Conservation Of Inherent Ignorance!

[Qfwfq]

I was responding to "...but of course that's only cuz I feel my profession being endangered which of course is why I keep concocting so many flimsy objections", with "I don't think he feels that way about you exactly".

Well then why did you quote something else when you responded with that? It wasn't clear which bit you referred to and anyway, he has often said that about me. :shrug:

 

I said "why do you ask?", because it makes absolutely no difference what the information-to-be-explained is, as long as its undefined at the beginning of this puzzle. When you ask that, you are thinking about some specific algorithm working for some specific data, while we are trying to analyze universal aspects of epistemology.

Anssi, I asked the question because you are not being self coherent and you don't seem able to conduct a debate logically and reasonably.

 

I had been trying to say that if you can put it in the notation you and Dick support, my points about information theory are relevant. It is no use repeating your objections when they are red herrings.

 

I was saying that, DD's "It is the explanations which require causality not the things being explained." and your "an explanation assumes causality in the things being explained.", sounded like the same statement to me, semantical ambiguities aside.

You could have said so. Yes, I was making a very subtle point, wasn't I?

 

(at least the impossibility of relating an entropy analysis to the undefined information, as oppose to some defined form of it)

It isn't as simple as you think. But, of course, my socratic questions enable you to see me as the layman who you are trying to teach something to. :rolleyes:

 

If you can attach numerical labels to something, be it a poltergeist or whatever the heck it is, if you can call it data or information, then you can reason with information theory about it.

 

That is absolutely crazy complaint.

Call it what you like, but you are not getting my point, especially if you think I was trying to insult you. I don't think you are an idiot, I think I see a bit further beyond what you do, I think you lose track of things when you reply to me and you are unwilling to follow me through.

 

recurring patterns of any sorts enable one to attach expectations to the information without knowing its meaning.

<ALERT>The following question is socratic, not a request of consultance.</ALERT>Exactly how?

 

If by any chance your meaning just happened to be that, if the recurring patterns seem to fit some format, inducing one to conjecture there being some cause, then one expects every next batch to fit the same format, then there we have it.

 

If that still sounds to you like the same thing as "accidentally" interpreting something very specific very correctly

No it does not sound like that to me, but you seem to think it does and you replied affirmatively when I asked you. :shrug:

 

So: Exactly why do we see recurring patterns in the data? Exactly why do we find that some explanations are not valid, while some seem valid at least so far? Do you deny having said this could easily be so, even if the data is random? Can you sort it all out without being vague or contradicting yourself?

Edited December 13, 2010 by Qfwfq
revision for clarity

[Bombadil]

I really don't get you, up to here. All that is more of a reason for us to say he shouldn't be calling Emmy into cause. You seem confused as to what our objection is; it is the lack of any kind of action (Hamiltonian or Lagrangian) that makes it pointless to call her theorem in cause.

 

This seems to show that even if the logic of something might lead to an important idea people would prefer to be surprised by a result much like they are surprised by a magician when he finely finishes his act rather then see the path of logic taken by someone else before seeing what will be used. Perhaps there is something here to be learned about trying to communicate new ideas.

 

Qfwfq for the remainder of your post see the reply here Answering Qfwfq as it really has very little to do with this thread.

 

From here I’ll just continue from where I left off in the OP as it doesn’t appear that I brought up anything that needs further discussion.

 

As I said in the original proof, every elemental event requires two numerical labels, one to represent the event as defined by the specific explanation being modeled (the "i" index) and one to represent the same event in all possible explanations (the unknown numerical label represented by x). When [math]\vec{\Psi}[/math] is seen as a function of a numerical argument (the representation I have alluded to above) it is important to recognize that the numerical argument must consist of the numerical label represented by the collection of unknowns "x" as, if one uses the numerical label represented by "i", one has essentially presumed all the constraints specified in the defined elements of the specific explanation are necessary: i.e., essentially a presumption that the specific explanation is correct. As argued in the proof of this mathematical representation of the explanation, if that were the case, no need for the unknown numerical labels exists.

 

So when referring to an element we must refer to its X label in an explanation as using the i label means that we are referring to the entire set of elements used in the explanation needed to define the element being referred to. This will result in assuming that the explanation is correct and that the same elements exist in any explanation of what is being explained.

 

In short the i labels are a function of everything in the explanation and removing any element will result in a different set of i labels being used for each element.

