Well, A Sign Of Intelligence!

[Rade]

It's that same old ontology vs. epistemology problem again.

My worldview is that of the primacy of existence as being axiomatic (prior to explanation), hence the "vs" problem you struggle with does not exist in my philosophy.

 

What there really is out there, I have no idea, of course.

I agree, but we do have at least one idea prior to any explanation, and that is that something is out there that requires explanation (primacy of existence), but we really have no idea what it is. Thank you for the clarity of your responses to me.

 

==

 

I would like to discuss, if you have time, exactly how you understand DD when he claims that mass derives from the tau dimension of his fundamental equation. Especially how this claim would relate to spontaneous symmetry breaking and perhaps (not sure DD would agree) to how mass could be calculated from application of a Feynman sum-over-history interpretation of quantum theory. Perhaps this topic is best moved to a new thread ?

[AnssiH]

No. I said that his equation is not fundamental and universal. One could make other (equally valid but non-equivalent) choices, leading to equations from which he would not get the same quantum physics stuff.

 

So your argument is that in the derivation of the "fundamental equation" there are arguments that cannot be defended as being universally true (i.e. as being consequences of generating expectations from undefined information), and those arguments appear to contribute to the results when tracing QM definitions?

 

I was not even remotely thinking of different glyphs for the same thing, what would be the point of that? I did not say Dick does that, I made an example hoping it would be much simpler for you to follow. Apparently you have no intention of following my arguments.

 

Of course I am interested of understanding whatever it is you are thinking. Perhaps it is not a good idea to make analogies, maybe you should just point out what arguments do you think are not defendable and why not.

 

Like I said before, if there are undefendable arguments in the derivation of the fundamental equation, then they are indeed choices leading to QM definitions and should be part of the derivation of those definitions. Any choice like that would of course be either implying something about reality itself (little bit tricky to prove though), or it would imply something about some approximation(s) that play a role in QM definitions.

 

The only problem is, I don't know what those undefendable arguments are.

 

Since you have complained about the anti-commuting elements, then would you say that the 3 constraints as expressed separately are universal;

 

[math]

\sum^n_{i=1}\vec{\nabla}_i\vec{\Psi}(\vec{x}_1,\vec{x}_2,\cdots,\vec{x}_n,t) = i\vec{k}\vec{\Psi}(\vec{x}_1,\vec{x}_2,\cdots,\vec{x}_n,t)

[/math]

 

[math]

\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\vec{\Psi}(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t)=iq\vec{\Psi}(x_1,x_2,\cdots,x_n,t).

[/math]

 

and

 

[math]

\sum_{i\neq j} \delta(\vec{x}_i-\vec{x}_j) = 0.

[/math]

 

(from http://scienceforums.com/topic/22894-a-universal-representation-of-rules/ in case you've forgotten what they stand for)

 

If you do, then at least I know your complaint has got something to do with the derivation of an expression that combines those constraints.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

My worldview is that of the primacy of existence as being axiomatic (prior to explanation), hence the "vs" problem you struggle with does not exist in my philosophy.

 

Well if you were to take the meaning of "epistemology" and "ontology" the way I do, then you would quite agree with the existence of that problem. I mean, that is why you said "I agree" to my comment about inability to know "what there really is out there". "Something is out there" does not constitute an ontology, by the way I take the meaning of "an ontology".

 

I would like to discuss, if you have time, exactly how you understand DD when he claims that mass derives from the tau dimension of his fundamental equation.

 

It simply means that the physics definition of "mass" appears in his notation as momentum along [imath]\tau[/imath] axis. It doesn't reflect a structure of a universe, it reflects a categorization of information into a form where such a definition is useful and quite apparent. Why this is interesting is that mass is not actually very simple definition, there are a lot of subtleties related to it (inc. its relationship to definition of energy and velocity), and those subtleties appear in DD's notation as well, but in this form it is clear to see exactly how they are consequences of the universally valid symmetries. I.e. "consequences of the definition of an explanation". These relationships are somewhat hidden from view without a careful analysis.

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

If you do, then at least I know your complaint has got something to do with the derivation of an expression that combines those constraints.

The matter of choice of Lie algebra definitely concerns the part where those three are combined, so you may as well consider that you know this.

 

As for those three equations, the first just means that no two [imath]\vec{x}[/imath] with distinct indices have the same value. As far as I could see in the argument, this is an artifice which I wouldn't really call "universal", it has a purpose. The first two are not universal at all but we had some time ago mentioned the matter of labelling in such a manner as to make them hold. I reckon this doesn't make them universal unless you allow re-labellings which are so arbitrary that the whole thing makes no sense. Like, you can make any rule hold when you empirically test it, if you allow ad hoc re-calibration of measurement instruments for each individual measurement, what would the point of that be?

