What is time?

[Doctordick]

If it were true, Newtonian mechanics would also fail to be quantized (as you say, Newton introduced the assumption).

That is a pretty broad statement. Do you actually think you can prove it or is it merely an opinion? :umno:

These theories have the same suppositions about time.

No, they certainly do not! Newtonian physics does not consider time to be a coordinate of the geometry. One would think that someone as versed in modern physics as yourself would be well aware of that fact.

How then do you define space, other then what rulers measure?

Space is a little more subtle (that is why I seldom bring it up). But, since you asked, I will put it forth: my definition of “space” is that “space is a geometric representation of numeric references to the unknown ontological elements upon which one builds one's epistemological constructs (which are, of course, the source of one's expectations).

 

As I said, I have been told over and over again by the academic authorities that "time is what clocks measure!" My first response to that is, “Ok then, what is a clock?” I think you would be astonished with the number of times that is answered with, “the thing that measures time!” Not only is that an entirely circular definition, but it is absolutely equivalent to, “just get off my back; if you don't know what time is, you can't do physics!” Essentially the response to my comments amounts to, “we all know what we are talking about and if you can't comprehend it you're just stupid”: i.e., let's not think about it.

 

And the same thing goes for space; if space is what rulers measure, please define a ruler without mentioning space. Physics is just chock full of such circular reasoning. It is what I define to be a "squirrel construct". (I intend no disrespect with that comment; it is no more than a statement of how their ideas were arrived at and I have no better procedure to suggest. I am merely solving the problem of constraining one's expectations when analyzing an extremely large set of undefined variables.)

 

And, speaking of relativity, I think you would benefit from reading a discourse I had with Hurkyl (who I think is a mathematician interested in relativity) on physicsforums.com (you should be aware that I was “banned forever” from posting on that forum for posting “crackpottery”). The authorities have ways of dealing with people like me. :) :) :)

 

Sorry, on reviewing that thread, I realized that there is a lot of garbage between my presentation to Hurkyl. In order to follow my presentation to him I think you would find it convenient to skip all posts except the following four:

my opening presentation to Hurkyl post #26

parametric representation of any arbitrary phenomena post #40

attaching a clock to each and every parametric path post #42 197640

continuation of post #42 post #43

 

Have fun -- Dick

[Overdog]

The common thread between all forms of constructivism is that they do not focus on an ontological reality, but instead on a constructed reality.[citation needed] Indeed, a basic presupposition of constructivism is that Reality-As-It-Is-In-Itself (Ontological Reality) is utterly incoherent as a concept, since there is no way to verify how one has finally reached a definitive notion of Reality. One must already have Reality in mind--that is, one must already know what Reality consists of--in order to confirm when one has at last "hit bottom." Richard Rorty has said that all claims to Realism can be reduced to intuition (Consequences of Pragmatism, chs. 9, 11). The Realist/Anti-Realist debate can be reduced, in the end, to a conflict of intuitions: "It seems to us that..." vs "Well, it seems to us that..." A realist would not like to construe the argument in this way, and would say that one of these is misled, that one group perceives correctly, and the other perceives incorrectly. Strict constructivists will complain that there is no way to confirm one way or another, since the goal of inquiry (Reality) must be assumed to be understood at the outset. The Realist hope, in a constructivist view, is simply to arbitrarily freeze the infinite circularity that plagues human reasoning which vainly hopes to validate itself with a secure foundation.

 

Famously, this rather relativist theory is seen by some to contradict itself as a true affirmation: because this view also is "constructed," that is, made and not found, built by human hands rather than discovered in Nature or Reality. Consistent constructivists, however, will reply to this tu quoque (your theory, too!) critique with a rejoinder of their own: bien sur! (of course our theory, too!). It is an obvious and foolish claim for a constructivist to play a realist with regard to his or her own perspective...

 

Constructivist epistemology - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

 

Thought this was interesting.

[Overdog]

The reason I posted that is because it seems to me the debate is being waged from points of view which are seperated by an epistimological paradigm shift. Perhaps some insight into the philosophical underpinnings of the two perspectives would be helpful.

[Doctordick]

The reason I posted that is because it seems to me the debate is being waged from points of view which are seperated by an epistimological paradigm shift.

