The Most Critical Question!

[modest]

We have two simple assertions which, superficially, appear to imply that having a world view is not possible;

 

- What some information means to you, must be a function of your world view.

- Your world view must be a function of what some information means to you.

 

restating the propositions in the first person:

 

• What some information means to me, must be a function of my worldview.
  
• My worldview must be a function of what some information means to me.
  

 

"what some information means to me" is identical to (and is the definition of) "my worldview" meaning that we can replace the first phrase with the second without changing the meaning of the propositions:

 

• My worldview must be a function of my worldview.
  
• My worldview must be a function of my worldview.
  

 

I am my worldview, therefore:

 

• I am a function of me.
  
• I am a function of me.
  

 

As Craig said, the critical question is "what am I?".

 

Can I both give meaning to information and be the meaning given to information? Yes, because I am what I do. A computer program can both compute information and be the computation of information.

 

~modest

[LaurieAG]

Hi Modest,

 

As Craig said, the critical question is "what am I?".

 

Can I both give meaning to information and be the meaning given to information? Yes, because I am what I do. A computer program can both compute information and be the computation of information.

 

He has been dubbed the "Father of Modern Philosophy", and much subsequent Western philosophy is a response to his writings, which are studied closely to this day. In particular, his Meditations on First Philosophy continues to be a standard text at most university philosophy departments. Descartes's influence in mathematics is also apparent; the Cartesian coordinate system—allowing geometric shapes to be expressed in algebraic equations—was named after him. He is credited as the father of analytical geometry. Descartes was also one of the key figures in the Scientific Revolution.

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Descartes

 

I think, therefore I am; or I am thinking, therefore I exist or I do think, therefore I do exist)

 

Whose shoulders is I standing on when I look from the outside looking in? If I is inside looking out those shoulders are the shoulders of men.

[Qfwfq]

"what some information means to me" is identical to (and is the definition of) "my worldview" meaning that we can replace the first phrase with the second without changing the meaning of the propositions:

 

• My worldview must be a function of my worldview.
  
• My worldview must be a function of my worldview.
  

 

I am my worldview, therefore:

 

• I am a function of me.
  
• I am a function of me.
  

LOL that's a good one Modest!

 

I think the insurmountable problem is due asking for a purely logical, abstract solution which makes it impossible because it requies the mind to build up a worlview starting from scratch. This isn't possible and it doesn't happen.

 

A solvable problem is to figure out how an innate sensory system might give the essential basics of a worldview (including the Kantian a priori concepts) so that the mind may elaborate on it with experience. This of course is the objective of cognitive sciences.

 

The trouble is that what we know about our sensory system comes to our mind through the same system, this is the bootstrap which makes it a conundrum. It leads to the hypothetical scenario of a deceptive data input which gives one the illusion of the perceived reality. What can we do about that? Next to nothing. Even so, the problem is logically solvable, providing we simply view it in terms of models, we can consider the results of cognitive sciences as being a model that works, and appears to be the actual way we perceive reality, even if we regard it only as "possibly" being it.

[AnssiH]

• My worldview must be a function of my worldview.
  

 

I am my worldview, therefore:

 

• I am a function of me.
  

 

As Craig said, the critical question is "what am I?".

 

Can I both give meaning to information and be the meaning given to information? Yes, because I am what I do. A computer program can both compute information and be the computation of information.

 

So should I understand that as, you expect the problem to be solved via understanding properly what "self" is? Because you define "self" as the same thing as the world view, you are simply saying that if we understood our world views better, we would understand how they come to be?

 

If that's what you are saying, I don't see any real reason to argue with it, but do you have any more specific thoughts about this?

 

Or anyone else?

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

I think the insurmountable problem is due asking for a purely logical, abstract solution which makes it impossible because it requies the mind to build up a worlview starting from scratch. This isn't possible and it doesn't happen.

 

A solvable problem is to figure out how an innate sensory system might give the essential basics of a worldview (including the Kantian a priori concepts) so that the mind may elaborate on it with experience. This of course is the objective of cognitive sciences.

 

The trouble is that what we know about our sensory system comes to our mind through the same system, this is the bootstrap which makes it a conundrum. It leads to the hypothetical scenario of a deceptive data input which gives one the illusion of the perceived reality. What can we do about that? Next to nothing. Even so, the problem is logically solvable, providing we simply view it in terms of models, we can consider the results of cognitive sciences as being a model that works, and appears to be the actual way we perceive reality, even if we regard it only as "possibly" being it.

 

So your take is essentially that the sensory system has by chance or by evolution struck upon useful fundamental concepts of a world view, which are thus serving as the rigid foundation for the rest of our world view?

