Is Reality An Unknown Thing

[Rade]

I would like to start a discussion on the question:

 

Is Reality an Unknown Thing ?

 

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True, false, depends ?

[Tormod]

What do you mean by "unknown thing"?

[ZacharyNardolillo]

You're being kind of vague on this subject. Could you be more specific?

[Rade]

I am just interested in how people respond--what definitions they use to reach an answer. I suspect many different answers depending how each person defines the terms reality, know, thing. I have thoughts, but will hold off to see if the question generates any interest.

[Ken]

I would like to start a discussion on the question:

 

Is Reality an Unknown Thing ?

 

==

 

True, false, depends ?

 

 

Well, for an empiricist it is only knowable from the perspective of consensus.

 

The reasoning goes something like this: We only know things about the "real" world through our sense organs. We have no way to reach certainty about the information provided by those sense organs. The closest we come to certainty is through the consensus of sensory experiences by multiple individuals. Scientists accept such consensus if multiple observations follow certain rules -- measurability, repeatability, etc.

 

Essentially, all humans believe that the experiences they have are representational of Reality, but it's fundamentally a belief nothing more. I suppose you could argue whether Reality is an UNKNOWN thing, or an UNKNOWABLE thing.

 

But only a Philosopher would worry about that distinction. B)

[Rade]

Well, for an empiricist it is only knowable from the perspective of consensus.

Thanks. So, you would say the statement in the OP is false. You would say that reality is a known thing, but a constraint must be placed on the knowing, that knowing reality is always with a degree of uncertainty ? Except for those things that we know by definition, I would agree with this, but would like to hear from others with a different view.

 

Essentially' date=' all humans believe that the experiences they have are representational of Reality, but it's fundamentally a [u']belief[/u] nothing more.

This is an interesting topic, representationalism. One problem I have with it is that the model assumes that perceptional awareness of objects is dependent on consciousness and thus leads to a belief about the objects. I do not agree with this. For me, perception is prior to and independent of consciousness and thus outside belief. By definition for me perception (in the various forms of the senses) is the only path to knowledge, either directly or indirectly via reason. Thus: [object---->perception---->consciousness<---->reason]. We must start the discussion with object because we must start with existence, that is, to say you have knowledge is to say you have knowledge of something that exists. For me, perception then is after object but prior to consciousness, which fits the facts of organic evolution--many forms of live perceive objects but have no consciousness that leads to reason about them.

 

I suppose you could argue whether Reality is an UNKNOWN thing' date=' or an UNKNOWABLE thing. But only a Philosopher would worry about that distinction.[/quote']Yes, here I would say it is important to accept as logically true there are two ways to know any thing, (1) from inside the thing (2) from outside the thing. That perception exists logically requires that at least one of these two ways of knowing exists for those forms of life that perceive via senses. But it does not mean that the way a bee knows, is the same as an elephant knows, ....to humans. I would think that a bee "knows" pollen, given that it has primitive mental abilities, that is, the bee has the ability to form a type of mental grasp of some fact(s) about pollen, an object of reality. But, I would like to hear what others have to say.

[Ken]

...snip...

 

This is an interesting topic, representationalism. One problem I have with it is that the model assumes that perceptional awareness of objects is dependent on consciousness and thus leads to a belief about the objects. I do not agree with this. For me, perception is prior to and independent of consciousness and thus outside belief. By definition for me perception (in the various forms of the senses) is the only path to knowledge, either directly or indirectly via reason. Thus: [object---->perception---->consciousness<---->reason]. We must start the discussion with object because we must start with existence, that is, to say you have knowledge is to say you have knowledge of something that exists. For me, perception then is after object but prior to consciousness, which fits the facts of organic evolution--many forms of live perceive objects but have no consciousness that leads to reason about them.

 

In Physiological Psychology there is a (correct in my opinion) clear distinction between Sensation and Perception. And there is no need to speculate about "objects" though it makes casual conversation easier. Sensation refers to the transduction of external energy into "internal" energy, i.e., some neural event. The cornea, lens, and neuronal bodies of the retina all function as part of the transduction process - with the cornea and lens focusing light energy and the neurons doing the work of changing photic energy into neural events in a photo-voltaic fashion.

 

Perception refers to the analysis and interpretation of those neural events. Some analysis takes place within the retinal connections across the various layers of the retina and most takes place in various cortical and sub-cortical locations in the brain. Positing inferred metaphysical mechanisms is hardly necessary since perception of some sort occurs in virtually every animal, even in the phototactic responses of plants and down to single-celled organisms.

 

You could define "objects" as phenomena that influence the speed and direction of photic energy; this could occur by the application of electromagnetic energy (bending by means of gravity, etc.) or by reflection. Those aspects of photic energy are outside my training and knowledge but might suggest a way of defining an "object" as anything which alters the path or speed of energy.

 

My main point, however, is to emphasize the difference between energy detection/transduction as sensation and the interpretation/analysis of such transduced energy as perception.