Edited October 22, 2011 by Qfwfq
typos & such

[AnssiH]

The matter of choice of Lie algebra definitely concerns the part where those three are combined, so you may as well consider that you know this.

 

Right. I would say from the rest of your post that it looks like you are viewing the meaning of those individual constraints a bit wrong, which is a bit more important point. Especially since, if you were to consider the individual constraint expressions as universally valid, then it would be somewhat of a side-issue where Lie algebra steps into play (except for what its use implies about the results exactly).

 

But that aside;

 

As for those three equations, the first just means that no two [imath]\vec{x}[/imath] with distinct indices have the same value. As far as I could see in the argument, this is an artifice which I wouldn't really call "universal", it has a purpose.

 

Well a labeling method where two or more defined elements are seen to occupy the same observable state seems quite undefendable way to define anything, so if by "it has purpose" you mean it is a constraint that any theory/ontology would set to achieve (i.e. because the alternative could not be defended), then you probably understand its meaning. It is simply a statement of an epistemological constraint, like all of these arguments (as in, "regardless of what reality is like, this is how things must be defined").

 

There is also a conversation about the defense of this constraint going on in the other thread, as I'm sure you have noticed.

 

The first two are not universal at all but we had some time ago mentioned the matter of labelling in such a manner as to make them hold. I reckon this doesn't make them universal unless you allow re-labellings which are so arbitrary that the whole thing makes no sense. Like, you can make any rule hold when you empirically test it, if you allow ad hoc re-calibration of measurement instruments for each individual measurement, what would the point of that be?

 

I don't think you view this quite the way it is intented. If you view the "collection of undefined events" as a set of points on an [imath]x,\tau[/imath] space, then it should be pretty trivial to convince yourself that any expectations related to "undefined events" can't be a function of what some individual events are (by the definition of "undefined events" they don't have distinguishable properties) or where in the space the collection was mapped , but rather they must be a function of some sorts of patterns within the collection of undefined events. Related to those patterns, all kinds of ideas of defined elements can arise, but regardless of what they are, the definitions of DD's notation lead to a trivial feature (of the notation itself) that the probablities must be shift symmetric.

 

From your comment I am getting the vibe that you are viewing this from the point of view of imagining a universe of some sort, and trying to figure out if it could be mapped in shift-symmetric fashion. I don't think that is a meaningful way to view this because the translation process from undefined events to defined elements is completely unknown in any case, and it is quite trivial to see the universal validity of the shift symmetry if you view it from the point of view of the definition of the notation, and what "undefined events" is supposed to refer to.

 

-Anssi

[Qfwfq]

You're not making much sense Anssi. It just sounds like you're saying that, because these tomatoes have no meaning anyways, you have every right to associate them with numbers in such a way as to make whatever rule you choose hold for them. Which is what my example about re-calibrating intruments does. So, you didn't answer the essential question: what the hell is the point of it all?

[AnssiH]

You're not making much sense Anssi. It just sounds like you're saying that, because these tomatoes have no meaning anyways, you have every right to associate them with numbers in such a way as to make whatever rule you choose hold for them. Which is what my example about re-calibrating intruments does.

 

Your comment "you can make any rule hold when you empirically test it, if you allow ad hoc re-calibration of measurement instruments for each individual measurement" doesn't really reflect what I mean. That comment implies that you are thinking about translations applied to some defined ontology (i.e. what "measurement instruments" and their measurements are taken to mean etc) to get to another ontology? I can't really know what is it exactly that you are thinking from the wrong perspective, but whatever it is, that would be why it sounds to you like I'm not making much sense.

 

Well, perhaps try to look at it this way; any explanation, prior to explaining something, is working with some information with unknown meaning. Which means that in terms of DD's notation, the labeling can be freely chosen (no information exists as to any "correct" or "incorrect" ways), as long as the labeling method does not lead to logical inconsistencies or constitute undefendable assumptions.

 

In that sense, you can view DD's notation as a method to index some information from the perspective of any explanation. The structure of DD's notation may not in any obvious manner reflect how that explanation sees the world, but it is possible to represents any self-coherent explanation in valid manner nevertheless.

 

So you can take the analytical purpose of DD's notation to be, that it brings those symmetry features in plain sight for analysis purposes; in real explanations those features may be more or less obscured in their terminology. But those same symmetry features still must have played a role in the formulation of that explanation, in so far that the explanation is internally self-coherent (I'm sure you understand it is incredibly hard to prove whether a full world-view actually is internally self-coherent or not).

