necessary for this. The stronger proposition is consequential to applying some very basic aspects of QM formalism to certain phenomenological circumstances and I don't see how this can be said to depend on ontological assumptions, unless my internal mapping could be adjusted in such a way that I can even choose what kind of lingerie Claudia wears in my dreamy worldview. How is your progress with the electric guitar? Have you already found a mapping according to which you are Jimi Hendrix?

 

The Bell inequalities that are explicitly based on assumptions and their violation obviously implies by modus tollens that those assumptions can't be quite right. How does Dick improve on this? Has he even shown the same kind of discrepancies for similar phenomenological examples?

 

That sort of gets us to the purpose of physics; it is possible to interpret the same raw information in very convoluted ways, or it is possible to interpret the same information in much simpler ways. Simpler is more useful for practical prediction purposes.

Much can be said about mappings and different choices. If you had the basics of analytical mechanics, I could make an amusing point about what you say concerning simpler and more convoluted ones and which ones are more useful, but you likely would want to know what canonical transformations and the Hamilton Jacobi method are. It is a point about the difference in perspective between the mathematician (to whom analytical mechanics is a purely mathematical exercise and who doesn't care about what material contraption it could describe) and the physicist (who commits the crime of having a worldview and might apply this method to a physical system). The choice that makes it mathematically trivial to solve the equations of motion (by fully exploiting the so called prime integrals), under which the mathematician would call the problem already solved because the solutions are those with constant values of the coordinates, but is the one you referred to as convoluted because it is typically meaningless to the physicist, who will need to carry these solutions back through the inverse of the transformation in order to make any sense of them.

 

This is why, although I believe I get what you mean by "traditional physics" (building on assumptions) and this epistemological analysis (building on universals), I don't quite agree that the most theoretical research is as lacking as you think; you might be surprised if you had more familiarity with some of the methodologies and certainly we could discuss it more effectively. I suspect that your boldest opinions about implications on physics are due to not considering the definition of dynamics in your musings, but I am as of yet unable to assert this with certainty.

[Doctordick]

Mathematics is a pure exercise in logic, I've needed to make sense of what Dick is claiming about his equation's bearing on interpreting reality and it takes more patience than most people have.

Make sense of what I am claiming? Do you have any idea at all concerning what I am claiming? I am claiming my fundamental equation is nothing more than a logical tautology; “a pure exercise in logic” having nothing whatsoever to do with reality. It is entirely derived from my definition of “an explanation”: i.e., a mechanism for generating probabilistic expectations for unknown information consistent with some body of known information. Unless there is an error in that “exercise in logic”, there exists a one to one correspondence between any specific explanation and some mathematical function of the arbitrary numerical references to the circumstances of interest.

 

If what I have just claimed is true, then it follows as the night the day that all explanations are tautologies. So the central question is, have I made an error in that “pure exercise in logic”. If I haven't, the idea that all explanations are tautologies is an interesting philosophical issue. But Qfwfq has utterly no interest in looking at any part of my logic. He just wants to baulk at the possibility that all explanations are tautologies on principal. As far as he is concerned that I could not possibly be correct; period!

 

It appears that he is of the opinion that, if such a thing were true, I could point out the one to one correspondence in each and every situation he could come up with. Anyone who thinks that is the proper attack on such a proof is a complete idiot as such a thing would require knowing and understanding every possible explanation to anything.

 

It follows that he and I have nothing to talk about. :shrug:

 

Good luck Anssi. It appears, from the implications Qfwfq wants to draw at this point, that his next step will be to assert that you don't understand what I am saying. Then he won't have to pay any attention to you either.

 

Sorry about that -- Dick

 

PS, In my opinion, the rest of Qfwfq's rantings belong in the “Philosopher's Weightroom”.

[Qfwfq]

C'mon OM, be a sport, will you?

 

I am claiming my fundamental equation is nothing more than a logical tautology; “a pure exercise in logic” having nothing whatsoever to do with reality. It is entirely derived from my definition of “an explanation”: i.e., a mechanism for generating probabilistic expectations for unknown information consistent with some body of known information. Unless there is an error in that “exercise in logic”, there exists a one to one correspondence between any specific explanation and some mathematical function of the arbitrary numerical references to the circumstances of interest.

This per se is a fair enough claim, leaving aside subtleties about your own definition of "explanation", the correspondence being bijective and why that equation ought to be The Fundamental One.

 

If what I have just claimed is true, then it follows as the night the day that all explanations are tautologies.

You would have to clarify the meaning of "an explanation being a tautology" and show how it follows.

 

It appears that he is of the opinion that, if such a thing were true, I could point out the one to one correspondence in each and every situation he could come up with.

Apart from the above subtleties and semantic arbitrariness, this sounds vaguely like what theoretic research is all about. At least they make an effort, instead of presuming to write one single equation and call it God.

 

Anyone who thinks that is the proper attack on such a proof is a complete idiot as such a thing would require knowing and understanding every possible explanation to anything.

You are not describing my misgivings correctly at all. In any case the type of remark you make about my points is not what we call philosophical argument.

 

Dick, one thing I am currently trying to glean from Anssi is whether he thinks that, according to one's choice of mapping/explanation, one could have that QM is valid or not and Bell's inequalities hold or not, for the same data observed, coming from the same reality out there. Somehow, I would tend to be skeptical of such an opinion.