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Deriving a statement's scientificness from its claim structure


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Posted

TITLE: Deriving a statement's scientificness from its claim structure

OBJECTIVE: To make a clear demarcation on what is a falsifiable or unfalsifiable claim.

 

Types of claims (in increasing order of objectivity).

  • FEELING: When the only elements of an "explanation" are states in attempt to explain a state, such an explanation is not subjectable to scientific or otherwise academic scrutiny, whether the statement is true or false.
     
    • Examples:
    • "I feel sick" because "it's wet outside".
    • "That person is cool" because "they look cool in those jeans".
    • "It's hot" because "it's very nice".

     

    [*]OPINION: When the only elements of an "explanation" are event(s) in attempt to explain a state, such an explanation is subjectable to academic scrutiny, but not scientific scrutiny, whether the statement is true or false.

     

    • Examples:
    • "I feel sick" because "I inhaled too much rain".
    • "That person is cool" because "they've said nice things to me".
    • "It's hot" because "our team won the game".

     

    [*]JUSTIFYING: When the only elements of an "explanation" are states in attempt to explain an event, such an explanation is subjectable to academic and scientific scrutiny whether the statement is true or false. But either the explanations begs question about the state itself, or it is tautological fact. Such statements are not falsifiable given the limited context.

     

    • Examples:
    • "My temperature is rising" because "I have a cold".
    • "They've said nice things" because "they are nice people".
    • "That person helped us win the game" because "her strategy was excellent".

     

    [*]REVEALING: When the only elements of an "explanation" are event(s) in attempt to explain an event, such an explanation is subjectable to academic and scientific scrutiny whether the statement is true or false. It is possible for this form not to beg the question, in light of explanations of the causal events, and the only tautologies that are allowed in this form are explicit, rather than implicit.

     

    • Examples:
    • "My temperature is rising" because "I have caught flames on my sweater".
    • "They've said nice things" because "they learn from other people who have said nice things to them".
    • "That person helped us win the game" because "she scored the only points we needed to win".

Posted

I would like further explination of the hypothesis and theory before I make coment about it.

 

Do you think you could structure your claim in this purposed structural form? Could analyze your form with your form?

Posted

Kmarinas’s list reminds me of several “baloney detection kits” – guidelines to alert a reader to exercise additional skepticism toward. Though hers seem sensible, I think Sagan’s are catchier – he had a knack for popularizing which, no disrespect intended, I don’t think kmarinas has attained yet. :sherlock:

 

I’ve a few of specific criticisms

  • Many of the statements are assertions of specific events. Specific events can’t be reproduced, making them difficult to examine scientifically.
  • Even very subjective statements can be examined scientifically. Although the statement “I feel bad” is subjective, the statement “Alice self reports ‘I feel bad’” is objective.
  • Although post #1’s title is “Deriving a statement's scientificness from its claim structure”, all of its example claims have the same structure: “A because B”. A better title seems needed.

Posted
Kmarinas’s list reminds me of several “baloney detection kits” – guidelines to alert a reader to exercise additional skepticism toward. Though hers seem sensible, I think Sagan’s are catchier – he had a knack for popularizing which, no disrespect intended, I don’t think kmarinas has attained yet. :D

 

I’ve a few of specific criticisms

[*]Many of the statements are assertions of specific events. Specific events can’t be reproduced, making them difficult to examine scientifically.

 

But not impossible to examine scientifically :read:. In correspondence with any specific event, the analysts reason from the static evidence that exists (records, videos, journals, diaries, etc.) and uses those states as justification for the specific event. Even as an examination, this is not a revealing (or an opening of the "grand curtains"), since that which "exists" (i.e. states) as of now is used to deduce the past event. The results (scientific retrodiction) in such cases are typically conservative, but are still the result of examination of the states of remnants (which are "linked" to the events). This is justification. A specific "OZ" behind the specific event is not actually shown to exist. This is why aliens are not proved to exist despite the claimed overwhelmingly extreme capabilities observed in a minority of alleged UFO sightings. Therefore, we can only explain specific events using theories. Specific events of the past are proposed by scientists (e.g. Big Bang), but these often leave philosophers with open-ended questions (e.g. "What caused the Big Bang?"), which is due to the nature of specific events in general.