 

So;

 

So, you didn't answer the essential question: what the hell is the point of it all?

 

the point of it is to analyze, in as exact scientific way as possible, what assumptions/approximations or universally valid definitions lead to what kinds of defined relationships. The internal self-coherency of every choice is governed by those symmetry constraints (i.e. in terms of analysis, DD applies the choices to the "fundamental equation").

 

There are many steps taken deliberately to bring this towards the terminology of modern physics, because DD is trying to make an argument about how it is always possible (but not necessary) to represent the (inductively derived) expectations of undefined events, in a terminology that looks like modern physics. The possibility of finding modern physics without making assumptions about the underlying information itself implies that the elements of modern physics are essentially epistemological choices (or methods) to represent (inductively derived) expectations, and not a reflection of the structure of reality per se.

 

I may be wrong, but I would imagine that an analysis like that would be highly interesting to any theoretical physicist. It should also be interesting to anyone working with the problem of general AI, or philosophy of intelligence. It implies something quite important about the nature of our intelligence, proving how it is possible to arrive to a valid representation of expectations without any pre-existing knowledge about what is being explained.

 

After all, it is quite reasonable to expect that any representation of expectations that is most useful for survival purposes, would be what survival machines would use. Ontological correctedness of that representation is simply not measured, only prediction applicability is.

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

...the elements of modern physics are ... not a reflection of the structure of reality

AnssiH. This claim makes use of words that can have multiple meanings. What you say I might agree with if you clarify a few points.

 

First, how do you define "the elements of modern physics" ? Two or three examples would help.

 

Second, why insert the word "modern" ? You are not saying the elements of ancient physics are a reflection of reality..correct ? So, modern can be removed. Thus your claim is reduced to ..."the elements of physics are...not a reflection of the structure of reality.

 

But, what exactly do you mean by elements not being "a reflection" of reality ? I'm not sure we can logically conclude that anything is a reflection of reality, let alone any element of physics. So, your claim can be further reduced to "the elements of physics are... not the structure of reality".

 

OK, but I'm sure you will agree that now we must know what you mean by "structure" of reality. How does reality have a "structure" ? Once we know this, then we can look to see if how you define "elements of physics" may or may not be associated with this structure. So, looking forward to clarification because I think I might well agree with your claim.

 

It implies something quite important about the nature of our intelligence' date=' proving how it is possible to arrive to a valid representation of expectations without any pre-existing knowledge about what is being explained.[/quote']But, one must always have pre-existing knowledge that some thing or some event EXISTS that has a possibility of being explained. The problem I see is with your use of the word "any". The pre-existing unknown concerns the thing-it-itself, it must be known that some "thing" exists prior to any attempt to explain.

 

After all' date=' it is quite reasonable to expect that any representation of expectations that is most useful for survival purposes, would be what survival machines would use. Ontological correctedness of that representation is simply not measured, only prediction applicability is.[/quote']But, many survival machines do not use expectations to survive. They use correct measurement of some representation of ontology, for example the representation that a cat is a cat. Consider for example a mouse trying to escape from a cat (that is, to survive). It is the lack of expectations that allows the mouse to survive. Natural selection favors gene patterns of behavior that act to protect the mouse from the cat after the first perception. It is perception, not any representation of expectation, that allows the mouse as a living machine to survive the cat.

[Qfwfq]

Your comment "you can make any rule hold when you empirically test it, if you allow ad hoc re-calibration of measurement instruments for each individual measurement" doesn't really reflect what I mean.

Uhm, your question:

That comment implies that you are thinking about translations applied to some defined ontology (i.e. what "measurement instruments" and their measurements are taken to mean etc) to get to another ontology?

doesn't really reflect what I meant.

 

I can't really know what is it exactly that you are thinking from the wrong perspective

Because I'm not thinking of anything from the wrong perspective.

 

So you can take the analytical purpose of DD's notation to be, that it brings those symmetry features in plain sight for...

Actually, by the time he gets to his FE, it is doing much more than what you guys are saying. I agree up to the point where he says that the probability doesn't depend on the labelling and hence ATM the phase of the complex values may depend on it. Writing the further relations (leading to the first two of those equations you repeated) entails a restriction compared to the above and hence, like it or not, already is not as universal.

 

There are many steps taken deliberately to bring this towards the terminology of modern physics,

Yeah, starting from what I said above.