 

Essentially, what they have is a function which is perfectly consistent with a finite number of specific observations, each observation being a specific circumstance, [math](x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t)[/math], where we will presume the number of circumstances indexed by t is conceptually large but not infinite: i.e., there is considerable information backing up that explanation as, if there is not, the solution is quite trivial. I further require that this explanation be consistently correct throughout the entire accumulation of those circumstances: i.e., the same definition of that function yields the correct expectations for each circumstance as the index t increases. That is to say, up until the present (any present within their analysis), no new circumstance has ever violated the expectations yielded by that explanation. That assertion essentially defines a flaw-free explanation.

 

We can say that both people have the same explanation of the situation since they have the same set of elements that they are explaining and that set is sufficiently large that we can assume that if they both took the same approach to explaining it that they must both have the same result.

 

This requires them to have the same expectations for what they are explaining.

 

Or is it that they must also both have the same expectations and so we must conclude that the explanations must be the same?

 

If both people use exactly the same procedure to list those undefined elements, they would most probably use exactly the same numerical labels for the “x” labels. In such a case, both representations would be exactly the same in every detail.

 

Doesn’t this mean that any explanation must be symmetric in the order of the element in it? That is, it doesn’t matter what order the x labels are in the explanation as long as they are the same?

 

Since both explanations are the same they must give the same expectations and since the i labels are supplied by the explanation if the i labels differ between the two the difference can only be in how the elements are marked so by changing the order of the elements both explanations become the same. Resulting in a symmetry of the order of [imath](x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t)[/imath].

 

Also isn’t it reasonable that if both people have the same expectations then even if they use different X labels if they use the same method to arrive at the i labels that they will be the same i labels since otherwise there explanation must assume the X locations are correct?

 

The deduced derivative can be multiplied by [math]da[/math] and integrated over [math]a[/math] yielding the result that P=k (where k is a constant). However, “[math]a[/math]” can be anything from minus to plus infinity, and it follows that the probability for a given specific “[math]a[/math]” summed over all possibilities must be exactly unity. Only one conclusion remains: the function “P” must equal zero. This shouldn't really bother anyone as the mathematics is treating the supposed arguments of P (and that would be the set [math]x_1, x_2 \cdots x_n[/math]) as constants. When we take into account the fact that P is actually a function of those n arguments, we get a somewhat different view of the situation.

 

Then in fact this is equivalent to just integrating over every possible location of the set [imath](x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n)[/imath] where the difference between any two element is kept constant. Now this says nothing about the probability of any particular arrangement of the set but it does seem to imply that we want to look at not the probability of one set but the probability of finding sets of elements in different subsets of our coordinate system as the alternative seems to be just looking at 0 probabilities all the time, which doesn’t seem particularly interesting.

[AnssiH]

Well then why did you quote something else when you responded with that?

 

Well I feel I quoted in pretty standard way...

 

Anssi, I asked the question because you are not being self coherent and you don't seem able to conduct a debate logically and reasonably.

 

What I'm trying to say feels like relatively simple issue to me, and not very hard to stay coherent with at all, perhaps some subtleties aside. So I think your feeling of me being incoherent is probably due to us not really speaking the same language.

 

I had been trying to say that if you can put it in the notation you and Dick support, my points about information theory are relevant. It is no use repeating your objections when they are red herrings.

 

Let's start with this; Is your argument to suggest an error in the analysis, or to suggest that something the analysis says has already been said by information theory, or to suggest something else?

 

You could have said so.

 

I thought I did.

 

It isn't as simple as you think. But, of course, my socratic questions enable you to see me as the layman who you are trying to teach something to. :rolleyes:

 

If you can attach numerical labels to something, be it a poltergeist or whatever the heck it is, if you can call it data or information, then you can reason with information theory about it.

 

Yes and then when you analyze that thing, you have to know how is it an analysis of universal constraints of explanations, as oppose to an analysis of that specific thing you just mapped... To me it just seems to be the latter, unless you arrive at it by making universally applicable definitions.

 

Call it what you like, but you are not getting my point, especially if you think I was trying to insult you. I don't think you are an idiot, I think I see a bit further beyond what you do, I think you lose track of things when you reply to me and you are unwilling to follow me through.

 

I understand you feel that way, but let it be said that I have a similar feeling about you.

 

If by any chance your meaning just happened to be that, if the recurring patterns seem to fit some format, inducing one to conjecture there being some cause, then one expects every next batch to fit the same format, then there we have it.