 

In the case for the fourth category listed (revealing claims), where the logic is "Event A because of event B" event B may be a specific event, whereas A is an event that is thought to occur as a result of instances of events like specific event B. In this case, B is harder to examine than A, and can only be justified if explained, whereas A may be revealed if explained.

 

If B is a specific event, while A is not (but still an event depending on events like :sherlock:, then the "revelation" made by linking A with B rests upon a justification. If the justification supporting the occurence of specific event B is held, then the reason for A (i.e. A because of :) is thought to be revealed. But B is not untarnishably revealed as long as it remains a specific event.

 

[*]Even very subjective statements can be examined scientifically. Although the statement “I feel bad” is subjective, the statement “Alice self reports ‘I feel bad’” is objective.

 

Notice that the act of "reporting" happens and is an event (in doing). The phrase "I feel bad" is a statement of feeling (every kind of feeling is a state or being).

 

Alice's claim about feeling bad is not another person's claim that Alice reported that she feels bad. That Alice reported that she feels bad does not imply that she does feel bad. Alice could be lying about her feelings. Though we could, by applying sympathy, establish that she is feeling bad simply by hearing her words "I feel bad", the conclusion in this case is a product of our opinion.

 

Likewise, that she feels bad does not imply that she reported it. If the statements you gave were "Alice feels bad" and “Alice self reports ‘I feel bad’” we know which is more verifiable. If you claim that I am happy, it is a less verifiable claim than the claim that I reported that I am (i.e. was) happy :Happy: .

 

If the objective claim could be deduced from the subjective claim then truth of the subjective claim would have to imply truth of the objective claim. However, the examination of the objective claim (considered here) depends on the examination of the alleged utterance of the subjective claim, not on examination of the allegations of the subjective claim itself.

 

You have not shown that subjective claims (claims which allege states) can be investigated scientifically by reference to an equivalent objective claim (claims which allege events). There is no objective claim which follows from the subjective claim "I feel bad". A subjective claim does not reference its own expression.

 

[*]Although post #1’s title is “Deriving a statement's scientificness from its claim structure”, all of its example claims have the same structure: “A because B”. A better title seems needed.

 

If by structure you mean the use of "because" and not whether A or B is an event or state, then your point is taken.

Posted

My question is (and yes I know this is a science website) why does it matter if a claim is scientific or not?

 

I think that there are many types of unscientific claims that are much more valuable for certain things than any scientific claims.

 

For instance, if I said that "People feel hungry when they haven't eaten", everyone on earth can look at how they themselves feel when they haven't eaten to try and determine if they agree with the claim. They cannot tell if other people become hungry when they do not eat, but they can listen to other people's reports about themselves as evidence regarding whether or not those other people feel hungry when they do not eat.

 

Or the claim can simply be altered such that it only applies to whoever reads it. As in, if you feel hungry when you eat, then: ...and then go on to make some logical deduction based on the premise that you feel hungry when you haven't eaten. For instance I could say "then you are like the writer in that respect" or "then you are driven to eat when you haven't eaten (if that is a definition of being hungry)"

 

These are unscientific claims because only first person experience can be used to evaluate the claim. However they allow people to know and understand things that science cannot tell them, or at least it allows people to understand some things in a more direct manner than science could allow. What is signifigant about the fact that these claims are unscientific?

Posted

I find that thought intriguing Krim. The statement people feel hungry when they haven't eaten is an objective statement. It can be scientifically tested.

1) bring in 100 subjects.

2) Feed 50 of them whatever they feel like eating whenever they feel like eating.

3) Take the remaining 50 and deny them food for a suitable length of time (say 24 hours).

4) At the end of the 24 hours, and after the first 50 have had a meal, ask them to take a survey stating in their own words how they feel.

 

Some will report that they feel very hungry, others simply hungry, and a few might even state that they don't feel hungry at all. Compare responses to data stating when they had last eaten and the quantity they had eaten, etc.

 

This is a scientifically verifiable statement.

Other statements such as I feel sick might also be scientifically verifiable through all kinds of medical studies, such as brain wave analysis or ct type scans that show brain activity.

Posted
My question is (and yes I know this is a science website) why does it matter if a claim is scientific or not?

 

I think that there are many types of unscientific claims that are much more valuable for certain things than any scientific claims.

 

For instance, if I said that "People feel hungry when they haven't eaten", everyone on earth can look at how they themselves feel when they haven't eaten to try and determine if they agree with the claim. They cannot tell if other people become hungry when they do not eat, but they can listen to other people's reports about themselves as evidence regarding whether or not those other people feel hungry when they do not eat.