 

Therefore:

because DD is trying to make an argument about how it is always possible (but not necessary) to represent the (inductively derived) expectations of undefined events, in a terminology that looks like modern physics.

the word always in there is very heavy indeed. In order for this word to be correct, you would need an assumtion:

The possibility of finding modern physics without making assumptions about the underlying information itself implies that the elements of modern physics are essentially epistemological choices (or methods) to represent (inductively derived) expectations, and not a reflection of the structure of reality per se.

The choices, as you call them, begin with cherry picking the phases in such a way that a fundamental rule holds which is the very essence of quantum physics. To see it exactly, you would need to be more competent about the very quantum formalism so I'm not at all sure about attempting to give you more detail, I'll just say it's got to do with the existence of a universal value called "Planck's constant" (I'm sure you've heard of that, eh?) and its fundamental role throughout quantum physics.

 

I may be wrong, but I would imagine that an analysis like that would be highly interesting to any theoretical physicist. It should also be interesting to anyone working with the problem of general AI, or philosophy of intelligence. It implies something quite important about the nature of our intelligence, proving how it is possible to arrive to a valid representation of expectations without any pre-existing knowledge about what is being explained.

IMHO you have the cart before the horse here.

 

After all, it is quite reasonable to expect that any representation of expectations that is most useful for survival purposes, would be what survival machines would use.

The trouble is: Where is the boundary between these "survival machines" and the "reality" they are "survivng" in?

 

Actually, the above is only one of the troubles with your whole line of argument. I doubt that all phenomenology could always be accounted for even if the "survival machines" are totally free to choose each and every one of those phases as they please.

[AnssiH]

AnssiH. This claim makes use of words that can have multiple meanings. What you say I might agree with if you clarify a few points.

 

First, how do you define "the elements of modern physics" ? Two or three examples would help.

 

The whole paragraph I wrote read;

 

There are many steps taken deliberately to bring this towards the terminology of modern physics, because DD is trying to make an argument about how it is always possible (but not necessary) to represent the (inductively derived) expectations of undefined events, in a terminology that looks like modern physics. The possibility of finding modern physics without making assumptions about the underlying information itself implies that the elements of modern physics are essentially epistemological choices (or methods) to represent (inductively derived) expectations, and not a reflection of the structure of reality per se.

 

I am referring to DD's derivation(s) of modern physics, so by "the elements of modern physics" I am specifically referring to the elements whose definitions are traced in DD's derivations.

 

Thus your claim is reduced to ..."the elements of physics are...not a reflection of the structure of reality.

 

Yes.

 

But, what exactly do you mean by elements not being "a reflection" of reality ? I'm not sure we can logically conclude that anything is a reflection of reality, let alone any element of physics. So, your claim can be further reduced to "the elements of physics are... not the structure of reality".

 

OK, but I'm sure you will agree that now we must know what you mean by "structure" of reality. How does reality have a "structure" ? Once we know this, then we can look to see if how you define "elements of physics" may or may not be associated with this structure. So, looking forward to clarification because I think I might well agree with your claim.

 

I'm not sure what you are asking. I was not saying reality has got a structure, I was saying that our understanding of anything has got a structure, and that it would be an error to assume that the same structure is embedded to the nature of what we are trying to understand. For instance, we must think of any information in terms of some elements that can be identified as the same elements from one moment to the next, but the validity of such a perspective doesn't tell us if reality is structured that way.

 

And indeed, for those kinds of epistemological reasons, I do not think it is fruitful to assume realty to have some particular "structure" to itself.

 

I.e.,

 

But, one must always have pre-existing knowledge that some thing or some event EXISTS that has a possibility of being explained. The problem I see is with your use of the word "any". The pre-existing unknown concerns the thing-it-itself, it must be known that some "thing" exists prior to any attempt to explain.

 

as soon as some specific "things" or "elements" are being perceived, they are already some information having been structured into some representational structure that cannot be objectively taken to reflect the actual structure of the information.

 

-Anssi

[AnssiH]

Because I'm not thinking of anything from the wrong perspective.

 

The whole paragraph I wrote read;

 

Your comment "you can make any rule hold when you empirically test it, if you allow ad hoc re-calibration of measurement instruments for each individual measurement" doesn't really reflect what I mean. That comment implies that you are thinking about translations applied to some defined ontology (i.e. what "measurement instruments" and their measurements are taken to mean etc) to get to another ontology? I can't really know what is it exactly that you are thinking from the wrong perspective, but whatever it is, that would be why it sounds to you like I'm not making much sense.

 

First sentence means that judging by your comment, you don't seem to be reading what I am meaning.

