A New Moral/social/political Theory, Claiming Objectivity.

[James Royce]

The arguments below, concerning a new moral, social, legal and political theory, may interest you. The theory argues that an objective normative theory must be coherent and uniquely supported by evidence, evidence coherent with evidence as in scientific objectivity. The theory argues that, though fallibilism and skepticism are often appropriate (objective) regarding knowledge- or objectivity-claims, and “regardless of underlying theoretical epistemic controversies, practical science moves on highly-successfully — showing in-practice that scientific objectivity or knowledge is a sufficiently firm notion to be involved in a practical, normative theory’s basis [but not to constitute that basis].” Hence an objective normative theory must be pro-objectivity. (The book arguing this concerns ‘pro-objectivity normative theory’ and its universal applications, including regarding all human subjectivity, e.g., the book argues that various emotions are needed to achieve the theory’s end.)

Some other or related summarised arguments here:-

“From the viewpoint of any standard, the standard and viewpoint are correct. E.g., from a selfish viewpoint, selfishness is normatively correct. As ‘correct’ means ‘truly, i.e., objectively, correct’, here selfishness is viewed as the only correct/objective moral end. This relatedly applies to pro-selfishness or the end, ‘Be pro-selfishness’, as that selfish viewpoint is inherently pro-selfishness. The general point here has important implications:-

Thence, from objectivity’s viewpoint, or judging via the standard, ‘objectivity’, a pro-objectivity standard and viewpoint are the only correct or objective standard and viewpoint. So this applies regarding normativity. With this, as a viewpoint involves a theory, from objectivity’s or an objective viewpoint pro-objectivity theory is the only correct or objective normative theory, and ‘Be pro-objectivity’ is the only objective normative standard and hence end. It is of course only from objectivity’s viewpoint that it can be known whether something is an objective normative end. (From other viewpoints, e.g., a selfish viewpoint, there can only be mere belief, without objectivity or truth.) Knowledge means truth. Therefore, ‘Be pro-objectivity’ truly is the only objective or correct normative end. This is the only coherent conclusion here, and not just because being pro-objectivity is coherent with objectivity. It is also coherent in that it is the only comprehensible and relatedly rational conclusion here.”

A related argument, also involving coherence, “involves another rationally unquestionable proposition, namely: an objective normative theory, one able to be knowledge, must have a basis and hence end/standard which favour and somehow involve (at least their own) objectivity or status as knowledge.

An objective, normative theory and hence its basis must involve objectivity in that normative theories inherently prescribe or are pro- some end(s), and being pro- an objective end means the theory here and hence its basis are pro- the theory’s end’s objectivity, i.e., its correctness. Otherwise the theory would not be in favour of the theory’s end’s correctness, of itself being objective, and of its own existence. This situation and the theory would be incoherent, self-contradictory. The theory would either be indifferent regarding its prescribed end, and hence not necessarily bother to prescribe or be pro- it, in-effect regarding its correct, inherent end as not correct, not inherent; or the theory would reject its own prescribed, correct end, and hence not prescribe the end it inherently prescribes. It would be anti- what it inherently is pro-. Either way, it would unobjectively regard the objectively correct as not correct. So the theory would not be that objective theory. It would not really exist (as itself).

In sum:- It is impossible and incoherent for an objective normative theory inherently pro- its objective end to not be pro- the theory’s and the end’s objectivity — and hence inherently pro-objectivity here. Objectivity, or knowledge, is inherently never incoherent. So an objective theory, one able to be normative knowledge, must have a basis and end positively involving or pro- at least their own objectivity and hence status as knowledge. There must be coherence here — a positive, pro- relationship.” The book argues that, further, coherence demands that, coherent with the previous sentence’s ‘coherence here’, to maximise coherence an objective normative theory must be coherent with pro-objectivity in as many ways as possible — including by having ‘Be pro-objectivity’ as its (the) single, objective end. With this, the book argues as follows:-

“Those arguments centrally involve pro-objectivity having a pro- relation to objectivity, and vice versa, and hence a unique coherence between pro-objectivity and objectivity. That is, relatedly, again, an objective normative end must be coherent with, pro- or positively-related to objectivity. ‘Be pro-objectivity’ obviously achieves that, in a unique way no other end can match. (Other ends are primarily pro- something other than objectivity, e.g., selfishness.) Similarly, the only end-prescription as close as possible to objectivity, or as closely normatively related as possible to objectivity, is ‘Be pro-objectivity’. And, if a normative principle can be rationally claimed to be knowledge, the principle must be coherent with, pro- or positively-related to knowledge in a general way (where choices here are coherent with that principle). ‘Be pro-objectivity’ obviously achieves that, because objectivity is the faculty-system which acquires and contains knowledge. (And ‘Be pro-objectivity’ is inherently not incoherent with any knowledge, only with certain (inherently normative) choices concerning knowledge.)”

Summarising those and related arguments:-

“Where objectivity is rationally-undeniably possible, e.g., in practical science, evidence crucially involves coherence.... Evidence is that which confirms whether a theory is objective/knowledge.

Because evidence’s essential nature involves coherence, if there is unique mutual coherence between a normative theory and objectivity, ... this provides at least some evidence for the theory’s objectivity. Coherence here suggests the theory is at least somewhat evidence-based or supported by the general nature of evidence.” The argument here again concludes that a normative theory with ‘Be pro-objectivity’ as its only obligatory end, and hence maximally coherent with objectivity, is hence at least as close as possible to an objective theory — and that no other normative theory can match that coherence/closeness.

