Solipsism, Berkeley, Impressions, Idealism-Realism Dispute Resolution

[cpu68]

(the author of the text comes from outside of Anglosaxon lingual area)

 

Cognition is not only structurally limited to sensations, but no subject can go beyond itself to convince not only that matter exists but even that there are other subjects. Solipsism thus understood seems impassable, assuming the existence of other subjects, we could also assume the existence of something beyond the experience, this is the strongest argument against Berkeley's theory, an argument from solipsism that is more consistent than Berkeley's. Such a solipsistic limitation of knowledge seems unbearable, and on this basis, since we accept the existence of subjects, we have the FULL RIGHT to accept the existence of beyond phenomenal reality.

However, one moment seems important here, although we cannot go beyond our own experiences, we can verify some facts based on other subjects, that there are, also data about reality; however, in the case of beyond phenomenal reality such verification is not possible. The existence of subjects seems to be confirmed by some verification possibilities, but the existence of beyond phenomenal reality is not confirmed by them; hence the presumption that it does not exist. The existence of other subjects can be verified and out of mind matter can not, this logical situation can lead to the rejection of the existence of matter. The statement - when I say that, I am lying, it is simply wrong, poorly formulated; no one has the right to say that. The same problems, idealism-realism, movement-immutability, eternal-finished and so on.
When someone is thinking about the essence of things, have only a.) sensory data b.) names, conclusion whether the sensory data relate to something beyond the mental or not, is antinomial and is one of those questions that is not answered for reasons essential. Whether the subject goes beyond itself, not - and yet we accept the existence of other subjects, in a similar way we can accept the existence of something outside the minds. The contradition idealism-realism resembles the subject-object antinomy, and in fact the question of whether there is something beyond this or that specific subject seems to exceed the capabilities of this or that particular subject, and yet we accept the existence of other subjects.
Asking the problem whether reality exists outside of minds or not seems to exceed the possibilities of minds, because they are not able to check what is beyond their borders. A single mind can only check what remains within it and cannot access what is beyond it; it is not wise to ask minds a question that they cannot solve; why such a question - this is an example of a paradox issue (somewhat similar to the liar's paradox), aporia from which there is no way out, as in the tic-tac-toe game, the same history of philosophy tends to understand that with good play on both sides (idealists and realists), gameplay MUST remain unresolved.
How to solve the paradox under consideration, is it possible to adopt a third position next to idealism and realism? Is it even possible to formulate such a position, for example in such a way that it combines the features of idealism and realism? It turns out that there is a theory that makes it possible to get out of this antinomy, and it was created in the ancient period. To solve the discussed aporia (and others) one can recall the theory of Gorgias whose main thesis is: nothing exists. So there is no mind and there is no matter, there is no movement and what is immutable, there is what is eternal and what is finished and so on. 

 

Gregory Podgorniak, Poland (2019)

 

whole text you can find here: http://studia.scienceontheweb.net/philosophy.php

Edited November 23, 2019 by cpu68