 

The second sentence is what your comment implies to me, topped with a question mark, because I can't know if that is really what you were thinking.

 

The third comment re-iterates, that I can't really know what your perspective is on what I am saying, but clearly it is not the perspective I meant, and that that is why my comments sound so non-sensical to you.

 

Actually, by the time he gets to his FE, it is doing much more than what you guys are saying. I agree up to the point where he says that the probability doesn't depend on the labelling and hence ATM the phase of the complex values may depend on it.

 

I'm not the most competent person in the world to investigate the consequences of the possibility that the phase of the complex values depends on the shift on the labeling, but if it does have serious consequences, then certainly it can reflect a definition that should not be part of the universal part of the argument. Basically it would mean that the relationship between P and [imath]\vec{\Psi}[/imath] needs to be more carefully defined, so not to lead to any undefendable consequences.

 

Writing the further relations (leading to the first two of those equations you repeated) entails a restriction compared to the above and hence, like it or not, already is not as universal.

 

If that's true, then it means they represent categorization choices to the data. That leads to two possibilities;

 

If they are categorization choices that cannot be applied universally for any given collection of data, then they represent some knowledge about reality (i.e. they represent choices that can be valid only for some types of realities).

 

If they are categorization choices that can be applied universally to any given collection of data, then they represent exactly that; an arbitrary categorization choice, that plays some role in further the categorization to more specific collection of defined elements.

 

The central idea with all the definitions used in the notation and FE is that, while their validity may require some particular characteristic to the labeling, as long as a 1:1 translation exists between possible labelings now and possible labelings prior, then it's reflects an immaterial epistemological choice.

 

The choices, as you call them, begin with cherry picking the phases in such a way that a fundamental rule holds which is the very essence of quantum physics.

 

So you view this issue as playing a key role in the way quantum mechanical definitions arise as valid in DD's derivations? Is it possible to demonstrate that without this characteristic, the collection of approximations he makes later in the derivations would not lead to QM? (I certainly don't have the chops to prove that issue one way or another)

 

When you say "cherry picking the phases", are you sure you mean cherry picking as in making assumptions what the data is, or just in making choices as to how the data is being labeled? Because if it's the latter, then it's all exactly intentional, because it just reflects representation choices, not assumptions regarding what is being represented.

 

To see it exactly, you would need to be more competent about the very quantum formalism so I'm not at all sure about attempting to give you more detail, I'll just say it's got to do with the existence of a universal value called "Planck's constant" (I'm sure you've heard of that, eh?) and its fundamental role throughout quantum physics.

 

Yes but I don't understand what you are implying. Even if you don't think I am capable of following whatever your argument is, you should still just lay it out here for anyone else who might stumble upon this issue in the future. Your argument may or may not be valid, and it may or may not imply something interesting. But if you don't spell it out here explicitly, no one will ever know.

 

IMHO you have the cart before the horse here.

 

Well I don't know about the physicists, I guess it depends on the philosophical alignment of a person, but for AI it is certainly very important result relating to the the fundamental problem of general AI (semantical understanding and general learning).

 

The trouble is: Where is the boundary between these "survival machines" and the "reality" they are "survivng" in?

 

Indeed. I don't claim to know where that boundary is. Assumptions regarding where it is or is not are not used anywhere in DD's arguments. Rather he makes an argument that our explanations cannot depend on knowledge of such a thing, because that kind of knowledge cannot exist. We just define that boundary somewhere the way we see it, as part of our representation of reality.

 

I doubt that all phenomenology could always be accounted for even if the "survival machines" are totally free to choose each and every one of those phases as they please.

 

Well certainly just about everyone would doubt that, I mean, isn't it just another way to say that our representation of reality (in this case the quantum representation) appears to capture how reality is in some sense or another. I would think almost everyone would find it quite surprising if that structure could be shown to be just a very general way to represent inductive expectations. Well, as a physicist you have probably thought a lot about how deeply the physics definitions are related to each others and you have probably many times viewed some areas of physics as a self-coherent set of definitions, and you have probably noticed how some collection of definitions affects how some other area is viewed, when the same terminology is meticulously applied (while knowing that another collection of definitions could just as well be used to represent the same thing).

 

DD's work is in my view just a general examination to connections between definitions, when you account for our ability to translate undefined collection of events into any self-coherent set of definitions, as long as expectations can be validly expressed. In that sense, there is a lot of "cherry picking" going on when arriving at some particular terminology. What impact that cherry picking has, that's the important question (and no, it's not a trivial question).

 

-Anssi

[Rade]

DD's work is in my view just a general examination to connections between definitions, when you account for our ability to translate undefined collection of events into any self-coherent set of definitions, as long as expectations can be validly expressed.