The book presents further arguments or evidence for the book’s theory, arguing that this theory uniquely has sufficient evidence, as much evidence as is possible for a normative theory; but hopefully I’ve said enough to get you interested. The book also discusses practical applications at length (while “stressing that fallibilism and skepticism may be appropriate regarding some suggested specifics – but that future research can increasingly avoid problems here”). The theory argues it has one objective, obligatory primary end, namely ‘Be pro-objectivity’, but also permits numerous a-objective or a-objectivity, secondary ends “irrelevant [orthogonal] to that end. The theory’s basis permits great liberty and cultural, sexual, artistic, lifestyle and much other diversity regarding secondary ends. The primary end is a general principle implying non-sexism, non-racism, types of happiness, freedom, education, sympathy, peace, democracy, altruism, flourishing, fairness and much more. Emotions and various other subjective experiences are considered important.”

[geko]

That was quite a difficult post to read. However i don't see any basis or benchmark for normative ethics in it. The moral landscape by sam harris gives a basis for it and i'd recommend the book to you as you seem interested in this stuff. In the book he gives the basis of value as well being, i.e. good is that which increases well being, bad is that which increases suffering. It's a good idea, i like it. However i still don't see, or maybe understand, how this gets round the idea of values being voluntary ideas in the minds of individuals. And insofar as they are mental acts dealing with preferences, tastes and wishes based on an individuals ideas they aren't, and cannot be, objectively-coherent... which seems to assume in the first place that 'society' is an entity of some kind existing independent of the individual. It doesn't.

 

Personally though, i have no problem with science giving an ought. In fact, it does it all the time and oughts are inherent in the method to begin with.

[dduckwessel]

In one respect it sounds like the Selfish Gene Theory so I don't know how the 'primary end' would be workable?

[James Royce]

That was quite a difficult post to read. However i don't see any basis or benchmark for normative ethics in it. The moral landscape by sam harris gives a basis for it and i'd recommend the book to you as you seem interested in this stuff. In the book he gives the basis of value as well being, i.e. good is that which increases well being, bad is that which increases suffering. It's a good idea, i like it. However i still don't see, or maybe understand, how this gets round the idea of values being voluntary ideas in the minds of individuals. And insofar as they are mental acts dealing with preferences, tastes and wishes based on an individuals ideas they aren't, and cannot be, objectively-coherent... which seems to assume in the first place that 'society' is an entity of some kind existing independent of the individual. It doesn't.

 

Personally though, i have no problem with science giving an ought. In fact, it does it all the time and oughts are inherent in the method to begin with.

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'Notions like 'good is that which increases well being' are just claims, without evidence, and what one likes is subjective and can have nothing to do with what is objective, though they can coincide, as with your last sentence stating that science has oughts inherent in its method. The book in a sense goes from that fact to argue that such oughts are the only ones coherent with what can rationally unquestionable be called 'evidence', and from that basis applies such oughts to life generally, giving us the only evidence-based moral theory.

[geko]

I haven't read this book nor do i know what it is so i'm only going on what i've read here. But with that said: rationality is perspective based, and evidence, as a concept, is ambiguous. To remove the ambiguity we must define it. Defining it would lead to various adjectives. Picking any one of those adjectives and repeatedly ask 'why?' will eventually lead to a value claim. In which case we're back to subjective claims based on ideas in the mind of an individual.

 

Hell maybe i'm wrong though. Let's try and see. I'll start the argument off with as much ambiguity as i can think of right now…

 

Evidence.

Please define what is evidence...

Data.

What is data…

Quantitative measurements.

And why are you measuring things?

To gain information.

...and why are you trying to gain information?

To learn.

…and why are you learning and what is the point of it?

…?

 

 

This is one of the reasons i liked the well being idea because it's foundation is reason. Kind of an apriori support by asking you to imagine the worst possible misery for everyone. Then saying that if the word bad means anything it must mean this. Then proceeding to the idea that any other condition than the worst possible misery for anyone must be better. Rounding it off with quantifying this concept as a scale; one side is worst possible misery for everyone (bad), other side is best possible happiness for everyone (good). Between these two points there will be a landscape of troughs and valleys conducive to each direction on the scale. Ergo, the moral landscape.

 

What is this book you're talking about here?

[James Royce]

I haven't read this book nor do i know what it is so i'm only going on what i've read here. But with that said: rationality is perspective based, and evidence, as a concept, is ambiguous. To remove the ambiguity we must define it. Defining it would lead to various adjectives. Picking any one of those adjectives and repeatedly ask 'why?' will eventually lead to a value claim. In which case we're back to subjective claims based on ideas in the mind of an individual.

 

Hell maybe i'm wrong though. Let's try and see. I'll start the argument off with as much ambiguity as i can think of right now…

 

Evidence.

Please define what is evidence...

Data.

What is data…

Quantitative measurements.

And why are you measuring things?

To gain information.

...and why are you trying to gain information?

To learn.

…and why are you learning and what is the point of it?

…?

 

 

This is one of the reasons i liked the well being idea because it's foundation is reason. Kind of an apriori support by asking you to imagine the worst possible misery for everyone. Then saying that if the word bad means anything it must mean this. Then proceeding to the idea that any other condition than the worst possible misery for anyone must be better. Rounding it off with quantifying this concept as a scale; one side is worst possible misery for everyone (bad), other side is best possible happiness for everyone (good). Between these two points there will be a landscape of troughs and valleys conducive to each direction on the scale. Ergo, the moral landscape.

 

What is this book you're talking about here?

 

 

By 'evidence (or objectivity)' the book means evidence(or objectivity) as in practical science, e.g., as in evidence for Earth orbiting the sun, rather than (what is from an inherently overall, rational view) the unevidenced reverse. The book explains this much more.

The book is: Frederick Farrand "A New, Objective, Pro-Objectivity Normative Theory" University Press of America