To quote your quote, “The Realist/Anti-Realist debate can be reduced, in the end, to a conflict of intuitions:” . This I can essentially agree with; however, I would rather not use the word “intuition”. I would much prefer the concept I define as "squirrel thought". That is to say, the realist/Anti-Realist debate can be reduced, in the end to conflicting “squirrel constructs”. One thing which I find interesting is the fact that my presentation encompasses both possibilities: I show that the proper relationship which must be satisfied by a flaw free epistemological construct is my fundamental equation. In the deduction of that equation, the numerical references refer to the underlying ontological elements. If you were to follow my deduction carefully, you would discover that I make use of two very different ontological elements, one set would be the “valid ontological elements” (which would of course be reality itself) and the other set is purely imagined (entities dreamed up whose existence, together with my equation, would constrain the past to exactly what is observed).

 

It should be clear that, if the first set consists of no elements, we are speaking of an Anti-Realist construct. On the other hand, if the second set vanishes, we are speaking of a Realist construct. A central tenet in my presentation is the fact that the rules these ontological elements obey must be the same for both sets and it follows that my fundamental equation presumes that, in a flaw free epistemological construct there is simply no way to distinguish between a Realist and/or Anti-Realist construct. I am simply not part of that debate. In fact, from my perspective, such a debate does not belong in a rational discussion.

Perhaps some insight into the philosophical underpinnings of the two perspectives would be helpful.

The first error you make here is that you think that the discussion here has something to do with that issue. As far as I am concerned, the question being discussed is “What is time?” and that would be the definition of the concept. I give mine and everyone baulks. You all give yours and I find them consistently inadequate.

 

My deduction is based upon well defined opening issues and “time” is the first variable to be established. And that means established in the absence of any knowledge about that “valid epistemological construct” we are interested in discovering. Everyone else argues about what kind of epistemological construct should be used as a starting point. As you have pointed out

Strict constructivists will complain that there is no way to confirm one way or another, since the goal of inquiry (Reality) must be assumed to be understood at the outset. The Realist hope, in a constructivist view, is simply to arbitrarily freeze the infinite circularity that plagues human reasoning which vainly hopes to validate itself with a secure foundation.

Thus the argument you are all trying to settle is totally and completely beside the point. The “infinite circularity” can be solved in only one way.

 

Take the fundamental ontological elements as “unknowns” and see what can be said Without Any Epistemological Starting Point. Everyone, to every last man (except perhaps Anssi) absolutely confident that such a thing cannot be done which makes it perfectly obvious that I could not possibly have accomplished anything via the approach I have claimed. Thus they either ignore what I say or they waste all their time trying to figure out what my underlying epistemological starting point is: i.e., what you are calling the philosophical underpinnings of my perspective. The philosophical underpinnings of my perspective is that logic can be understood if an effort is made.

 

Don't start by looking at my conclusions and arguing that they aren't consistent with your world view. At the moment, on this very forum, I have taken the issue all the way to deducing Schroedinger's equation which most everyone knows implies Newtonian mechanics is approximately correct, To say that my conclusions aren't consistent with your world view is to say that, in your world view, Newtonian mechanics is not approximately correct. One should start with my original presentation and show a logical step which you believe to be erroneous. Any other approach to the issue is utterly unproductive.

 

The first step is simple beyond belief: any epistemological construct is based upon some collection of ontological elements. One can use numerical labels to refer to these ontological elements (thus avoiding the ambiguities inherent in using any defined “language”). Any “flaw free” epistemological solution provides you with a method of getting from this collection of ontological elements to your expectations as expressed in terms of these ontological elements. If that construct is flaw free, those expectation must be perfectly consistent with what you know. (Hey, there is my definition of “the past”). Finally, your expectation can certainly be expressed as a number bounded by zero and one which denotes the probability your expectation say should be attached to a particular set of ontological elements used to express that particular expectation.

 

And believe it or not, that makes your expectations a mathematical function. If you have expectations, then that mathematical function exists!

 

Am I a realist or an anti-realist? Does that question have any bearing at all on what I have just said?

 

Have fun -- Dick

[modest]

Hi modest, I have found your posts to be quite rational; however, you seem to entirely miss the issues I am trying to put forth...

 

I firmly hold that this is a simple consequence of the fact that you have no idea as to what I am saying.