Hi AnissH. Thanks for your replies to my post above. It helps to know that "elements of physics" that are being discussed are those elements unique to the definitions used by DD in his presentation. Most likely this has been a major source of confusion for DD as he tries to explain his presentation to other physicists, because to them, the words "elements of physics" would most likely have nothing at all to do with the elements DD is discussing. This problem of definitions also helps explain why you replied to me that when you mentioned "structure of reality", to relate to "elements of reality", and I asked you what this structure means, you explained to me that reality does not have any structure, which of course only can add to great confusion in communication given that common sense would suggest that when you placed the three words "structure of reality" in that order, that you implied that reality does have a structure.

 

Concerning your summary statement about DD's work above, I agree 100% that his work deals with connecting definitions (but I would add that what makes the approach of DD unique is that he presents a mathematical formalism how definitions can be connected...I am not aware that this has been presented before, but perhaps I error). I agree that definitions are the final stage of forming concepts. Concepts are formed from a collection of undefined EVENTS that are translated into a set of self-coherent definitions, again, I agree 100%. For me, the key aspect is that these EVENTS must be prior to the translation process, prior to concepts, and they must be undefined, common sense demands that this must be true of all EVENTS presented to the human mind. Finally, this process of connecting definitions that derive from EVENTS demands that expectations (ranging from mathematical probability of 0 to 1) about EVENTS can be validly expressed (mathematically), again, I would agree 100%.

 

Thus I conclude that the only reason we (or you and others) often talk past each other or just do not understand what the other is trying to say is due to different interpretations of how words are defined. For this reason, I believe it is critical that you provide a short list of all important definitions used by DD in his presentation that we can all refer to keep our minds focused on the presentation without bringing in alternative definitions that would exist for the same words. DD has already informed me that he has no interest in providing such a list of the definitions he uses, a very unfortunate decision he has made. I suggest these definitions be presented in thread by itself, and simply update as needed to keep it in view on the forum. Of course, this will also force DD to not flip-flop and use multiple new definitions for the same word in different ways, which he has so often done in the past. Think about it...why exactly did Webster decide to write a dictionary of words ? What was the value of that event, did it have value ? If the answer is yes for Webster, it is 100 times more important for DD.

[Qfwfq]

The whole paragraph I wrote read;

Anssi, I'm very tired of going round and round in circles, again and again, only to wind up talking about fried air each time; I've really had enough of it. I had read the first, second and third sentences and I had understood them exactly as you spell out; I replied that I disagree with each of your three statements. You have again reached the point at which you fail to effectively address matters concerning the distinction between explanations that are and aren't valid. Handwaving is not enough.

 

I'm not the most competent person in the world to investigate the consequences of the possibility that the phase of the complex values depends on the shift on the labeling, but if it does have serious consequences, then certainly it can reflect a definition that should not be part of the universal part of the argument.

Which leaves Dick with very little and this little is exactly what he does in common with the standard quantum formalism.

 

Basically it would mean that the relationship between P and [imath]\vec{\Psi}[/imath] needs to be more carefully defined, so not to lead to any undefendable consequences.

Not in the least.

 

That leads to two possibilities;

Exactly. And how do you judge which of the two is the case? You admit to not being the most competent person in the world to investigate the matter, so why are you always so stubborn about twisting anything I say into somehow supporting Dick's claims?

 

So you view this issue as playing a key role in the way quantum mechanical definitions arise as valid in DD's derivations?

I have no doubt about this and it is clear, at this point of the discussion, to anyone properly versed in the art, IOW who does have "the chops to prove that issue".

 

When you say "cherry picking the phases", are you sure you mean cherry picking as in making assumptions what the data is, or just in making choices as to how the data is being labeled?

First, I realize that I used the wrong word in my recent argument and it is surprising that you failed to point it out straight away. The matter of phases is not the "labelling" as you and Dick call it, but it certainly has a role in what you and he call "an explanation". That said, I'll say the step in question is key to whether a given explanation complies with quantum formalism (and even slightly more than this), while you and Dick consider it a step which holds if and only if the explanation is valid. This is exactly the kind of things Dick's tautology comes from: "If it complies with A then it's a kind of A."

 

...you should still just lay it out here for anyone else who might stumble upon this issue in the future. Your argument may or may not be valid, and it may or may not imply something interesting. But if you don't spell it out here explicitly, no one will ever know.