 

What I had in mind was not that making such conjecture would be necessary, and I was just referring to any cold logic for generating probabilities about the future. As a somewhat separated issue from supposing some meaning (or format) to the information.

 

It should suffice to say that different explanations may make different assumptions at this junction, and assign their probabilities accordingly. The fundamental constraints of the analysis don't limit the explanations regarding assumptions like determinism.

 

I didn't bother pointing it out earlier because the responses were turning very odd, but you probably realize that Russell's chicken also had his reasons to doubt the farmer, in some other piece of accumulated knowledge about farmers, which also must be based on recurring activity of some sort, one way or another.

 

At the end of the day, that comment is there just to take focus away from assuming such and such meaning to the information-to-be-explained. It's just the immaterial universal logic of explanations that we are trying to analyze.

 

So: Exactly why do we see recurring patterns in the data?

 

I don't know, and I'm settling with "apparently we do, because we have expectations".

 

Exactly why do we find that some explanations are not valid, while some seem valid at least so far?

 

That's a very loaded question, so I suppose you are asking that because it appears to you that finding validity or invalidity is due to finding something about the meaning of the information in some sense (as most people would intuitively see it, of course).

 

Note that the following is not some kind of underlying belief from my world view, but instead what seems to be the case, after walking through the analysis carefully (and I have a pretty good idea why and how it is so, after thinking it through). I.e. the defense is in the analysis and you can't expect me to make a better or clearer defense in english language. But since you asked, I can at least make a hand-waving comment of some sort.

 

Finding an explanation (of reality) to be invalid one way or another, seems to be sometimes a case of subtle inconsistency being resolved by more careful fundamental definitions (e.g. relativity), and sometimes a case of finding more accurate set of fundamental definitions in terms of approximations and assumptions made about reality (e.g. quantum mechanics). (Well I guess you could see the ultraviolet catastrophe as an inconsistency of a sort as well...) And in a plethora of less interesting cases, it appears to be simply a case of resolving inconsistencies between the fundamental definitions and more "high-level" definitions of the same world view.

 

As an example of relativity over newtonian view, while the newtonian definitions are part of an approximately valid explanation of reality, they are also inconsistent with Maxwell's equations in terms of coordinate transformations. Maxwell's equations appear to be valid too, and a resolution to that inconsistency was, as you well know, a redefinition of space and time. In ontological sense that move is of course undefendable from other moves that would resolve the same inconsistency. In the analysis this issue is approached from completely neutral grounds in ontological sense; by making necessary definitions to relate the modern physics definition of time measurement (including universally applicable definition of massless entities) with self-coherent coordinate transformations. This is all carefully done without any requirements about the underlying information actually being originated from relativistic reality in any sense.

 

Likewise, finding a new physics theory in the future, that is more accurate than the old ones, may well be just a case of finding a more effective way to categorize the same underlying recurring patterns. That new valid model, or the new idea about the structure of reality, is then actually a characteristic of that more effective categorization method.

 

Especially note that having a way to interpret recurring patterns means you can interpret ANY recurring patterns according to those same definitions or that same "format". It's just that you may end up seeing very complex and hard to predict reality, or possibly somewhat non-sensical random looking things.

 

I am not really interested of getting deeper into the issues I'm referring to above, such as the accuracy of the history of physics or anything that is actually just driving away from the topic. I really would just like to advice you to look at this from the fundamental perspective of epistemological issues that are being discussed in the OP, instead of trying to reverse-engineer physics or experimental validations of specific theories to these ideas immediately. This is not a trivial matter and you can't expect to just "get it" intuitively.

 

Do you deny having said this could easily be so, even if the data is random?

 

No I don't deny that, but just to be accurate, I said I do not know what is possible in terms of recognizing recurring patterns when something is "random". It is not really the topic here.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

We can say that both people have the same explanation of the situation since they have the same set of elements that they are explaining and that set is sufficiently large that we can assume that if they both took the same approach to explaining it that they must both have the same result.

 

Well no, actually he is just stating - for the sake of argument - that they have the same exact explanation for the same exact undefined information.

 

On a normal scenario we would have no guarantee that they'd end up with the same explanation. (Also with different personal histories, their accumulated undefined information would also be different)

 

Now the argument is simply that, when an explanation connects defined elements (i) with undefined elements (X), it refers to the undefined elements via numerical labeling. In doing so, it introduces an immaterial property to the situation. Your expectations can't be a function of what numerical labels you chose for the individual undefined elements. Instead, your expectations must be resulting from the actual information about the situation (i.e. the actual context or surroundings of the elements of interest, for instance).