 

This is entirely possible. I don’t have any trouble interpreting what you say, but I realize there is a large history behind it that I’m only tentatively aware. My interpretation then may not be your intended message and I accept that I may not know where you’re coming from. An ephemeral problem I should hope.

 

You are operating under the presumption that I am presenting an alternate way of explaining these issues of significance. This is not at all the basis of my presentation.

 

You seem not to allow for the possibility that my last post says explicitly that you are not presenting an alternate view of relativity - which I did.

 

My comments are merely addressed to the reasons why the adherents to Einstein's theories totally fail to comprehend the view I am presenting.

 

Your post to me addressed no such subject. I can appreciate you explaining the motivation for your comments, but I’d rather just focus on the substance of the comments themselves.

 

Reductionism is a conceptual building block of modern science. The philosophical problem with reductionism is the idea of infinite reduction; it is necessary to terminate this reduction at some point and that point is usually referred to as the fundamental ontology which is essentially reality itself.

 

I agree that this is very much the method science uses. On a personal note, I very much “like” reductionism. I like looking for and using the fundamental pieces. There is some satisfaction to it that I cannot fully explain. For example, I rather prefer statistical thermodynamics to classical thermodynamics. On this principle or personal preference, I’m a fan of your work on the reduction of epistemology. I regret that I have not had the time to properly appreciate it, and I’ve seen that’s something you’ve heard before on more than one occasion - so I’m sure you’re sick of hearing it from one more person. But, in my case it’s absolutely true. As I said, hopefully transient this problem is.

 

This requires us to “know” reality so we stand around, guessing what this fundamental ontology might be, and measuring our success by building logical structures and comparing them to our experiences. Essentially, this relies on the validity of the very world view we are trying to construct. It is inherently a circular construct.

 

Of course, this is an ongoing struggle. Things are reduced further continually. The four elements used to be fire, air, earth, and water. I’m prefer usefulness as a guidepost in science. The usefulness of these classically fundamental elements could not be sustained. Better ideas replaced them being more useful and of better theoretical structure. Ontology changed when that happened. We no longer consider “air” as a fundamental property of matter.

 

I fully accept that one day ‘time’ and ‘space’ may not be the fundamentals that we label them today. Perhaps they will be broken into subparts or perhaps they will be replaced with some other thing altogether. Until that happens, I will continue to use them as fundamental and useful. I will also advocate their usage as it has proven useful time and again.

 

As far as I can tell this is all tangent (though related) to the definition of time you gave. I would much rather focus on that than this.

 

You want Einstein's definition of time to fail in its purpose which would then support your personal philosophy of anti-realism.

 

Exactly where did you get the idea that I was suggesting a “philosophy of anti-realism”?

 

I apologize. I should not pigeonhole your views especially considering my knowledge of them is limited. Most of what you say comes off strongly as anti-realism. I’ve seen you both advocate the rejection of all reality and question the usefulness of modern science. Both these things are at the extreme end of anti-realism. I would guess that you’re philosophically aligned with Kuhn and that camp, however, I may be wrong and I’m certainly wrong for assigning you a personal philosophy. So, I do apologize and you should feel no need to confirm or deny my assumption.

 

edit: I see you expanded on this to overdog above, fee no need to do so again.

 

This is not a definition of time.

 

That appears to be an assertion! Please show me why I can not use that as a definition of time!

 

Yeah, let’s talk about time. Your definition of it:

 

The past is "what we know" and the future is "what we do not know". The present then becomes the boundry (of our knowledge).

 

is either not a definition of time or (if it is meant to be) it is incomplete at best. Consider the situation:

 

An object rotates in space some 5 times. I contend that it’s position is a function of time. This is incomplete because there is also the notion of past and future which your definition deals with – but it does not deal with anything else which is a huge gaping hole.

 

Let’s say the object rotates 3 times (three complete rotations back to its origin) in our past and twice we predict it will do so in our future. Your definition correctly sets a condition of our knowledge related to time. Markedly that we already know the past and we can only predict the future.

 

However, what in your definition distinguishes the three past rotations from each other? Nothing! What makes the first rotation, first; the second, second; and the third, third - nothing. Why are there three past rotations rather than just one – nothing. Without a meaningful definition of time, which yours is not, there is no way to deal with past or future evolution of a system. None at all. It’s, therefore, incomplete at best (as a definition of time).