Eh? What makes you think I must lay it out here, for some future archaeologist to brush the dust off it and see the light, else no one will ever again have the chance to know? I must damp your excess of enthusiasm, you're really getting carried away. Remember that the onus of proof is on who makes the claims, which is to say Dick. If you can't judge it because you lack the competence in math which has been done, available to all, for the purposes of theoretical quantum physics, it doesn't mean I should put it here for posterity.

 

As if your hyperbole about implications for AI and other things weren't enough.

 

Indeed. I don't claim to know where that boundary is. Assumptions regarding where it is or is not are not used anywhere in DD's arguments. Rather he makes an argument that our explanations cannot depend on knowledge of such a thing, because that kind of knowledge cannot exist. We just define that boundary somewhere the way we see it, as part of our representation of reality.

You are confusing things and handwaving, without properly addressing how valid vs. not may relate to the phases. The trouble is that, by the time I made any attempt to guide you toward the troubles your argument faces, you would as usual lose track and twist my whole line around to your convenience. I'm no longer inclined to help you with these things. At this point your last two paragraphs simply fade into the mist which they are part of.

[AnssiH]

Thus I conclude that the only reason we (or you and others) often talk past each other or just do not understand what the other is trying to say is due to different interpretations of how words are defined. For this reason, I believe it is critical that you provide a short list of all important definitions used by DD in his presentation that we can all refer to keep our minds focused on the presentation without bringing in alternative definitions that would exist for the same words.

 

I think currently the best attempt to explain the whole thing is in those various OP's by DD. I think it is certainly possible to make it clearer, but I don't think it is a very quick or easy task.

 

I don't think it's possible to compile a short list of definitions in such a manner that it would actually explain everone what is meant. The problem is, how to communicate what exactly is meant by a definition? Proper understanding of any of those definitions doesn't seem to come easy, but I believe some people just happen to be more readily aligned to read it as intented.

 

Think about it, if you were to compile a short list yourself directly from the explanation that DD uses, you'd still have to try and stitch that all together in your mind in some manner that seems to make sense. There are many non-sensical interpretations you can make along the way, and probably get frustrated and decide it doesn't make much sense.

 

Which gets us to;

 

Anssi, I'm very tired of going round and round in circles, again and again, only to wind up talking about fried air each time; I've really had enough of it. I had read the first, second and third sentences and I had understood them exactly as you spell out; I replied that I disagree with each of your three statements.

 

Okay then, you are convinced that you are not thinking of anything from wrong perspective, rather the problem is that I am simply not making sense.

 

There's no reason to get all stressed out about this Qfwfq. It could have been useful to have you understand it because you have a good idea about some fundamental issues of physics, but I'm not losing any sleep over it if you give up.

 

I don't expect a response from you and it's unfortunate that you refuse to lay down your argument explicitly, but I'll just lay down few short comments for any lurkers who might wish to think about these issues;

 

Basically it would mean that the relationship between P and [imath]\vec{\Psi}[/imath] needs to be more carefully defined, so not to lead to any undefendable consequences.

Not in the least.

 

What I was referring to was that, if the way that [imath]\vec{\Psi}[/imath] is defined would lead to constrain the general expression (The "fundamental equation") in undefendable way, then certainly that definition would need to be changed into something that does not amount to undefendable constraint.

 

Operative word is "if", because at present time I am not convinced whether it does. I do not claim it is trivial to prove this, one way or another.

 

That leads to two possibilities;

Exactly. And how do you judge which of the two is the case?

 

Either case has got some fairly interesting implications, but as I said, I do not claim it is trivial to prove this issue, one way or another. The difficulty arises from the fact that when you have a translation from undefined events to a particular expression of expectations, that translation is also always undefined. What needs to be proven is whether or not a categorization choice limits what the underlying data can be.

 

Eh? What makes you think I must lay it out here, for some future archaeologist to brush the dust off it and see the light, else no one will ever again have the chance to know? I must damp your excess of enthusiasm, you're really getting carried away. Remember that the onus of proof is on who makes the claims, which is to say Dick. If you can't judge it because you lack the competence in math which has been done, available to all, for the purposes of theoretical quantum physics, it doesn't mean I should put it here for posterity.

 

The proof from DD's side has been laid down for everyone to see, and if there is an argument that suggest that the validity of quantum mechanics arises from some particular definition embedded inside the FE, I'm afraid that argument needs to be laid down explicitly before anyone can understand what the argument is. The fact that FE can be approximated in terms of QM has been demonstrated in DD's threads, that should not be surprising, but if the FE (or the symmetry arguments) in itself is already limited to only explain quantum mechanical universe, that would be rather surprising.

 

That's all folks.