 

Or the claim can simply be altered such that it only applies to whoever reads it. As in, if you feel hungry when you eat, then: ...and then go on to make some logical deduction based on the premise that you feel hungry when you haven't eaten. For instance I could say "then you are like the writer in that respect" or "then you are driven to eat when you haven't eaten (if that is a definition of being hungry)"

 

These are unscientific claims because only first person experience can be used to evaluate the claim. However they allow people to know and understand things that science cannot tell them, or at least it allows people to understand some things in a more direct manner than science could allow. What is signifigant about the fact that these claims are unscientific?

 

Feeling is important for observation of states. This is where the feelings, or qualia, imply the states. The sound of the word "red" (which is a response) or the appearance of mention of the word red (which is a reponse) implies (a stimulus).

 

With feelings, form leads to form. All is form when it comes to feelings.

 

Opinion is important for operational definitions. This is where the function is a stimulus and the response is form. Therefore a state is implied by an event. This is also the basis for Heterophenomenology. Operational definitions are not falsifiable, as long as it is assumed that feelings cannot have precedence before them:

 

Opinion

"The pain of a horse is measured by its stride. This horse is in pain, because the stride of the horse shows what can be thought of as a sign of pain."

 

Feeling (that counters this opinion).

"The pain of a horse is not measured by its stride. The stride of the horse does not show what can be thought of as a sign of pain, because it does not allows us to know if the horse is in pain."

 

With opinions, function leads to form. It is the basis for making operational definitions and induction (e.g. "this exists and is the way it is" because of "those events") and the basis for nurture as precedent for nature.

 

In the post-structuralist view, operational definitions are seen to have been influenced by culture, as these operational definitions determine the states and therefore the structure of a system which by the structuralists reasons from to imply function. Varying operational definitions will lead to different stuctures interpreted influencing the outcome of the "function which follows form" as interpreted by the structuralists. According to the post-structuralists, the syntheses and justifications of structuralists are therefore mounted on top of operational definitions founded by the opinions of the culture.

 

Justification is important for syntheses. This is where the function is a response and the stimulus consists of form(s), so that the function is defined in terms of the forms. This is case with music, in which the melody is determined by the notes and their timing. This is also the case with testing chemical theory where the chemical reaction depends on the molecules present, the temperature, pressure, and other values measured via operational definitions. It is also the case in Newton mechanics, where the path of an object is determined by physical law, which is operationally defined. In science, the foundation for justifications are operational definitions, and outside science, they are not. As long as feelings do not oppose the reasons for the justification (i.e. the states which imply the transformation of states), then the justification is not falsifiable.

 

With justification, synthesis of forms at the same time leads to function. It is one of the bases for stereotypes (e.g. "that happened" because of "skin color, intelligence, height, natural law, whatever") (the other is feeling). Justification also is used for explaining emergence (e.g. the whole did this because of its parts), and the basis for nature as precedent for nuture. Functionalists and structuralists use justification to make for explanations.

 

Revealing statements is important for explaining viscious and virtuous circles. This is where a function is implied by the previous presence of a function (whether it is the same function or a different function).

 

With revelations, functions lead to other functions. It is the basis for business and macroeconomics and required for any well developed singular holistic theory with no logically possible competing theories. The largest chapter of practical thought arises from these kinds of statements. With revelations, both the stimulus and response are events (in doing).

 

What is the difference between an event and state?

 

An event is rather fluxing relative to the state to which is compared. To generalize, events have a higher frequency (shorter temporal interval of change) than a state. We may say that we are happy, but that too changes. If we are happy for 1 year, that is state, but if we have manic-depressive episodes, that is more fluxing and more easily parsed into events. The greater discrepancy between the time interval of the cause and the time interval of the effect, the more one is subjected to opinion in justification. The way out is to have effects that last just as long as their causes, where a state explains another state or where an event explains another event.