 

So as another side of that coin, are you saying that the total lack of knowledge about what the information means, will ensure that there cannot exist a mechanism that is capable of building any fundamental concepts for a world view?

 

You are bringing up the important aspect that I was hoping someone would bring up; models.

 

Before I comment more, let me just take a step back first so everyone are following;

 

- What some information means to you, must be a function of your world view.

- Your world view must be a function of what some information means to you.

 

When we think we understand what some information means, what does that really entail? I.e. how do we actually judge whether we understand something about reality correctly or incorrectly?

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

So your take is essentially that the sensory system has by chance or by evolution struck upon useful fundamental concepts of a world view

By evolution. Which is far from being by pure chance. This makes the words "struck upon" out of place, because the way the sensory system is helps animals to survive in the environmental situations in which it evolved.

 

When we think we understand what some information means, what does that really entail? I.e. how do we actually judge whether we understand something about reality correctly or incorrectly?

By how useful it is for survival.

 

When insects keep buzzing against a pane of glass, they are really stupid, they just don't learn that an obstacle is there despite their sensory system not otherwise revealing it. Dumb, eh?

[modest]

I think the insurmountable problem is due asking for a purely logical, abstract solution which makes it impossible because it requies the mind to build up a worlview starting from scratch. This isn't possible and it doesn't happen.

 

A solvable problem is to figure out how an innate sensory system might give the essential basics of a worldview (including the Kantian a priori concepts) so that the mind may elaborate on it with experience. This of course is the objective of cognitive sciences.

 

Yup, I agree on both accounts. Trying to model any worldview (or prove the usefulness of any worldview) via pure rationalism seems self-contradictory. Creating a useful worldview with experience and logic would most definitely be a solvable problem.

 

~modest

[modest]

So should I understand that as, you expect the problem to be solved via understanding properly what "self" is?

 

I'm saying that "what is self?" is a critical step. It is a question which cannot be sidestepped. Craig said it well:

 

I’ve an intuition – an intuition only, as I’ve not read all your writing about your question and your answer to it, so apologize and ask to be corrected if wrong – that you are failing, Doctordick, to ask and answer a prerequisite question, “what is ‘we’?”, or, more commonly “what is ‘I’?”

 

In terms of DoctorDick's analysis the critical question is "what is an explanation?". He defines the concept by giving it certain characteristics (or assumptions). He says "central to my approach is to make no assumptions not absolutely necessary to the definition of an explanation", but this does not answer what an explanation *must* be in order to match some unknowable territory with a useful map in a flaw-free way.

 

Euclid did not prove that every geometry which models data usefully has parallel lines which do not cross by simply defining parallel lines as "lines that extended indefinitely do not cross". Euclid's fifth does not constitute a proof of what a geometry must be. DD's analysis does not constitute a proof of what a flaw-free worldview must be.

 

Because you define "self" as the same thing as the world view, you are simply saying that if we understood our world views better, we would understand how they come to be?

 

While I suppose that's true, it isn't what I said nor meant to imply.

 

~modest

[Bombadil]

Once again, the question I have in mind is a question no one wants to consider. The most prevalent reason for that fact is that they simply don't believe any answer can be found. “Man could not possibly fly as, if he could, he would have already done it”, seems to be one of the strongest arguments against intellectual analysis out there.

 

Or because everyone feels that attempting to do so is comparable to trying to reinvent the wheel and no one wants to take the time to rebuild all of science when the way that they are looking at it there is no constraints placed on a tautology other then consistency and as long as they remain consistent they will have no problems. So not only do they see it as reinventing the wheel they see no reason not to do it the same way as before.

 

But it makes me ask if you would still think that physicists are who you need to try to get interested in your derivations if what you had derived from your fundamental equation had looked nothing like theoretical physics. If it had looked like nothing ever derived before would you still be looking for people trained in physics to look at it or is there some other field that you would think should be interested in it? It would certainly still be of interest.

 

Another problem that I suspect is that people can look at the derivations that you have done and conclude that you have made an assumption somewhere vary easily because if they do get past your derivation of the fundamental equation which it looks like not many do they can’t see the derivation of Schrödinger’s equation or any other derivation as reversible. If you have truly shown that there is no other possible world view then these derivations should be reversible at least as far as returning to a differential equation which is comprised of functions with the same form as the fundamental equation.

 

Of course from how people are reacting on this thread this is probably just a minor issue as every one here seems to think that you have made a terrible mistake in your derivation of the fundamental equation. Or that you are asking the wrong question.