 

There are some subtleties there worth thinking about (and somewhat hard to communicate), but it is easy to imagine this particular symmetry if you think about the undefined elements as being mapped onto a coordinate system, and think about moving the entire set of undefined elements together. That is of course the same thing as moving the coordinate system around. "Where" you find a particular set of elements inside that coordinate system is completely immaterial. What kind of set it is, is all that matters.

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

...an explanation connects defined elements (i) with undefined elements (X), it refers to the undefined elements via numerical labeling. In doing so, it introduces an immaterial property to the situation. Your expectations can't be a function of what numerical labels you chose for the individual undefined elements. Instead, your expectations must be resulting from the actual information about the situation (i.e. the actual context or surroundings of the elements of interest, for instance).

I have a question. How does an "undefined element" allow for "actual information" ? I am confused. If the information about the element was "actual" would not the element be defined, not undefined ?

[Qfwfq]

Rade asked exactly what I thought.

 

Now I refuse to stay behind the blackboard with my dunce cap on, so I come back to this thread with points that were in here:

What I'm trying to say feels like relatively simple issue to me, and not very hard to stay coherent with at all, perhaps some subtleties aside. So I think your feeling of me being incoherent is probably due to us not really speaking the same language.

Definitely, we are not talking the same language. What's worse is that you make no effort to keep track of references, nor to make it easy for me.

 

Let's start with this; Is your argument to suggest an error in the analysis, or to suggest that something the analysis says has already been said by information theory, or to suggest something else?

My points about information theory are directed at your contentions, I only meant to underscore how unreasonable they are.

 

Yes and then when you analyze that thing, you have to know how is it an analysis of universal constraints of explanations, as oppose to an analysis of that specific thing you just mapped... To me it just seems to be the latter, unless you arrive at it by making universally applicable definitions.

When I analyze which thing, the poltergeist? :doh: Why do you keep insisting on taking my points to be restricted to one specific example?

 

I was just referring to any cold logic for generating probabilities about the future.

Try gaining money from the national lotto or a fair roulette with it and let's see how you fare. I'm sure you're aware that, in this case, any expectation based on previous outcomes that differs from what's to be expected for a single run has no reliability. Nevertheless, some people start placing their cash on things that haven't come up for more than average consectutive runs; their intuitive expectation is that it must be more likely than usual.

 

...but you probably realize that Russell's chicken also had his reasons to doubt the farmer, in some other piece of accumulated knowledge about farmers, which also must be based on recurring activity of some sort, one way or another.

Only if the chicken has seen other chickens getting their throats slit.

 

That's a very loaded question, so I suppose you are asking that because it appears to you that finding validity or invalidity is due to finding something about the meaning of the information in some sense (as most people would intuitively see it, of course).

Not at all. I asked what you and Dick mean about valid and invalid, because you seem to have been totally ignoring when I refer to it in my points. This is how you keep working the debate: If I base a conclusion on something you guys talk about but you disagree, you assume I meant something else instead.

 

I really would just like to advice you to look at this from the fundamental perspective of epistemological issues that are being discussed in the OP, instead of trying to reverse-engineer physics or experimental validations of specific theories to these ideas immediately. This is not a trivial matter and you can't expect to just "get it" intuitively.

This shows that you have really not been following my argument.

 

No I don't deny that, but just to be accurate, I said I do not know what is possible in terms of recognizing recurring patterns when something is "random". It is not really the topic here.

Well this doesn't put you in a position to doggedly deny the relevance of what I say, I've been telling you that "random" means that recognizable recurring patterns are very unlikely, in a sense that can be better defined in terms of a format having some entropy which is lower than the number of possible combinations. It is a rather complex and subtle matter, you shouldn't be drawing overly bold conclusions without grasping it better. You do not define things clearly and your arguments abound with paralogism. I don't get your point about "somewhat non-sensical random looking things" unless you are referring to something along the lines of an encryption. This is quite the opposite of what I had asked you about.

[AnssiH]

I have a question. How does an "undefined element" allow for "actual information" ? I am confused. If the information about the element was "actual" would not the element be defined, not undefined ?

 

Yeah that's exactly the thing that seems to confuse a lot of people.

 

"Undefined elements" are just a way to refer to whatever it is that our definitions are based on, without making any assumptions about what that is.