 

What I’m saying here is not that what you’re saying is wrong – just that it’s incomplete.

 

I appreciate that it has meaningful constraints that are related to time. But, taken literally "the future is "what we do not know"" means anything we do not know is in our future.

 

Are you asserting that there exist things you do not know which are not in your future?

 

Yup, I’m talking about the time things happen – you’re talking about the time they are learned. As these things are indeed different, I believe it is necessary for you to step outside your box a bit here. I do contend there are things in my past that are unknown to me.

 

It appears that you are asserting that there exists things in the past which you do not know, but that idea presumes that you understand reality.

 

I don’t have to understand reality to assume there exist things outside my knowledge. I only have to assume my knowledge is not infinite. A rational proposition that is.

 

The fact that you assign a time to new knowledge which yields temporal continuity to your world view (i.e., things that occurred in the past) is no defense that these supposed events actually occurred in the past (your awareness certainly occurred in the future).

 

I assign no time for the learning of things unknown to me – only that there are such unknown things. What you say precludes the possibility that the past is larger than an individual’s memory. Quite frankly, that’s an absurd assumption. Can you not qualify this a bit better: “the past is what we know” Because, taken as a description of reality, it makes the incorrect assumption that reality is completely known and understood by an individual. There are valid constraints or qualification you could put on that statement that would make it meaningful. But, as it stands (as a definition of time) it doesn’t work.

 

A description of the extent of an individual's epistemology does not make a good, real, and correct description of reality. When you try to describe one as the other it leads to inconsistencies as I've shown above.

 

~modest

[ldsoftwaresteve]

DoctorDick, aside from yourself and Ansii, nobody is looking at this issue from outside of a specific worldview. I'm not, that's for sure. Mine just happens to bring the same concept of time to the discussion as yours does, and I totally agree and accept your definition of time. Until you gave it, I had no actual definition of time.

 

The fact that you derived your concept of time outside of a specific worldview, using pure mathematics, is to me astonishing. Perhaps I should be ashamed to admit that, but I'm not. Those who disagree with you seem to completely ignore the mathematical arguments you make and focus instead on trying to get you to straighten out their worldview which contains a contradictory definition or idea of time.

 

They go, 'look at my worldview'. You go, 'look at my mathematics and stop looking at your worldview!'. That scares them so they come back at you with 'look at my worldview', etc.

 

How long has this been going on.... I'm thinking of a song....

 

You know, there is understanding and then there is understanding. Perhaps the people who disagree with you are not as good at mathematics as they think they are. I could be wrong but I have this really strong squirrel feeling that I'm not.

 

Modest, I just read your response too. I liked it, you're very honest. I especially liked how you made it clear you come at all of this stuff from a 'how useful is it to me approach' and you make no bones about that. I think the usefulness of DD's approach will be a coming attraction. Hey, his idea of time agrees with mine perfectly - so how wrong can he be! ;)

[Overdog]

Well, if I understand you, you are saying you are not argueing from any philosophical position, so if I have mistaken it for a form of constructivism, my apologies. It sounded like a form of constructivism to me...

 

On an epistemological continuum, objectivisim and constructivism would represent opposite extremes. Various types of constructivism have emerged. We can distinguish between radical, social, physical, evolutionary, postmodern constructivism, social constructionism, information-processing constructivism and cybernetic systems to name but some types more commonly referred to (Steffe & Gale, 1995; Prawat, 1996; Heylighen, 1993). Ernest (1995) points out that "there are as many varieties of constructivism as there are researchers" (p.459) . Psychologist Ernst von Glasersfeld whose thinking has been profoundly influenced by the theories of Piaget, is typically associated with radical constructivism - radical "because it breaks with convention and develops a theory of knowledge in which knowledge does not reflect an objective, ontological reality but exclusively an ordering and organization of a world constituted by our experience" (von Glasersfeld, 1984, p.24). Von Glasersfeld defines radical constructivism according to the conceptions of knowledge. He sees knowledge as being actively received either through the senses or by way of communication. It is actively constructed by the cognizing subject. Cognition is adaptive and allows one to organize the experiential world, not to discover an objective reality (von Glasersfeld, 1989).

Constructivism: Philosophical & Epistemological Foundations

 

So you have in any case found a mathematical basis for pointing out that anything anyone says is an assumption?

 

Isn't that what the Constructivists say?