 

I haven't the slightest idea as to how to get others to look at the question and don't feel that is a reprimand of your efforts. I have never intended to “chide” anyone and I still read your posts with interest. Thank you.

 

Have you considered writing your own book in the hopes of someone reading it that understands it. Even if it was just a virtual book a lot of the work is already done as you could use the posts that you have composed as a bases for such a book.

 

I mean maybe it’s a long shot but if you properly presented it and you had everything there in a single book maybe you would get the right person to read it. At the very least if you didn’t get the right person to read it I think that the idea could spread if people did read it.

 

In any case I would defiantly suggest putting all of the information that you have presented on this forum in a single package that could easily be accessed by any one that wants to look at it. I rally don’t think that you would have any issues showing that you where the original founder of the derivations if you where concerned with that. I can’t imagine though that you would mind if your ideas suddenly started springing up in different ways that couldn’t be tracked back to you.

[AnssiH]

When we think we understand what some information means, what does that really entail? I.e. how do we actually judge whether we understand something about reality correctly or incorrectly?

 

By how useful it is for survival.

 

Trying to model any worldview (or prove the usefulness of any worldview) via pure rationalism seems self-contradictory. Creating a useful worldview with experience and logic would most definitely be a solvable problem.

 

Now we are getting somewhere.

 

So would you guys agree that the only measure for the validity of our understanding, is our ability to produce valid expectations about the future? I.e. Having a good explanation means we have some method of anticipating the future, and make useful survival choices accordingly?

 

Would you agree that it is a sensible definition of a world view, that it is any self-coherent set of definitions, that can produce valid expectations for information whose meaning is explicitly unknown?

 

And would you agree that it is irrational to assume, that our ability to make valid predictions entails that we do have correct understanding regarding what the information actually means in reality? (i.e. "ontologically")

 

I'll have more to say about "self" but one step at a time.

 

-Anssi

[modest]

So would you guys agree that the only measure for the validity of our understanding, is our ability to produce valid expectations about the future?

 

That is how human worldviews tend to work.

 

I.e. Having a good explanation means we have some method of anticipating the future, and make useful survival choices accordingly?

 

No, that would be affirming the consequent.

 

There's really, really, no telling what type of worldview might be useful to an alien entity on some other planet or even in a different universe with different physics. 'Future' is a useful part of our worldview, but this does not necessitate that every useful explanation contain the concept 'future'.

 

Time (or change), for example, may be an emergent concept based on a more fundamental concept that is not part of our current physics nor our current worldview. You really don't know.

 

You and Doctordick frequently claim necessity while proving sufficiency.

 

Would you agree that it is a sensible definition of a world view, that it is any self-coherent set of definitions, that can produce valid expectations for information whose meaning is explicitly unknown?

 

I would define worldview as "the totality of an entity's beliefs concerning reality".

 

And would you agree that it is irrational to assume, that our ability to make valid predictions entails that we do have correct understanding regarding what the information actually means in reality? (i.e. "ontologically")

 

If you mean 'irrational' in the sense that it is not based on rationality then, yes, I agree.

 

You should equally recognize that it is irrational to assume that DD's definition of time is a necessary part of every useful explanation in any possible reality. That is actually a bigger and more irrational assumption than just assuming time is a fundamental property in our universe.

 

~modest

[Qfwfq]

Well I'm glad we are getting somewhere!

 

So would you guys agree that the only measure for the validity of our understanding, is our ability to produce valid expectations about the future? I.e. Having a good explanation means we have some method of anticipating the future, and make useful survival choices accordingly?

No doubt about this, providing we don't forget it musn't be in conflict with past experience either. We can certainly say this is fundamental to how scientific research proceeds.

 

And would you agree that it is irrational to assume, that our ability to make valid predictions entails that we do have correct understanding regarding what the information actually means in reality? (i.e. "ontologically")

This is where we keep getting tangled up. The word ontologically seems to be the spectre in your nightmares. Nobody can breath a word without you construing it as an undefendable ontological assumption, unless it perfectly agrees with your opinion.

 

So it remains that a worldview may be valid or invalid, so to speak; this is pretty much like saying whether the data is compliant with it and new data continues to be. Whenever I say things to this effect, no matter what precautions I take, specifications I make, or how I spell it out, you always say I'm making undefendable ontological assumptions and/or that it's irrelevant because the information is undefined.

[Qfwfq]

There's really, really, no telling what type of worldview might be useful to an alien entity on some other planet or even in a different universe with different physics.