 

None of the logical arguments make any assumptions about what the information is. The actual arguments that got us to use this concept "undefined elements" are;

 

1. There is some information that our definitions are based on one way or another

2. The amount of information behind our definitions is always finite (thus we know we can always represent that information as "elements", as oppose to some continuous thing)

 

When DD is talking about some "defined elements" being connected with "undefined elements", that is just a way to say that some defined entity is associated with some amount of "undefined information".

 

When he is saying that different explanations may associate different defined elements with different undefined elements, that is just a way to say that the same exact underlying piece of information could be explained (or "seen") in many different ways.

 

So, by; "your expectations must be resulting from the actual information about the situation"

 

I was not referring to actually knowing something about reality or about the information itself. I was just referring to the simple fact that your expectations must be fundamentally based on whatever information your explanation is actually based on. And not on some extraneous aspects that appear only when that information just so happens to be mapped in some particular way.

 

Epistemologically speaking, that essentially means that whenever undefined information is mapped into the terminology of some definitions, these symmetry features can be recognized from the resulting mapping. It may not be apparent at all, but the symmetry features must be there in one form or another. Unless of course the explanation has made some appropriate undefendable assumptions, i.e. assumptions that are not actually supported by the available information.

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

The actual arguments that got us to use this concept "undefined elements" are;

1. There is some information that our definitions are based on one way or another

2. The amount of information behind our definitions is always finite (thus we know we can always represent that information as "elements", as oppose to some continuous thing)

Thanks for the clarification. The above leads me to another question.

 

Suppose you are asked to define the word "game". Your argument is that there is some undefined information that your definition must be based on, and the amount of that information is always finite. Now, to make things interesting, Wittgenstein has suggested that it is impossible to define the word "game" in a way that would be universally accepted. He would say there is no finite amount of undefined information that can be used to define the word "game". How would you answer Wittgenstein ? --and then also this question,

 

When DD is talking about some "defined elements" being connected with "undefined elements"' date=' that is just a way to say that some defined entity is associated with some amount of "undefined information".[/quote']Sure, but how does this help us with "game" ? A "game" is not an "entity", it is an activity.

 

... that is just a way to say that the same exact underlying piece of information could be explained (or "seen") in many different ways.

Or' date=' it could be explained by many in one way--correct. So, suppose 100 scientists are given a box of the exact same amount (10 ug) of an underlying piece of radioactive material that emits decay products over time. You are not saying that these 100 scientists would report 100 different decay rates--that the information from the 100 boxes could be explained (or seen) in 100 different ways--correct ?

 

So, by; "your expectations must be resulting from the actual information about the situation"I was not referring to actually knowing something about reality or about the information itself. I was just referring to the simple fact that your expectations must be fundamentally based on whatever information your explanation is actually based on.

OK. But, suppose you have an expectation that someone will arrive to meet you at lunch at 12:00 noon because they sent you an email to that effect, but they never show up. Clearly, your expectation is based on one fact of reality, an email. So, it seems silly for you to say that you were not referring to actually knowing something about reality to form your before-the-fact expectation--correct ? Now, we can also be concerned with the after-the-fact explanation, how to explain the fact the person did not arrive at 12:00 noon. So, as you sit waiting, you have no valid explanation why, only conjecture (well, maybe they got a cold, or had an accident, or had to take the children somewhere, etc.). So, you put together this imagined list of expectation probabilities of why they did not arrive. But, as you can see, the after-the-fact expectations are not based on any "actual information" at all, only what you imagine in your mind.

 

Thus, I do not understand your use of the term "actual information". In my example, it only makes sense for the before-the fact expectation (the email sent) and not for the list of after-the fact expectation probabilities (probable reasons why the person did not arrive). I would suggest you consider not using the term "actual information", it only adds confusion. Clearly, expectations are possible with 0% actual information.

[AnssiH]

Thanks for the clarification. The above leads me to another question.

 

Suppose you are asked to define the word "game". Your argument is that there is some undefined information that your definition must be based on, and the amount of that information is always finite. Now, to make things interesting, Wittgenstein has suggested that it is impossible to define the word "game" in a way that would be universally accepted. He would say there is no finite amount of undefined information that can be used to define the word "game". How would you answer Wittgenstein ?

 

Of course I agree there is no way to define the word "game" in a way that would be universally accepted.

 

That doesn't mean that you couldn't form a definition from a finite amount of information.

 

And certainly no definition can be based on infinite amount of information.