[Erasmus00]

That is a pretty broad statement. Do you actually think you can prove it or is it merely an opinion? ;)

 

Which part of the statement? The idea that if GR cannot be quantized because past knowledge lets you know future knowledge then this implies Newton cannot be quantized, or the fact that you CAN quantize Newton?

 

No, they certainly do not! Newtonian physics does not consider time to be a coordinate of the geometry. One would think that someone as versed in modern physics as yourself would be well aware of that fact.

 

You'll forgive a vagueness of language. Your claim was that the deterministic nature of the theory (i.e. if we know the past, we can know the future) is the reason that GR cannot be quantized. I was speaking of this particular feature of time (knowing the past lets you know the future) that the two theories share. I did not mean to imply that time was exactly the same in each.

-Will

[modest]

I am a bit puzzled by your reply. I had to go back to my post to see what exactly did I say, in order to try and understand what are you saying.

 

Yes, in other words the simultaneity planes themselves are not observable at all; they are things we have defined as part of relativistic spacetime, but their ontological reality is an assumption.

 

I think you're the only one assuming it has any ontological reality. I honestly don't think that would be a normal assumption. The present instant is no more real than a world line.

 

By that, do you mean to say that I am the only one to presume, that anyone would assume ontological reality to the "present moment"?

 

Or to the "relativistic present moment"?

 

In our everyday conception of reality, I think just about everyone do assume reality is in some specific state at "present instant" even before they themself see that state.

 

Of course if one assumes the relativistic description of "present moment" to be ontologically correct, they are forced to change their assumptions of how world looks like right "now", beyond their natural senses.

 

Since you say "the present instant is no more real than a world line", I am interested to hear what you think world looks like beyond your sight. Is it a mixture of all the possible states?

 

Also, from a physics standpoint, people regularly make assertions that hinge completely on the assumption that "relativistic present moment" (inside relativistic spacetime) is ontologically correct. For example that "Rigorous Proof of Determinism..." that I just mentioned (and the whole Andromeda invaders Wikipedia page for that matter). And length contraction and isotropic speed of light. They are not ontologically correct descriptions if simultaneity is not ontologically relative. Different models would communicate the same reality rather differently.

 

-Anssi

 

When solving a problem of special relativity you see how the present instant is a construct or confluence of things. It's an extrapolation of ideas - not so much something that's real in and of itself. I would think you'd agree with this ;)

 

If you're looking for a way to disprove or maybe question relativity, this is not a good way to go about it. The present instant is completely unobservable. There is nothing conceptually that prevents two people from having different present instants - even if they are not spatially separated. It is easily implied by relativity that it is necessary for them to have different present instants.

 

As it's conceptually possible and impossible to disprove with observation - it's not a good way to attack the theory.

 

But, no, I don't think the average expert in relativity would tell you the present instant or a world line or the lorentz factor, or many other things that represent the method of solving a transformation are necessarily ontologically real.

 

~modest

[Doctordick]

You seem not to allow for the possibility that my last post says explicitly that you are not presenting an alternate view of relativity - which I did.

What I am doing does indeed bring up the issue of an alternate view of relativity but that is really not the real issue of my presentation. I bring up the issue of relativity and the fact that there are alternate views only to encourage people to examine the derivation of my fundamental equation.

I fully accept that one day ‘time’ and ‘space’ may not be the fundamentals that we label them today.

Or perhaps we might come to understand exactly why “time” and “space” are useful concepts for explaining a universe that, in reality, requires neither.

Until that happens, I will continue to use them as fundamental and useful. I will also advocate their usage as it has proven useful time and again.

No where am I suggesting that one should not use these concepts; I simply derive them from very fundamental issues.

An object rotates in space some 5 times. I contend that it’s position is a function of time. This is incomplete because there is also the notion of past and future which your definition deals with – but it does not deal with anything else which is a huge gaping hole.

You have proceeded to a circumstance (a full blown epistemological construct) without ever considering the constraints on those unknown ontological elements upon which that construct has been built. If you follow my deduction you will discover that, using my definition of time, I deduce what I call my fundamental equation which your expectations must satisfy. In fact, I further prove that Schroedinger's equation is an approximation to my equation (and it is not difficult to prove that any Newtonian many body solution is an approximation to Schroedinger's equation). Take a look at the thread, “Deriving Schroedinger's Equation from my Fundamental Equation”. You must comprehend that any “object” your world view might define will essentially be described as obeying Newtonian mechanics.