To be fair, I think it should be specified that we are talking about a worldview being good for the reality that we exist in or, at least, for a given reality being analysed. The fact that bees can distinguish certain species by colour of their flower, which look the exact same colour to us, only shows that they have survival needs that we don't have and neither our nor their representation is perfectly faithful, but adequate for the needs of each. It complicates the matter but we can gloss over it.

 

'Future' is a useful part of our worldview, but this does not necessitate that every useful explanation contain the concept 'future'.

This is a point, past vs. future is a Kant style a priori in Dick's analysis that we could hardly imagine not having in our own worldview. I agree that, logically, Dick's claim is more general, hence bolder, than assuming time to be a fundamental aspect of the reality we exist in.

[modest]

To be fair, I think it should be specified that we are talking about a worldview being good for the reality that we exist in or, at least, for a given reality being analysed.

 

Right, and Doctordick and Anssi will be the first to tell you that they are making no assumptions about the nature of reality (this one or any other). So, whether or not we are talking about a human in this reality with a useful worldview appropriate to this reality or we are talking about a gloplog in another reality with a useful worldview appropriate to that reality should make no difference.

 

DD and Anssi are assuming that DD's definition of time is a necessary component of both. I think we can easily enough prove that it is sufficient for one, but don't think we could prove it is necessary for both.

 

~modest

[Qfwfq]

Right, and Doctordick and Anssi will be the first to tell you that they are making no assumptions about the nature of reality (this one or any other).

I get your point but in taking the step about what we mean about a worldview being valid, the point is that we can only examine what we perceive from the reality, so we should do this regardless of the nature of reality.

 

The trouble is that the whole argument involves different aspects including the sensory system through which we receive the perceptions, but it aims at scientific research in general. All our "knowledge" of reality comes to the mind through it, including our knowledge about the system itself, hence the conundrum and hence Descartes' cogito. The manner in which we are born with a basic worldview to start out with is of course the result of evolution, i. e. it should be put in terms of survival. Scientific research can be discussed in the same way, according to epistemology, just as in Conjectures and Refutations, it is a selection much like that on which Darwin's evolution is based.

 

So the matter of "valid or not" can be seen in terms of "survival" and abstracted to a question of interpreting data and having good or poor expectations about new data. It can also be compared to the cryptanalyst who is trying to crack someone's messages, for instance.

 

IOW Dick's presentation is an attempted generalization, much as I disagree with his overall claims.

[modest]

I get your point but in taking the step about what we mean about a worldview being valid, the point is that we can only examine what we perceive from the reality, so we should do this regardless of the nature of reality.

 

No doubt.

 

The trouble is that the whole argument involves different aspects including the sensory system through which we receive the perceptions, but it aims at scientific research in general. All our "knowledge" of reality comes to the mind through it, including our knowledge about the system itself, hence the conundrum and hence Descartes' cogito. The manner in which we are born with a basic worldview to start out with is of course the result of evolution, i. e. it should be put in terms of survival. Scientific research can be discussed in the same way, according to epistemology, just as in Conjectures and Refutations, it is a selection much like that on which Darwin's evolution is based.

 

yeah, I don't disagree. My point is that our worldview (in particular, certain assumptions made in DD's analysis which are consistent with that worldview) are sufficient for our survival, but that we cannot prove their necessity.

 

So the matter of "valid or not" can be seen in terms of "survival" and abstracted to a question of interpreting data and having good or poor expectations about new data.

 

My problem is not so much with the abstraction, but the claims of necessity regarding the abstraction.

 

If my worldview were eternalism rather than presentism then I would have no idea what "new data" even meant. I don't believe we can claim that "having good expectations about new data" is a necessary aspect of any and every useful worldview in any and every possible reality. But, that is the claim that's going around.

 

It can also be compared to the cryptanalyst who is trying to crack someone's messages, for instance.

 

And the claims of DD and Anssi are that any message can be cracked with a certain form of representation/explanation of the data while at the same time making no assumptions regarding the message. This is unreasonable.

 

IOW Dick's presentation is an attempted generalization, much as I disagree with his overall claims.

 

Yes, I'm thinking that it is a mistake to assume that every set of data, if well-interpreted, can be so generalized.

 

~modest

[Qfwfq]

My problem is not so much with the abstraction, but the claims of necessity regarding the abstraction.

I realized that I did not make explicit the essential thing, in my effort. The crux was distinguishing between the universality of a worldview being valid and the claim that his analysis is universal.

 

I do agree that time is a weak point. His basis is on data being (already) known and not (yet) known. It is very natural for us to insert the chronological references and even neglecting the case of "forgetting" isn't so relevant because we are concerned with an optimal analysis. However, a mathematician can treat the set of known data as a subset of a more complete set, regardless of past and future.