Understanding Stuff

[coberst]

Jehu

 

I would like to focus, for a moment, on the concept of ‘paradigm’.

 

I first read Kuhn’s book about 5 years ago. Since then I have reread it or portions of it many times. I have decided that ‘paradigm’ was a concept I had been looking for; not while I was looking but only after I had found it and had digested the matter somewhat.

 

This concept has clarified many things for me. It has allowed me to better comprehend my intellectual experiences. Two experiences might clarify what I mean.

 

I have been an autodidactic for 25 years. This experience has been very important for me. I have focused on what I call disinterested knowledge, knowledge without any apparent extrinsic value, knowledge I seek just because it interests me. Actually I have been seeking not just knowledge but understanding. I think that one seeks understanding only of disinterested knowledge because seldom is understanding necessary in our daily lives.

 

In these last two decades two domains of knowledge, sciences, have come to my attention and upon which I have focused a great deal of attention. CT (Critical Thinking) is one and ‘conceptual metaphor’, which is the ‘pre-paradigm’ for cognitive science (in my opinion), is the other.

 

I do not know if CT should be considered as a teaching paradigm or as a learning paradigm or perhaps as a thinking paradigm. I find the conceptual metaphor as a means to understand the world that philosophy failed to do for me.

[Jehu]

Jehu

 

I would like to focus, for a moment, on the concept of ‘paradigm’.

 

I first read Kuhn’s book about 5 years ago. Since then I have reread it or portions of it many times. I have decided that ‘paradigm’ was a concept I had been looking for; not while I was looking but only after I had found it and had digested the matter somewhat.

 

This concept has clarified many things for me. It has allowed me to better comprehend my intellectual experiences. Two experiences might clarify what I mean.

 

I have been an autodidactic for 25 years. This experience has been very important for me. I have focused on what I call disinterested knowledge, knowledge without any apparent extrinsic value, knowledge I seek just because it interests me. Actually I have been seeking not just knowledge but understanding. I think that one seeks understanding only of disinterested knowledge because seldom is understanding necessary in our daily lives.

 

In these last two decades two domains of knowledge, sciences, have come to my attention and upon which I have focused a great deal of attention. CT (Critical Thinking) is one and ‘conceptual metaphor’, which is the ‘pre-paradigm’ for cognitive science (in my opinion), is the other.

 

I do not know if CT should be considered as a teaching paradigm or as a learning paradigm or perhaps as a thinking paradigm. I find the conceptual metaphor as a means to understand the world that philosophy failed to do for me.

How is it that you feel Philosophy (love of knowledge) failed you, or do you simply mean that you have been unable to embrace any particular philosophy? Surely what we are engaged in here, delving into the nature of understanding, is itself a philosophical pursuit. Furthermore, why do you feel that you must settle for a “conceptual metaphor”, when the Truth itself remains to be found? I know that I ask a great deal of questions, but this is simply because I do not understand. You say that you seek an understanding of something, not because it has any utilitarian value, but because you are interested, but is this not a love of knowledge? I say, put aside you paradigms for a time, and let us do a little philosophizing together. You want to understand the “nature of understanding”, so let us begin by understanding what we mean when we say “the nature of a thing”. What do say?

 

Jehu

[coberst]

Jehu

 

First a comment about my disenchantment with philosophy; I admire the nature of philosophy greatly but I have not found a ‘philosophy’ that I admire greatly. I am disenchanted with academic philosophy because it is so isolated and removed from the world. I think I have a philosophical nature, I do not mean I have a philosophical talent but that I seek to “strike at the root”, which is what philosophy is all about, as you say.

 

I am with you; let us reason together about “the nature of a thing”.

 

I will let you start.

[Jehu]

Jehu

I am with you; let us reason together about “the nature of a thing”.

Very well, let us begin by first defining precisely what we mean by “the nature of a thing”, for if we are to have any hope of succeeding in our investigation, we must have a clear idea of what it is that we wish to discover. As we are engaged in a philosophical enquiry, I have taken the following definitions from the Oxford Dictionary, under the appropriate heading. Since it is not the function of the philosopher to redefine the meaning of a term, and given that these are the conventionally prescribed meanings of the terms, and I suggest that we hold to these meanings in defining “the nature of reality”.

 

By the term, “nature”, we mean, “that set of qualities or characteristics that are essential to a thing’s being perceived or thought about.”

 

By the term, “thing”, we mean, “any sort of mentation, sensation, object, property, or activity.”

 

By the term, “essential”, we mean, “that which is necessary and sufficient.”