Markedly that we already know the past and we can only predict the future.

You cannot predict the future; you can only express your expectations for the future and, the most rational expectation is that any epistemological construct which flawlessly agrees with everything you know (the past) will most probably yield satisfactory expectations for the future. If it doesn't than the epistemological construct immediately becomes flawed. Considering the vast amount of information going to make up your past, it is highly doubtful that the next moment will include enough information to destroy your current world view.

However, what in your definition distinguishes the three past rotations from each other? Nothing!

What you miss is that my fundamental equation is a many body equation including every entity in the universe. Certainly, if the entire universe were to come to a state which exactly matches a previous state, nothing would distinguish those two states. But that circumstance is highly unlikely at best.

What I’m saying here is not that what you’re saying is wrong – just that it’s incomplete.

And what I am saying is that it is entirely complete; the additional machinations you want to perform are totally unnecessary.

I do contend there are things in my past that are unknown to me.

But you will learn of them in the future and you are free to put any numerical reference number you wish on those things (that is a consequence of your epistemological construct). I am talking about the equation that epistemological construct must obey, not what that epistemological construct is.

I don’t have to understand reality to assume there exist things outside my knowledge. I only have to assume my knowledge is not infinite.

That is, what you know is finite. Have you considered what consequences that has upon the possible flaw free epistemological constructs? I have and I have logically deduced the fact that my fundamental equation must be valid under the definitions I have provided.

Because, taken as a description of reality, it makes the incorrect assumption that reality is completely known and understood by an individual.

No, that is not true. What you are failing to consider is the fact that your past includes evidence your world view is a valid epistemological construct. That is why I always comment about intelligence being a data compression mechanism.

A description of the extent of an individual's epistemology does not make a good, real, and correct description of reality.

I never said it did; what I said was that it is the determiner of their expectations, quite a different matter.

When you try to describe one as the other it leads to inconsistencies as I've shown above.

As far as I am concerned, you have shown no inconsistencies.

How long has this been going on.... I'm thinking of a song....

Long enough to depress the hell out of me. I first tried to publish in the academic journals back in 1982. I don' t think a referee every saw it. The editors simply returned the stuff to me with the comment that it was not the kind of thing they published. (I suspect they couldn't come up with a rational choice for a referee.)

Well, if I understand you, you are saying you are not argueing from any philosophical position, so if I have mistaken it for a form of constructivism, my apologies. It sounded like a form of constructivism to me...

Well, perhaps it is but it certainly does not begin with any assumptions. Essentially, any epistemological construct must be based on some ontological basis. I merely take that ontological basis as an unknown and examine the implied constraints on a flaw free epistemological construct.

So you have in any case found a mathematical basis for pointing out that anything anyone says is an assumption?

I might agree with that and I might not agree as I do not really know what you mean. People discover epistemological constructs which apparently yield flaw free explanations of their experiences. They cannot do this without having some ontological basis so that epistemological construct includes the assumption of those ontological elements upon which it is based. Does that mean that “anything anyone says is an assumption?” I would certainly never put the issue that way.

Which part of the statement? The idea that if GR cannot be quantized because past knowledge lets you know future knowledge then this implies Newton cannot be quantized, or the fact that you CAN quantize Newton?

My complaint with Einstein's general relativity is the fact that it is based upon a geometry which uses time as a coordinate; this fact is what makes it totally inconsistent with quantum mechanics.

You'll forgive a vagueness of language. Your claim was that the deterministic nature of the theory (i.e. if we know the past, we can know the future) is the reason that GR cannot be quantized.

No, that is not what I was saying. What I was saying was that it was Newton's idea that if we knew the past exactly, we could know the future, which led Einstein's to conclude that time should be a coordinate of the correct geometry. In my opinion, that decision was the most erroneous step one could take. I think Einstein took Newtons space time diagrams of dynamic phenomena far too seriously.

 

Have you looked at that parametrized representation of a valid general relativistic physics problem I posted on physicsforums.com?

 

Have fun -- Dick

[Erasmus00]

My complaint with Einstein's general relativity is the fact that it is based upon a geometry which uses time as a coordinate; this fact is what makes it totally inconsistent with quantum mechanics.