 

Under this definition of "Re: Deriving a statement's scientificness from its claim structure", it appears that business and economics surpass the sciences and philosophies in terms of objectivity, where subjectivity and opinion are almost non-existent in business. In sciences and philosophy subjectivity and opinion are common (more so in philosophy). Everyday personal life is as subjective as it can get. More subjectivity means more leads to more questioning of opposing subjectivities. Even so, there are observations in science, philosophy, and everyday life that focus on vicious circles: (you get what you pay for) (what goes up must come down). There is a virtue associated with observations like these. It's called patience. Often, what seems to be states actually appear to change with time, making the succession of these states events. The events can be explained by other events which happen around it at the time of transformations. The events are like waves in an ocean and are manipulated among many surfaces.

 

In the end, it is probably due to a sort of vicious circle that leads to the many different levels of scientificness and objectivity in different statements. Sometime the cause is better known than the effect, and vice versa. Sometimes the cause is equally known as the effect. In businesses and institutitions such as universities, that is the case, and explain why they have somewhat consevative principles of operation, though innovation may come within as well since business and sciences are interdependent.

 

The last sentence is a justification according to the standards of the opening post :partyballoons:.

Posted
I find that thought intriguing Krim. The statement people feel hungry when they haven't eaten is an objective statement. It can be scientifically tested.

1) bring in 100 subjects.

2) Feed 50 of them whatever they feel like eating whenever they feel like eating.

3) Take the remaining 50 and deny them food for a suitable length of time (say 24 hours).

4) At the end of the 24 hours, and after the first 50 have had a meal, ask them to take a survey stating in their own words how they feel.

 

Some will report that they feel very hungry, others simply hungry, and a few might even state that they don't feel hungry at all. Compare responses to data stating when they had last eaten and the quantity they had eaten, etc.

 

This is a scientifically verifiable statement.

Other statements such as I feel sick might also be scientifically verifiable through all kinds of medical studies, such as brain wave analysis or ct type scans that show brain activity.

 

edit: See Kriminal99's next post :partyballoons: .

Posted
I find that thought intriguing Krim. The statement people feel hungry when they haven't eaten is an objective statement. It can be scientifically tested.

1) bring in 100 subjects.

2) Feed 50 of them whatever they feel like eating whenever they feel like eating.

3) Take the remaining 50 and deny them food for a suitable length of time (say 24 hours).

4) At the end of the 24 hours, and after the first 50 have had a meal, ask them to take a survey stating in their own words how they feel.

 

Some will report that they feel very hungry, others simply hungry, and a few might even state that they don't feel hungry at all. Compare responses to data stating when they had last eaten and the quantity they had eaten, etc.

 

This is a scientifically verifiable statement.

Other statements such as I feel sick might also be scientifically verifiable through all kinds of medical studies, such as brain wave analysis or ct type scans that show brain activity.

 

What you would be verifying in that case is how the people report that they feel, not what the people are actually feeling.

 

Some feelings of consiousness we believe we have discovered physical correlates to, but of course one might ask the question how anyone could claim to refute something based on such evidence. If someone told you that you were experiencing something different than you what you were experiencing based on some physical readings they had, you would tell them they have no clue what they were talking about because you know what you are feeling. You would determine that the physical understanding was somehow lacking. This demonstrates that knowledge based on first person experience is priveleged as compared to physical correlates. IMO this means it is foolish to investigate such matters using physical experiments.

Posted

I wasn't convinced of it at first... but now I'm sure.

 

The Linking Verb

 

Action verbs denote events ... ALWAYS

 

Linking verbs denote states ... ALWAYS

 

One can test for a linking verb by replacing it with the word is, are, was, etc (i.e. known linkin verbs).

 

Linking verbs denote correlation without denoting causality.

 

A statement with event following event uses action verbs in both "before" and "after" clauses. Via modus tollens, every "revelation" is associated with a feeling.

 

Revelation: "The tide rises and falls, because the moon pulls on its water at variance."

Feeling: "The tide does not rise or fall, therefore the moon does not pull tidally on its water at variance".

 

But in fact, both statements cannot be true at the same time - they are existentially opposite. So the feeling is not implied by the revelation. Associated, yet not implied. Let's see what happens for opinion and justification.

 

Opinion: "It was an accident, because I didn't mean it to happen."

Justification: "I didn't mean it to happen, because it was an accident."

 

In this case, we did not have to turn the positives into negatives as we did last time to turn events into states. All we had to do is to reverse the causality. Undersome some meanings of justification, the opinion is a justification, in so much as to lack any guarantee of acceptance by those hearing it. That's why they are opinions/justifications/whatever.

 

Feel free to rate the following sentences:

 

Feeling: "The tide does not rise or fall, therefore the moon does not pull tidally on its water at variance".