 

Therefore, by the term, “the nature of a thing”, we mean, “that set of qualities and characteristics that are necessary and sufficient to anything’s being perceived or thought about.”

 

It’s not much, but it a beginning.

 

Jehu

[coberst]

Jehu

 

"Therefore, by the term, “the nature of a thing”, we mean, “that set of qualities and characteristics that are necessary and sufficient to anything’s being perceived or thought about.”"

 

OK—great—I am with you—please continue.

[Jehu]

Jehu

 

"Therefore, by the term, “the nature of a thing”, we mean, “that set of qualities and characteristics that are necessary and sufficient to anything’s being perceived or thought about.”"

 

OK—great—I am with you—please continue.

Very well, then lets us christen these essential qualities and characteristics the, “primitive elements of a thing”, for they are more fundamental than is any “thing”. Now, what can be deduced from our working definition of “the nature of a thing”?

 

Since the primitive elements that we are seeking are fundamental to all classes of things, it follows that the individual elements cannot themselves be things, and consequently, cannot be independently perceived or thought about. Neither can these primitive elements be defined in the way that we would customarily define a thing, that is, in terms of the number and types of subsidiary things that comprise it. Table salt, for instance, is defined in terms of the number of sodium and chlorine atoms that make up one of its molecules. In the case of the primitive elements, however, there can be no subsidiary things that might act as defining terms. Consequently, a primitive element may only be defined in terms of its relationship to the other primitive elements. Would you agree? If so, this raises an interesting problem. Since a primitive element cannot be independently perceived or thought about, we cannot denote it by a unique designation, as is the custom with all “things”. Nevertheless, if we are to be able to speak about an individual element, we will need to assign that element some sort of designation, even though no such element independently exists.

 

It is primarily for this reason, that the nature of a thing is so difficult to understand or to communicate, for we are accustomed to signifying everything by way of a distinctive label or name. Any suggestions? Comments?

 

Jehu

[DarkColoredLight]

"... our single planetary globe is mocked by worlds of different understanding."

Richard Weaver

 

Couldn't of said it better myself.

 

Carry on.

[coberst]

Jehu

 

Yes, I see what you mean.

 

I do not mean that I really ‘see’ what you mean I mean that I ‘know’ what you mean. I am using the metaphor “know is see”. If I understood what you mean I would be inclined to say “I grasp your meaning”; using the metaphor “understand is grasp”. Indicating, perhaps, that knowing like seeing is more easily accomplished than understanding, which is grasping and thus a more intimate and difficult activity.

 

Metaphor use is ubiquitous in life. It is so ubiquitous as to remain unseen, i.e. unknown.

 

The metaphor helps us comprehend ‘X’ by using ‘A’ to indicate that this new concept “X’ can be thought of as like ‘A’ in many ways. ‘Know is see’ tells that person, who does not comprehend ‘know’, that s/he can comprehend ‘know’ by recognizing that know has some similarity to ‘see’. See what I mean?

 

You say that “Since the primitive elements that we are seeking are fundamental to all classes of things”. My question is; how do we know such a thing. How do we know that all things have fundamental elements? How do we know that all things are a ‘kind of thing’ and that “all class of things” is made up of fundamental elements?

 

It seems to me that you started out with definitions and the definition of ‘definition’ is “a statement expressing the essential nature of something”. By starting with these definitions are we not creating a circular argument?

 

It seems to me that if we wish to get to the nature of things that we must go to the source. We must “strike at the root” and the root seems to me to be at the beginning. The root of the matter is in our “assumptions”.

 

Where comes these things that we “know” in the beginning? How do we ‘know’ that every thing is a kind of thing? Is there a metaphor that will enlighten me as to how this is known?

 

My puzzlement begins with such things as when Euclid stated his postulates at the beginning of proving his explanation of ‘Plain’ Geometry. What is the “source” of these postulates? Did he help us understand these postulates by giving us a metaphor to help “the medicine go down”?

 

How did Euclid know that “a straight line is the shortest distance between two points”. Did he use definitions to justify this knowledge?

[Jehu]

coberst

 

You ask some very difficult questions, and I am not entirely certain that I can answer them all satisfactorily, nevertheless, I will try to deal with what I see as the central question: how do we know anything for certain.