 

This still can't be true, special relativity has this same feature and is completely compatible with quantum mechanics. Also, GR is not completely incompatible- if you work in a weak field limit GR can in fact be quantized (which leads to gravitons).

 

Have you looked at that parametrized representation of a valid general relativistic physics problem I posted on physicsforums.com?

 

I sent you a private message discussing it to avoid dragging this thread too far off topic. Should we start a new thread?

-Will

[modest]

Yet there is something (some concept) that distinguishes two past events that are exactly the same in every way except for 'time' that separates them.

 

This is a consequence of your interpretation of these events. You are the one who has decided that these two past events are exactly the same. Have you considered the possibility that you are wrong?

 

However, what in your definition distinguishes the three past rotations from each other?

 

What you miss is that my fundamental equation is a many body equation including every entity in the universe.

 

Honestly! Look at that exchange. You knew just what I was asking for - why is your answer twice ambiguous? This post is where I found the answer you could have quickly given had you intended some basic explanation of your system rather than quick and unproductive responses that insult my intelligence:

 

The next step I take is to transform the numerical representation into points on the x axis. This step however introduces a difficult fundamental problem as information can be lost if multiple occurrences of a given number exist in the elements of B(t). That is the reason I introduce the tau axis. Without the tau axis, there is no way of using points to represent all possibilities with points.

 

So, I assume you have some t axis which is built on some four dimensional geometry. How then is your tau different from normal proper time? Or, is that probably too complicated to get into? Maybe I should just go admire your theory rather than asking questions which continue to demonstrate my inability to comprehend :phones:

 

~modest

[Overdog]

...Well, perhaps it is but it certainly does not begin with any assumptions. Essentially, any epistemological construct must be based on some ontological basis. I merely take that ontological basis as an unknown and examine the implied constraints on a flaw free epistemological construct.

 

Well, is seems to me that the very act of seperating the ontological basis and the epistemological contructs into two distinct sets implicitly adopts an epistemological point of view that recognizes a dichotomy. Your mathematical construct then, is based on this philosophical point of view. While the mathematical construct may indeed be pristine and indisputable, the philosophical point of view which recognizes the dichotomy is not accepted by some other points of view.

 

Which gets me back to my original observation about the discussion being waged from different philosophical perspectives, seperated by an unbridgable paradigm shift in epistemology.

 

EDIT:

 

Oh, I forgot this part:

 

...They cannot do this without having some ontological basis so that epistemological construct includes the assumption of those ontological elements upon which it is based. Does that mean that “anything anyone says is an assumption?” I would certainly never put the issue that way.

 

I wouldn't put that way either if I were you.

[Overdog]

I will say this, Doctordick, it appears to me that your approach embraces objectivism, but leads you to conclusions that sound like some form of constructivism...

 

To me, that seems rather remarkable.

[AnssiH]

When solving a problem of special relativity you see how the present instant is a construct or confluence of things. It's an extrapolation of ideas - not so much something that's real in and of itself. I would think you'd agree with this :confused:

 

If you're looking for a way to disprove or maybe question relativity, this is not a good way to go about it. The present instant is completely unobservable. There is nothing conceptually that prevents two people from having different present instants - even if they are not spatially separated. It is easily implied by relativity that it is necessary for them to have different present instants.

 

As it's conceptually possible and impossible to disprove with observation - it's not a good way to attack the theory.

 

I'm not looking to disprove or attack relativity as far as its predictionwise validity goes, I think I've mentioned this a few times.

 

The reason I've brought up relative simultaneity was to make people (some who were not familiar with that concept), to think about it from the ontological perspective, and realize that there are many ways to view relativity. To realize that one of the most common views - Minkowski's static spacetime - can't be objectively defended as valid ontological interpretation.

 

Seems like a good way to make people think of that issue is to make them imagine what does the world look like around them before they see it, according to relativity. That forces you to think because it is not a straightforward issue.

 

Unfortunately that often gets interpreted as if I'm trying to point out a logical flaw in relativity. If you look at post #408 where I brought up relativistic simultaneity, you can see how I just comment on how it caused people to interpret relativity in terms of static spacetime, and how it is not really necessary to interpret things that way.

 

i.e. when I refer to the possibility of understanding reality in terms of absolute simultaneity, I am not advancing any new theory. I am just talking about a different way to plot/understand the exact same information.