 

Sure, but how does this help us with "game" ? A "game" is not an "entity", it is an activity.

 

Yes it is a very complex thing with ridiculous amount of associated definitions that need to be understood first, before something in the undefined information would be called "a game", so I don't take it as a very fruitful example.

 

And yet, whatever it is that is interpreted as "a game", is something that is based on some concepts/definitions that are fundamentally associated with some sort of recurring activity.

 

...as long as we are really talking about explanations of undefined information (as it was defined), as oppose to some abstract definition of "a game".

 

Or, it could be explained by many in one way--correct. So, suppose 100 scientists are given a box of the exact same amount (10 ug) of an underlying piece of radioactive material that emits decay products over time. You are not saying that these 100 scientists would report 100 different decay rates--that the information from the 100 boxes could be explained (or seen) in 100 different ways--correct ?

 

Correct. But they could mentally think about the quantum realm in different ways (in ontological sense), essentially understanding the same activity in terms of very differently behaving set of entities.

 

OK. But, suppose you have an expectation that someone will arrive to meet you at lunch at 12:00 noon because they sent you an email to that effect, but they never show up. Clearly, your expectation is based on one fact of reality, an email.

 

Again, you jumped into an example containing incredibly complex set of defined entities.

 

Remember, we are basically talking about the very fundamentals of epistemology, and later on we will be arriving at the most fundamental concepts of our current world view. Those fundamental concepts would be the ideas that allow us to understand and perform any sort of human activity, including "reading an e-mail" and forming an idea of what it says etc.

 

I.e. something you read from an e-mail is hardly "a fact of reality". Ontologically speaking, we do not even have any "facts of reality" in our mental comprehension, and epistemologically speaking, I was just referring to "whatever it is that our explanation is based on" as "facts". Doesn't mean I know, or that anyone could know via their own conceptualization of reality, what those facts actually are in themselves! And I repeat, none of the arguments to be made, are a function of knowing what those facts are in themselves.

 

I would suggest you consider not using the term "actual information", it only adds confusion.

 

Yes it certainly does, quite many words that I use actually do. I used the phrase just because we were in the discussion of having introduced some properties to the mapping of the defined entities, which are not actually properties or supported by whatever-it-is-that-our-definitions-are-based-on. Doesn't mean that we know what the "actual properties" are.

 

This is just the limit of natural language. I hope I managed to clear things up a bit.

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

`When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, `it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.'

[Rade]

Of course I agree there is no way to define the word "game" in a way that would be universally accepted. That doesn't mean that you couldn't form a definition from a finite amount of information.

Sure, I understand. But Wittgenstein would say that it does not matter if you could form "a" definition, because it would not be universally accepted, it would always be lacking. If definition itself is not fundamental, then explanation itself cannot be fundamental, that is, explanation itself would always be lacking.

 

I wonder, suppose the presentation of DD does away with all reference to definition or lack of. So, rather than suppose there to be undefined information and defined information, consider only that there is information that needs to be explained. How would the presentation suffer from such a consideration ?

 

Again' date=' you jumped into an example containing incredibly complex set of defined entities.[/quote']Sure, but all examples to any specific circumstance would be so, would have a very complex set of defined entities.

 

Remember' date=' we are basically talking about the very fundamentals of epistemology, and later on we will be arriving at the most fundamental concepts of our current world view. Those fundamental concepts would be the ideas that allow us to understand and perform any sort of human activity, including "reading an e-mail" and forming an idea of what it says etc.[/quote']Are you saying there are two types of concepts (1) fundamental (2) non-fundamental ? It was my understanding that all concepts are fundamental, and they can be combined to form complex concepts.

 

I.e. something you read from an e-mail is hardly "a fact of reality".

Interesting point of view. So' date=' the letter [b']A[/b] you read now in this email is not a fact of reality ? Is the A : (1) not a fact, (2) not real, (3) both ? Also, for my example, suppose the information that the person would meet you for lunch at 12:00 noon was directly given to you, person to person. Clearly, some fact of reality was transmitted to you upon which you formed an expectation--correct ? If yes, that was all I was claiming.

 

Edit:

 

Yes it is a very complex thing with ridiculous amount of associated definitions that need to be understood first' date=' before something in the undefined information would be called "a game", so I don't take it as a very fruitful example.[/quote']I think you maybe missed my point. My point was not that you could not get to "game" from undefined information, but that you can never say you have an "entity" that you got to. That is, the presentation of DD cannot logically be constrained to definitions of "entities" as you said, it also must deal with definitions of "activities". So, you cannot say this:

 

When DD is talking about some "defined elements" being connected with "undefined elements"' date=' that is just a way to say that some defined [b']entity[/b] is associated with some amount of "undefined information".