 

Let me begin by addressing the domain of the natural language. A language, as you are aware, is a system which uses public symbols to designate private concepts, and as such, is only useful if the symbols it employs are conventionally prescribed. By “conventionally prescribed” I mean that the users of the language, as a whole, must necessarily establish the correct meaning or association of each individual symbol within that system. This is reflected in the fact that in the compilation of a dictionary, such as the Oxford English Dictionary, lexicographers will examine thousands of different publications, catalogues, etc., comprising perhaps twenty million words or more, in order to ensure that the vocabulary employed is that of everyday usage. Hence, although it may be asserted that an individual user of a language may be erroneous in the meaning or association of a certain symbol, this same assertion cannot be made with respect to the users as a whole, for the “users as a whole” must necessarily be correct. This is why I said before, that it is not the function of a philosopher to redefine a term. It is the function of a philosopher, however, to make sense of a term’s various usages, which is what are attempting to do here. Therefore, to answer your question, “How do we know that all things have fundamental elements?”, it is because our everyday language tells us that it is so. Furthermore, if we do not accept this to be true, we will eliminate any possibility of further meaningful discourse, for we cannot then be certain of what we ourselves mean to say, let alone what another means.

 

With regard to the axioms and principles that are the founding principles of sciences such as physics and mathematics, these are, without exception, the product of inductive inference. We observe the world around us, and then, by inductive reasoning, infer that certain things are true. In physics, for example, we infer the existence of space, time, matter, energy, and motion, and although we cannot logically demonstrate their existence, we take them to be either “intuitive” or “self-evident”. These are, however, not a logical arguments, but a rhetorical ones. In fact, many philosophers question the validity of inductive reasoning altogether, for even if one’s substantiating premises are all true, an inductive inference may still turn out to be false. But this is a rabbit that we might want to chase at another time, if you would like.

 

Returning to our original enquiry, we were faced with the question of how to designate that which is not a thing per say, when our language has no provision for such an eventuality. What I think we will need to do, is to assign a surrogate designation to each primitive element. This “surrogate designation” is one that rightfully belongs to an actual thing, that is, something which exhibits those qualities that are most characteristic of the primitive element that it is to denote. However, having done this, it is imperative that we remember that these “surrogates” are not identical with the primitive elements that they stand-in for, but are merely communicatory proxies. In addition, we must also keep in mind, that although we speak of “individual elements”, there can be no actual separating out of one primitive element from the others, for that which would result would be nothing (not a thing). Consequently, only when all of the primitive elements are assembled, is there anything that might be perceived or thought about.

 

Jehu

[coberst]

Jehu

 

I am not engaged in a Cartesian search for certainty. In fact, I am certain that certainty is not obtainable!

 

I do, however, think that the work done by cognitive science in the last several decades has made it possible for us to develop an understanding of the forces that drove our first philosophers to the conclusions that they assembled. I think that our fore-fathers of philosophy did not have the technology we have today that will allow us to understand the source of their assumptions.

 

Linguists, neuroscientists, philosophers, mathematicians and perhaps others that I am not familiar with have used technology to open some new doors for exploration. I think that these new empirical determined facts have given cognitive science a possible first paradigm.

 

When written history began five thousand years ago humans had already developed a great deal of knowledge. Much of that knowledge was of a very practical nature such as how to use animal skins for clothing, how to weave wool, how to hunt and fish etc. A large part of human knowledge was directed toward how to kill and torture fellow humans. I guess things never really change all that much.

 

It is natural for humans to seek knowledge. In the “Metaphysics” Aristotle wrote “All men by nature desire to know”.

 

The attempt to seek knowledge presupposes that the world unfolds in a systematic pattern and that we can gain knowledge of that unfolding. Cognitive science identifies several ideas that seem to come naturally to us and labels such ideas as “Folk Theories”.

 

The Folk Theory of the Intelligibility of the World

The world makes systematic sense, and we can gain knowledge of it.

 

The Folk Theory of General Kinds

Every particular thing is a kind of thing.

 

The Folk Theory of Essences

Every entity has an “essence” or “nature,” that is, a collection of properties that makes it the kind of thing it is and that is the causal source of its natural behavior.

 

The consequences of the two theories of kinds and essences is:

 

The Foundational Assumption of Metaphysics

Kinds exist and are defined by essences.

 

We may not want our friends to know this fact but we are all metaphysicians. We, in fact, assume that things have a nature thereby we are led by the metaphysical impulse to seek knowledge at various levels of reality.

 

Cognitive science has uncovered these ideas they have labeled as Folk Theories. Such theories when compared to sophisticated philosophical theories are like comparing mountain music with classical music. Such theories seem to come naturally to human consciousness.

 

It is when we try to understand these theories that seem to come natural to us that we can, I think, spread a new base for better understanding the nature of rational wo/man.