 

And the point of all that was to relax some assumptions people almost always make in their mind regarding the relationship between ontological reality and the way they understand reality. To make people look at their worldviews in terms of defined entities, whose ontological existence is unknown (including spacetime). So that it would be easier to comprehend that there always exists many different ways to model/communicate the same raw data. And to prepare them better to understand what DD's analysis is about. To understand it can be valid even when it doesn't operate with the components that people believe reality is made of.

 

(And like I said before, even though DD's analysis does not explicitly give you any answers as to what is reality really like, it does show that many aspects that are usually thought of part of how the universe "just is", are in fact consequences of defining any sort of raw data in a specific way, implying strongly that we are talking about completely imaginary constructs. How much these constructs correspond to actual reality is unknown)

 

But, no, I don't think the average expert in relativity would tell you the present instant or a world line or the lorentz factor, or many other things that represent the method of solving a transformation are necessarily ontologically real.

 

Nor should they, because it would essentially be an assumption. At the back of their mind they probably make some interpretation, but they don't communicate it if they recognize many interpretations can be made, and they all include some very unintuitive aspects.

 

The reason I posted that is because it seems to me the debate is being waged from points of view which are seperated by an epistimological paradigm shift. Perhaps some insight into the philosophical underpinnings of the two perspectives would be helpful.

 

Well, we have probably once all been what's called "naive realist", i.e. we tacitly assume world is the way we perceive it. Slowly we come to realize it's not so simple. I suppose that's the first step for a constructivist. I guess the last step is to realize that "to discover something about reality" is to interpret something in some specific way.

 

I've talked with realists who strongly oppose my view, but when pushed agree that it may be possible that many valid models can always explain the raw data. But they still believe that hidden underneath is reality that really does consist of "fundamental parts", i.e. that one's worldview could perfectly co-incide with the way reality ontologically exists. (As oppose to just being one of all the possible "perfectly aligned representations" of the reality)

 

Even so, the problem remains that there's no way to tell. To me, such a belief is much like believing there exists particles that do not interact with any things we can observe. I.e. that there are universes that could never be detected. Rather moot belief if you ask me.

 

Furthermore, what makes that belief rather unreasonable from my perspective (albeit not impossible) is that it seems quite clear, that in order to predict anything, we have to conceive some features of reality as "same object" through time; i.e. to classify some data in terms of "objects" seems to be part of the model construction process. When people discuss "ontologically fundamental entities", I just always wonder "well who defined those things as "entities" before we did?"

 

That applies to our views on time (and space).

 

I think understanding DD's analysis would be easier for a constructivist. For example, note the exchange between Modest & DD about "past" and "future". I would like to re-iterate that DD is referring to that "undefined data" all the time. I should clarify this for the benefit of Modest too;

 

taken literally "the future is "what we do not know"" means anything we do not know is in our future.

It appears that you are asserting that there exists things in the past which you do not know, but that idea presumes that you understand reality.

 

I.e. we have thus far learned some amount of "raw data", and our worldview "explains it". That explanation fills in certain blanks (we assume certain things have happened because of how we conceive the world). Different explanations are obviously allowed to fill those blanks differently.

 

When you (modest) say there exists things in the past that you do not know, you are referring to things filled in by your worldview, but not things that exist in the raw data. Whatever you learn about past when you are sitting in a history lecture, is new raw data that is learned exactly there; while sitting in the history lesson. That you are capable of interpreting that data in the form of "account of something that happened in the past", is because you have that worldview which places the data as something referring to your past.

 

That is very important distinction when you want to analyze epistemological constructs objectively.

 

-Anssi

[Overdog]

....I think understanding DD's analysis would be easier for a constructivist.

 

Yes, I agree, and also someone extremely mathematically-minded. Although it is beyond my abilities to follow his logic in it's mathematical form, I think I am beginning to sense that if constructivism didn't exist, understanding his analysis might well force people into the kind of thinking that might ultimately lead to something like it. I don't know.

 

In my opinion, constructivist ideas have not penetrated nearly as deep into the physical sciences as they have in the social sciences. Perhaps there is a good reason for this.

[Little Bang]

Doesn't ontology sort of imply that consciousness has something to do with reality? Metaphysics seems like a lukewarm way to give meaning to the observed universe.