In other words, DD also must allow for defined "activity" to be associated with undefined information--the presentation cannot be limited to some defined entity. I hope you see my point, again, offered to help clarify the presentation.

[Rade]

`When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, `it means just what I choose it to mean -- neither more nor less.'

Humpty Dumpty was pushed for a reason, he had one too many private conversations.

[Qfwfq]

he had one too many private conversations.

You mean... secretly bribing words to work his own way.

[AnssiH]

Sure, I understand. But Wittgenstein would say that it does not matter if you could form "a" definition, because it would not be universally accepted, it would always be lacking. If definition itself is not fundamental, then explanation itself cannot be fundamental, that is, explanation itself would always be lacking.

 

Sure if that's how one chooses to understand the word "fundamental" (to refer to ontological correctedness in some sense).

 

In which case it is just the exact same commentary as I made.

 

Why, what do you have in mind when you bring that up?

 

I wonder, suppose the presentation of DD does away with all reference to definition or lack of. So, rather than suppose there to be undefined information and defined information, consider only that there is information that needs to be explained. How would the presentation suffer from such a consideration ?

 

I'm not sure what you are getting at. We need to use some words to communicate the issue.

 

Are you saying there are two types of concepts (1) fundamental (2) non-fundamental ? It was my understanding that all concepts are fundamental, and they can be combined to form complex concepts.

 

Clearly you are using the word "fundamental" differently than I am. I suspect your meaning refers to ontological correctedness in some sense.

 

But when I said "the most fundamental concepts of your world view", I mean the most basic building blocks of your understanding of reality. Like "space" and "time" and "matter" and the definitions that stand behind your understanding of those concepts.

 

Or in the case of "reading an e-mail", whatever are the most basic concepts that stand behind your understanding of your perceptions, and ultimately allow you to interpret some situation as "a computer screen" and "e-mail".. Of course additionally, you need to refer to very many things in your world view to be able to understand some things constitute "letters" and "words", and then even form an understanding about what the words might mean. At any rate, these examples are quite far removed from the problem that DD's fundamental equation refers to, and later we will be arriving at some of the most basic concepts of your world view, instead of arriving at some complex high-level defintions that would entail the understanding of stupendous amount of simpler definitions.

 

I suspect when you say "...they can be combined to form more complex concepts", what you have in mind is exactly the way there are simpler concepts standing behind our understanding of more complex things. We will be focusing on getting to analyze the simplest concepts.

 

Interesting point of view. So, the letter A you read now in this email is not a fact of reality ? Is the A : (1) not a fact, (2) not real, (3) both ?

 

It's my comprehension of some information (or noumena), whose ontological nature is not known to me. It is based on some noumena via some unknown translation, and that noumena (which I cannot mentally access without that translation already having taken place), is what I'd refer to as "facts of reality".

 

See my previous post for clarification on why exactly "facts" is carrying some unwanted implications.

 

I think you maybe missed my point. My point was not that you could not get to "game" from undefined information, but that you can never say you have an "entity" that you got to. That is, the presentation of DD cannot logically be constrained to definitions of "entities" as you said, it also must deal with definitions of "activities". So, you cannot say this:

 

In other words, DD also must allow for defined "activity" to be associated with undefined information--the presentation cannot be limited to some defined entity. I hope you see my point, again, offered to help clarify the presentation.

 

Of course but activities are also things that are understood via recognizing some specific behaviour to the defined entities. Just to get a simpler example, you remember how "clock" was defined in the analysis about special relativity? That's also a specific activity performed by some defined objects. As is anything that you'd point at and call "a game".

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

But when I said "the most fundamental concepts of your world view", I mean the most basic building blocks of your understanding of reality. Like "space" and "time" and "matter" and the definitions that stand behind your understanding of those concepts.