 

“Therefore, to answer your question, “How do we know that all things have fundamental elements?”, it is because our everyday language tells us that it is so. Furthermore, if we do not accept this to be true, we will eliminate any possibility of further meaningful discourse,”

 

I suspect we face a common difficulty; we do not have a communicative rationality to help us. You, I assume, are using an Analytic Philosophy paradigm and I am using a cognitive science paradigm. We perhaps are faced with the inability to engage across the chasm of differing paradigms, which might “if we do not accept this to be true, we will eliminate any possibility of further meaningful discourse,”

 

The information comes primarily from “Philosophy in the Flesh” and http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/302/folkmeta.htm

[Jehu]

coberst

 

It is as you say, “we are all metaphysicians”, and so all have a worldview/paradigm which aids, or perhaps hinders, us in our attempt to interpret our cognitive experiences. Nevertheless, you and I agreed that we would put these aside, if only temporarily, so that we might see what comes of an enquiry that is unencumbered by such impediments. We also agreed that we would begin our enquiry by determining what was meant by the term, “the nature of a thing”, and to that end I began a deductive analysis of the term, and of its component terms. To carry out this analysis, I suggested that we must adhere strictly to the conventionally prescribed meanings (definitions) of all terms, and I provided (in my last post) a rationale for why I believe this to be necessary. The point of this analysis was to establish a precise language whereby you and I could communicate, while at the same time, gain a deeper understanding of the intuitive concepts that are embedded in our language.

 

I assure you that I am employing no paradigm (although I obviously hold one), but rather, I am determined to rely wholly upon our common faculty - deductive reasoning, and to go wherever that reasoning might lead. I mean no disrespect to you, or to the cognitive sciences, but I would rather discover the truth of a thing for myself, than to simply take the word of another, no matter how eminent they might be in their field of knowledge. As I said before, understanding is a kind of seeing, a “clear seeing”, and so must be unencumbered by any preconceived notions or theories.

 

Now, as it would pain me deeply to see our enquiry stall before it can bear any fruit, I would ask you whether the kind of deductive analytical approach I have adopted is acceptable to you, and if not, what then sort of approach would you suggest that we employ?

 

Jehu

[coberst]

Jehu

 

“The nature of a thing” as you framed the matter is our quest. We seek to understand “the nature of a thing”. Great, this is a beginning.

 

Added to that beginning we continue with your statement “I would rather discover the truth of a thing for myself, than to simply take the word of another, no matter how eminent they might be in their field of knowledge. As I said before, understanding is a kind of seeing, a “clear seeing”, and so must be unencumbered by any preconceived notions or theories.”

 

It seems to me that there are three forms of reasoning “deductive, inductive, and dialectic (discussion and reasoning by dialogue as a means of intellectual investigation). We have reached this beginning by dialectic reasoning.

 

You have suggested that we proceed with a definition as a platform for continuing. I argue that in accepting the definition as a beginning we are missing an opportunity to ‘really’ discover the nature of a thing. I would like to look behind the curtain of this definition in the hope that we may utilize our technology as a means to ‘see’ beyond this definition.

 

The definition of ‘definition’ I guess comes from Aristotle. The definition of a thing lays bare the essence of a thing. It lays bare the necessary and sufficient conditions of a thing.

 

Our pre-Socratics and Socratics developed their understanding of philosophy based upon their ‘intuition’ developed assumptions. They hadn’t the means to examine these assumptions but we have the technology and I would like to examine those assumptions prior to accepting these assumptions intuited three thousand years ago.

 

I suggest a “back to the future” technique where we take our technology with us to lay bare the intuition of our fore-philosophers. In this way I think we can better “discover the truth of a thing for myself, than to simply take the word of another, no matter how eminent they might be in their field of knowledge. As I said before, understanding is a kind of seeing, a “clear seeing”, and so must be unencumbered by any preconceived notions or theories.”

 

To the two statements in bold I would like to add ‘in an effort to see clearly, unencumbered by preconceived notions, we will examine the assumptions of our fore-fathers of philosophy’.

[Jehu]

Coberst,

 

First let me address your statement, “It seems to me that there are three forms of reasoning “deductive, inductive, and dialectic (discussion and reasoning by dialogue as a means of intellectual investigation). We have reached this beginning by dialectic reasoning.” I would have to disagree that “dialectic” is a “form of reasoning”, but rather that it is a form of philosophical investigation, through logical disputation or argument, such as we are engaged in presently. Our investigation, however, must be based upon deductive or inductive reasoning, or some combination of the two.