 

You then went on to write:

Yes, here I would say it is important to accept as logically true there are two ways to know any thing, (1) from inside the thing (2) from outside the thing. That perception exists logically requires that at least one of these two ways of knowing exists for those forms of life that perceive via senses. But it does not mean that the way a bee knows, is the same as an elephant knows, ....to humans. I would think that a bee "knows" pollen, given that it has primitive mental abilities, that is, the bee has the ability to form a type of mental grasp of some fact(s) about pollen, an object of reality. But, I would like to hear what others have to say.

 

For a behaviorist "knowing" is a metaphysical phenomenon and may, or may not, ever be really useful. I don't accept the anthropomorphic notion that a bee necessarily forms a "mental grasp" (whatever that means) of anything. That approach moves into the realms of Occam's Razor, Lloyd Morgan's Canon, or the Law of Parsimony, i.e., introducing conceptual baggage beyond necessity. :)

 

I'll step back now and read what other's have to say.

[Rade]

....My main point, however, is to emphasize the difference between energy detection/transduction as sensation and the interpretation/analysis of such transduced energy as perception.

Thank you for the reply. I agree completely with you that there is a fundamental difference between sensation and perception. Where I disagree--is the reason I disagree with the representationalist model as presented in the history of philosophy--where I disagree is with your definition of perception as the ability of life forms to "interpretation and analysis of the transduced energy" (which is the definition used by all representationalist philosophies at least since Descartes--which I reject).

 

So, for me, perception is the ability of life forms to group individual sensations, to place the individual sensations into a memory, as a pattern of energy {sets of sensations} that relate directly to the entity perceived, the thing, the object of perception. The ability to integrate sensations with perceptions, to analyze and interpret, and explain {sets of sensations} comes latter in the scheme of evolution of consciousness, it is limited to those forms of life that can form concepts via a process I call mental calculus (differentiation of {sets of sensations} followed by integration of percepts to form concepts retained in memory). Well, this is how I see it, and I really do appreciate hearing how others deal with these ideas.

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edit: I see my question...does a bee know pollen...is much too abstract. Let me change it to...does the bee know the flower ? So, perhaps we can apply the sensation-->perception-->conception process to this question.

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For a behaviorist "knowing" is a metaphysical phenomenon and may, or may not, ever be really useful.

Yes, makes sense for those forms of life whose ability of "knowing" advances no further than the perceptional level (as I discussed above). That is, placing patterns of sets of sensations into memory may or may be useful for survival--but then--not having the ability must logically lead to non-existence for any form of life. So, seems to me that "knowing" at some level always more useful than not knowing at any level.

 

I don't accept the anthropomorphic notion that a bee necessarily forms a "mental grasp" (whatever that means) of anything.

OK, good comment. So, let us define mental grasp as the ability to integrate individual energy sensations into groups to form a precept of an entity, and to place that pattern of energy as a {set of sensations} into memory. Can we agree the bee has this ability to so mentally grasp ?

[Ken]

Thank you for the reply. I agree completely with you that there is a fundamental difference between sensation and perception. Where I disagree--is the reason I disagree with the representationalist model as presented in the history of philosophy--where I disagree is with your definition of perception as the ability of life forms to "interpretation and analysis of the transduced energy" (which is the definition used by all representationalist philosophies at least since Descartes--which I reject).

 

So, for me, perception is the ability of life forms to group individual sensations, to place the individual sensations into a memory, as a pattern of energy {sets of sensations} that relate directly to the entity perceived, the thing, the object of perception. The ability to integrate sensations with perceptions, to analyze and interpret, and explain {sets of sensations} comes latter in the scheme of evolution of consciousness, it is limited to those forms of life that can form concepts via a process I call mental calculus (differentiation of {sets of sensations} followed by integration of percepts to form concepts retained in memory). Well, this is how I see it, and I really do appreciate hearing how others deal with these ideas.

==

 

edit: I see my question...does a bee know pollen...is much too abstract. Let me change it to...does the bee know the flower ? So, perhaps we can apply the sensation-->perception-->conception process to this question.

==

 

Yes, makes sense for those forms of life whose ability of "knowing" advances no further than the perceptional level (as I discussed above). That is, placing patterns of sets of sensations into memory may or may be useful for survival--but then--not having the ability must logically lead to non-existence for any form of life. So, seems to me that "knowing" at some level always more useful than not knowing at any level.

 

OK, good comment. So, let us define mental grasp as the ability to integrate individual energy sensations into groups to form a precept of an entity, and to place that pattern of energy as a {set of sensations} into memory. Can we agree the bee has this ability to so mentally grasp ?

 

 

:D We are getting much closer.

 

I like your addition of memory into the discussion. I don't think it leads to rejection of what you call representationalism but it adds an important component to the sophistication of the analysis and interpretation. It fits in well with the evolutionary increase in encephalization of the NS to a CNS.

 

I'm not up to speed on the latest research on the neurophysiology of memory so it's hard to speculate about where the mechanism is, and how it is directly involved. Functionally, I agree with you that higher order organisms are better equipped to integrate immediate analysis and interpretation into a broader historical schema.