I do not find any "most basic building blocks" (concepts) in understanding. Space is not a fundamental concept, one cannot have a concept of space without having a concept of boundary and a concept of something contained. Time is not fundamental, one cannot have a concept of time without entities with potential for motion. Matter is not fundamental, one cannot have a concept of matter without a concept of energy and motion. All concepts (as building blocks) are on an equal metaphysical footing, none individually are fundamental. Sure, when you build a wall from bricks, some first row of bricks must be placed. But this does not make the bricks of this first row "basic" building blocks, they have no greater importance than any of the bricks placed on top of them. I do not understand an arch by saying I understand the keystone brick, a basic building block. The complexity with concepts, as with bricks, only comes when more than one is united. Whatever anyone means by reality, it represents an integrated interconnected whole of all concepts that form the basis of our understanding of it.

 

I'm not sure what you are getting at. We need to use some words to communicate the issue.

Yes' date=' of course, some words must be used. What I was saying is that I do not see that you need to use the words 'defined' and 'undefined'. So, the presentation begins with "information". Because it is a concept, it already has a definition--information is what information is. Next the information needs to be explained. The word explanation comes with a definition, the one provided by DD--a procedure to yield rational expectations for hypothetical circumstances. So, yes, use some words, just do not use the words undefined and defined, all they do is add confusion to the presentation, imo.

 

I suspect when you say "...they can be combined to form more complex concepts", what you have in mind is exactly the way there are simpler concepts standing behind our understanding of more complex things.

Not simpler concepts, just single concepts. Again, I have no idea how a simple concept would differ from a complex concept. You use a language that I do not understand.

 

It's [the letter A]my comprehension of some information (or noumena)' date=' whose ontological nature is not known to me. It is based on some noumena via some unknown translation, and that noumena (which I cannot mentally access without that translation already having taken place), is what I'd refer to as "facts of reality".[/quote']OK, for you, the noumena of Kant represent "facts of reality", the A is a representation of some fact, some phenomenon. However, Kant does not claim that you cannot "understand" noumena. He does not claim that you must have the translation of [noumena ---> A]. Understanding of noumena occurs without any translation via intuition. Thus, if noumena represent facts of reality, then you can have understanding of them via intuition, which means without the aid of any of the senses. But, I am not sure this is what you mean, so, I would suggest you be very careful bringing forth the Kant concept of noumena to help explain what you mean by |undefined information|. The reason being is that Kant would say you most surely can understand |undefined information| as an intuition without the need for any prior transformation into any phenomenon that you can sense, such as the letter A.

 

Of course but activities are also things that are understood via recognizing some specific behaviour to the defined entities.

OK, so you agree (with the 'of course') that the presentation of DD cannot be limited to definitions of entities as things, it also must include definitions of activities as things, for these are two completely different types of things (entities and activities). This was all I was trying to clarify.

 

This leads me to a question. Did we not say that the unknown transformation of |undefined information| is an activity ? If so, that would make this activity a thing that could be understood via some specific behavior of a defined entity (which is what you said above). I assume the defined entity involved would be the human mind, and the understanding would be via the intuition of Kant ?

[Qfwfq]

Clearly you are using the word "fundamental" differently than I am. I suspect your meaning refers to ontological correctedness in some sense.

Sure enough, any way in which anyone differs from you, you always attribute it to that.

 

Humpty Dumpty at least doesn't choose how others mean words when they say them, if he's aware they mean them differently.

[Rade]

Sure if that's how one chooses to understand the word "fundamental" (to refer to ontological correctedness in some sense). Why, what do you have in mind when you bring that up?

Only that no presentation can be true by definition (such as this one by DD), for this would assume that all agree that definitions have fundamental and universal meaning that all agree with, but they do not. Again, this was the point Wittgenstein was making with his example of the word 'game'. And, unless I read you wrong, you did agree that there is no universal accepted definition for any word (concept) such as 'game' or 'explanation' or 'information' or 'expectation' or 'rational' or 'circumstance' or 'element' etc., etc. (all the concepts being used in the presentation).

 

I do not see this as being any problem at all. It seems to mesh well with the intent of DD, to have a presentation that makes no assumptions. All I am saying is that we keep in mind that we cannot assume that the presentation of DD is logically valid, that the definitions as used are the proper definitions to use for the concepts presented. They may be valid, they may not be valid, there may be types of explanations (those that use a different definition of the term) where the fundamental equation does not apply. It gets to the issue we discussed before about the limits of the inductive (probability) approach that is being used for the presentation to derive the fundamental equation.

 

I believe that it is the constraint of induction logic that causes other physicists to not agree with the approach of DD. I do not want to put words into the mouth of Qfwfq, but I would think that this is one aspect of the presentation of DD that he does not agree with, that it uses inductive logic to derive the fundamental equation.