 

-Anssi

[Doctordick]

The proof from DD's side has been laid down for everyone to see, and if there is an argument that suggest that the validity of quantum mechanics arises from some particular definition embedded inside the FE, I'm afraid that argument needs to be laid down explicitly before anyone can understand what the argument is.

I have come to the conclusion that Qfwfq's only interest here is to insert totally confusing comments designed to prevent anyone else from taking anything we say seriously. It is the rather typical response of threatened authorities and I doubt anything you might say would be of any interest to him.

 

Have fun -- Dick

[Qfwfq]

Dick, kindly get that Browning away from my face, it is making me feel as if my authority is threatened. :rolleyes:

 

I don't think it's possible to compile a short list of definitions in such a manner that it would actually explain everone what is meant.

What you mean is that you don't think it's possible to compile a short list of definitions in such a manner that it would actually enable to compute expectations of future outcomes everone what is meant.

 

No use being patronizing Anssi.

It could have been useful to have you understand it because you have a good idea about some fundamental issues of physics, but I'm not losing any sleep over it if you give up.

 

I don't expect a response from you and it's unfortunate that you refuse to lay down your argument explicitly,

It isn't up to me to teach you the basics of QM better than Dick does. Get yourself a tutor independent of both him and me. Start with the von Neumann formalism, see the role of energy (i. e. eigenvalues of the Hamiltonian) in time evolution. See how the universal Schrödinger equation becomes the familiar one for non-relativistic particle in a potential when the hamiltonian just happens to have the form [imath]\frac{p^2}{2m}+V(x)[/imath] and follow how this leads to the Einstein-de Broglie relations. At that point it just might become possible to discuss how Dick's argument pulls an Ansatz or two out of his hat.

 

What I was referring to was that, if the way that [imath]\vec{\Psi}[/imath] is defined would lead to constrain the general expression (The "fundamental equation") in undefendable way, then certainly that definition would need to be changed into something that does not amount to undefendable constraint.

Aside from whether this Hyp. implies this Th. I would ask you if you don't reckon that would change the FE. But:

Operative word is "if", because at present time I am not convinced whether it does.

And you are correct about that and I for one hadn't said so. You missunderstood what I did say, which leaves me in doubt about the possiblity of reaching the above scenario of discussing the matter with you.

 

What needs to be proven is whether or not a categorization choice limits what the underlying data can be.

I say it is and so would anyone actually competent that could be bothered to follw your details. You are saying you've no proof of Dick's claim that it isn't and the onus of proof rests on him. This gives you no grounds for saying things like:

I'm afraid that argument needs to be laid down explicitly before anyone can understand what the argument is.

IOW I'm afraid that that it doesn't.

[Rade]

I don't think it's possible to compile a short list of definitions in such a manner that it would actually explain to everyone what is meant.

This makes no sense to me. It would be very easy to compile such a short list..so, let me make the offer. With both your and DD permission I will start a new thread topic titled "Definitions used by DoctorDick for Fundamental Equation". I will take the lead to add definitions from all his previous posts. I will take responsibility to make sure it is a current thread. I will send you a PM of each definition first, get approval, then post. In no time at all we will have the short list. If yes, please post here a list of the first 20 most important words that need to be first added. I will then begin my search of previous posts of DD where he provided definitions. So, let me know if you and DD have any interest in my offer.

 

The problem is' date=' how to communicate what exactly is meant by a definition?[/quote']Again, what does this mean ? It is absolutely no problem, we provide a definition for the word definition in the list of definitions used by DD. So, let us make this one of the first 20 words added to the short list...I'll begin a search of posts by DD to see if he defined the word "definition".

 

Proper understanding of any of those definitions doesn't seem to come easy

Yes' date=' exactly why people need a list of definitions to constantly refer to. You see, proper understanding of any definition requires proper use of words to form it. Making a proper definition to allow proper understanding is critical to the process of communication.

 

Think about it, if you were to compile a short list yourself directly from the explanation that DD uses, you'd still have to try and stitch that all together in your mind in some manner that seems to make sense.

Yes, again, you hit the nail on the head. This what what we do every time we open a dictionary. Last time you looked at a dictionary, why did you do it ? Because you were trying to stitch how some one word meshes with all the others in the book so as to have it make sense in relation to some explanation.

 

Time and again I have read DD say that his presentation is 'true by definition'. Great, all the more reason why we must have the short list of definitions so we can know what is true and what is false.

 

After 3 years of DD posting on this forum, and at least as many on Physics Forum until he migrated here, don't you see that his presentation cannot move forward until the short list of definitions is provided?