Opinion: "It was an accident, because I didn't mean it to happen."

Justification: "I didn't mean it to happen, because it was an accident."

Revelation: "The tide rises and falls, because the moon pulls on its water at variance."

Posted

Not necessarily sold on that Krim.

 

Psychologists are constantly probing the brain. They believe they can find the areas of the brain that cause feelings. They have already identified several pleasure centers and probably dozens or hundreds more. Thus they can do scans of that persons brain when they report feelings and measure them on the scan. If someone claims to feel hungry and it isn't verified on the scan, that does not mean that the person isn't correctly identifying hunger. It simply means more data needs to be collected. Perhaps that person's brain is wired differently due to some natural or nurtural occurence in their life. However, to say that their statment can't be tested and attempted to be verified means that we can never know. That would be a conclusion based off of facts not in evidence (since you can't know the future, or its totality.)

Posted
Not necessarily sold on that Krim.

 

Psychologists are constantly probing the brain. They believe they can find the areas of the brain that cause feelings. They have already identified several pleasure centers and probably dozens or hundreds more. Thus they can do scans of that persons brain when they report feelings and measure them on the scan. If someone claims to feel hungry and it isn't verified on the scan, that does not mean that the person isn't correctly identifying hunger. It simply means more data needs to be collected. Perhaps that person's brain is wired differently due to some natural or nurtural occurence in their life. However, to say that their statment can't be tested and attempted to be verified means that we can never know. That would be a conclusion based off of facts not in evidence (since you can't know the future, or its totality.)

 

What is needed is a operational definition that is hunger relevant. We may consider this:

 

Hunger

 

Hunger is a feeling experienced when the glycogen level of the liver falls below a threshold, usually followed by a desire to eat. The usually unpleasant feeling originates in the hypothalamus and is released through receptors in the liver. An average nourished human can survive about 50 days without food intake. Hunger can also be applied metaphorically to cravings of other sorts.

 

Hunger is mediated by several molecular signaling pathways in mammals. Hormones known to affect hunger include ghrelin, leptin, and Peptide YY3-36 [1].

 

"The dog ate breakfast, because his glycogen levels fell."

Posted

Very good. Therefore one can say I feel hungry and that feeling can be measured by glycogen levels.

 

I do agree though that something is missing. How do we actually measure the level they feel? It is completely subjective. All you can do is ask them to give you a measurement on a scale and compare it to their glycogen level. Does that mean that the statement is not scientific? I wouldn't say so. The statement is just harder to measure and subject to many more variables than one would like.

 

Of course, context is a major part of this. Some people say I'm hungry, others say I'm very hungry. Their glycogen levels may be the same, but their wording is definitely different. How do we get around this obstacle?

Posted
Very good. Therefore one can say I feel hungry and that feeling can be measured by glycogen levels.

 

I do agree though that something is missing. How do we actually measure the level they feel? It is completely subjective. All you can do is ask them to give you a measurement on a scale and compare it to their glycogen level. Does that mean that the statement is not scientific? I wouldn't say so. The statement is just harder to measure and subject to many more variables than one would like.

 

Of course, context is a major part of this. Some people say I'm hungry, others say I'm very hungry. Their glycogen levels may be the same, but their wording is definitely different. How do we get around this obstacle?

 

Here's a test.

 

Have them drink as much water as they want.

 

Tell them that they are going to go to bed after a buffet.

 

Have a diverse buffet.

 

This will make sure:

They are similarly satisified of water so that thirst is not easily confused for hunger.

Their interpretation of their hunger is not based on different plans for the day, because there will be no other plans but sleeping.

Posted
Not necessarily sold on that Krim.

 

Psychologists are constantly probing the brain. They believe they can find the areas of the brain that cause feelings. They have already identified several pleasure centers and probably dozens or hundreds more. Thus they can do scans of that persons brain when they report feelings and measure them on the scan. If someone claims to feel hungry and it isn't verified on the scan, that does not mean that the person isn't correctly identifying hunger. It simply means more data needs to be collected. Perhaps that person's brain is wired differently due to some natural or nurtural occurence in their life. However, to say that their statment can't be tested and attempted to be verified means that we can never know. That would be a conclusion based off of facts not in evidence (since you can't know the future, or its totality.)