 

Now, I have expressed my own preference for a deductive approach, while you seem to favour and inductive path, and so there we are, stalled. When we first began own discussion, you rightfully stated that. “If “reasoning together” requires the ability to communicate understanding in a fairly precise manner then I would judge that our self destruction is just a matter of time ….” Well, if you and I are to communicate in a “fairly precise manner”, we must develop a vocabulary that is free of obscurity. How, you might ask, are we to do this, given that our definitions may or may not be based upon assumptions. Let me state my position by the following analogy. If I am on a patrol, and my squad leader give the hand signal to take up a particular defensive position, how do I know what is meant by that signal? I know what the signal means because we have trained together, so that whenever he uses this particular signal, I know that I am to adopt a prone position and defend a certain arc of the perimeter. Now, if you are the squad leader, and I take the appropriate action in response to your hand signal, them you have no doubt that I understand. But how are you and I to develop the kind of precise vocabulary necessary to leave no doubt as to what the other means by a given term, if we do not, together, delve into the full meaning (definition) of each term? However, this does not mean that we must necessarily believe what a definition asserts, but we must analyze and logically examine each with a critical eye, and perhaps then we will know the truth of it.

 

I’m am very eager to hear about your “back to the future approach”, and to know how you think that our technologies may aid us in such a philosophical investigation, but whatever approach we may decide to take, do you not think that it is vital that we speak a common language?

 

Jehu

[coberst]

Jehu

 

You are correct regarding ‘dialectic’. It is not a mode of reasoning but a mode of investigation.

 

I also agree that we need to use a precise vocabulary that is understood by both of us.

 

Let us continue!

[Jehu]

Coberst

 

Excellent! I am most pleased that we have overcome this first obstacle, although I am certain there will be more to come, in any event, I am now confident that we will be able to deal with those, should they arise. Returning to our enquiry, what more can we deduce from the definition of “the nature of a thing”?

 

As we have already established that a thing may only be perceived or thought about when all of the primitive elements are assembled, it follows that these elements are somehow existentially bound together by the very thing that they constitute. Consequently, there must necessarily be some law or principle whereby these primitive elements are unified. Such a law or principle is what is traditionally called a, “first principle”, however, given that the elements of which we speak must necessarily underlie all things (i.e., all domains of reality), we can rightfully call the relationship that binds them together the “Ultimate Principle”.

 

Thus, in addition to identifying the primitive elements whereby all things are perceived or thought about, we must also identify that law or ultimate principle whereby those primitive elements are bound together in a thing.

 

Would you agree with this deduction?

 

Jehu

[coberst]

Jehu

 

Sounds very Aristotelian, I am sure he would be pleased.

 

Lets have at it.

[Jehu]

Coberst

 

Very well, but I warn you, Aristotle may not fare well by our enquiry.

 

Before we begin to search out these primitive elements and the principle that binds them, there is one more aspect of our definition that we must examine. It is especially important that we recognize the subtle distinction implied in our working definition, between a thing’s being perceived and its being thought about. To be perceived, requires only that a thing enter into one’s field of cognitive awareness, that is, that one becomes aware of the thing’s presence in one or more sensory fields. To be thought about, on the other hand, requires only that a thing enter into one’s field of cognitive knowledge, that is, that one knows or recognizes what a thing is. It follows then, that one must be able perceive a thing without necessarily thinking about it, and that one must be able to think about a thing without necessarily perceiving it, and this is born out by our own experience. From this, it follows that the elements that give rise to the perception of a thing must necessarily be distinct from the elements that give rise to its being thought about, else the one could not occur without the other. What’s more, those elements that give rise to thinking about a thing must necessarily have their origin in the interpretive mental processes of the thinker, while the origin of those elements that give rise to perception must necessarily be independent of those interpretive mental processes. Consequently, the fundamental elements of a thing may be divide into two discrete sub-sets, (1) those that are necessary and sufficient to a thing’s being perceived, and (2) those that are necessary and sufficient to a thing’s being thought about.

 

Now, if we are in agreement thus far, I would like to turn now to the analze the term “matter”, for as it is held that only material things may be perceived, I feel that this is the most likely place to encounter the primitive elements of perception. But before we proceed, please tell me what do you think? Are we beginning to understand what is meant by the term “the nature of a thing”? Are we beginning to understand what it means to understand something? Are we really creating anything new? I don’t know the answer to any of these, but I do wonder at times, if I am merely building castles in the air.

 

Jehu