 

No external measuring of qualia - only their proposed correlates

 

Unless a psychologist can use an implement that allows the person using the implement to take over the person's body and feel what they would be feeling it is not the same. Simply seeing a needle on a graph go up that you think represents emotion or something is not going to ever prove that a person is experiencing an emotion. Only that person can really ever know.

 

How testing for correlates may fail

 

I suppose if you had tons of people tested and report what emotion they were experiencing and compared it with the "needle" then eventually you might develop the belief that you had discovered a physical correlate to the emotion.

 

However without a comprehensive understanding of how the mind worked you could never be that sure of it. Maybe the emotion and the proposed physical correlate only usually occur simultaneously, but you couldn't know that because for instance you couldn't test a situation where they weren't without endagering the subject. Thus your sample was not randomly sampled from that which you might attempt to make predictions for. IE there might be states in which that physical sign did not occur simultaneously with the emotion and you did not see that because you would never purposely initiate that state. It could be that it was not correlated with the emotion in some people and you just didn't test any of those people. ETC.

 

Inverted spectrum paraodxes still hold

 

Other possibilities involve paradoxes similar to the "inverted spectrum" paradox, which I find signifigant because I have had contact with a well known figure and been read arguments by other well known figures in the theory of mind academic community that demonstrated a clear lack of understanding of the paradox. The inverted spectrum paradox speculates that 2 people could see the spectral opposite of each color whenever they look at the same thing, and noone would ever know the difference - Whenever one person would say green the inverted person would think of/see/etc the spectral opposite of what the first person was talking about so no disagreement would ever occur.

 

The aforementioned well known figures proclaimed that this paradox was disproven because we were now capable of seeing that emotional centers related to a feeling of coolness were triggered when a person saw blue for example. If you actually understand the paradox, then the obvious response to such a claim is that for an inverted spectrum subject the spectral opposite of blue would be attributed the associated feeling of coolness. Perhaps learned by interacting with water which he would have seen as the spectral opposite of blue.

 

No such thing as a competent judge or authority on the subject

 

The purpose of mentioning this here is to show that interpreting experimental results with 100% accuracy is outside anyone's or any group's ability therefore noone should be deemed "an authority on the subject" such that their conclusions are accepted without question. I am sure many advocates of science would simply attempt to sweep such examples under the carpet and suggest that people trust the claims of scientists and not think for themselves about such issues.

 

I disagree - I think that instead psychologists should simply be presenting their experimental results in the most objective form possible, and not in private langugage, and keep their conclusions completely seperate. If an outside party disagreed with the findings of a psychologist it may be because they realize something said pyschologist failed to consider. Therefore no scientist should ever disregard such disagreement.

 

Heresay is inferior to personal experience

 

And even if this system was followed science could never compete with a well reasoned belief set that allowed someone to organize and reason using their own experience to come to the same conclusions.

 

In summary it is important to realize that first person experiences are what REALLY matter, and that any physical correlates are only signifigant to the degree that they allow you to understand what someone else's first person experience might be. And furthermore, that it is probably very easy for things to get lost in the translation.

 

@Kmarinas - Is low glycogen congruent with motivation to eat?

 

I don't mean to be avoiding your posts but I have trouble deciphering what you are trying to say sometimes. But here is something I clearly understand:

 

"The dog ate breakfast, because his glycogen levels fell."

 

You can probably guess what my response to this would be: If the dog doesn't FEEL hunger when his glycogen levels fall he won't go eat. In this claim is only useful to the degree that the dog feeling hunger and having low glycogen levels are correlated. If nothing else the fact that they are 2 different things usually suggest that it is theoretically possible for one to occur without the other. And as such altering language to treat them as though they are one and the same is a recipe for confusion.

 

Assuming equivalence makes us less capable

 

If we wanted to create a situation where a dog did not eat when his glycogen levels were low, or a situation where the dog did eat when they were not, we would not be able to do it due to our lack of ability to differentiate the feeling of hunger (or a dog's motivation to eat from an external perspective) and low glycogen levels. Whereas someone who did not define them as equivalent WOULD be able to do so. And so our approach would be less competitive and less capable.

 

Of course you can claim that we have no access to a dog's feelings therefore we must rely on measuring external indicators. But I think that all evidence (not scientific evidence) points to the fact that dogs feel things just like we do - or rather just suggests that a dog's motivation to eat can be seperated from his glycogen levels.

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